The case Lebron v. Wilkins concerns a challenge to Florida Statute Section 414.0652, which mandates suspicionless drug testing for applicants seeking Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) benefits. Plaintiff Luis Lebrón, who applied for these benefits to support his child, refused the test on Fourth Amendment grounds, claiming it constituted an unreasonable search without individualized suspicion. The court granted a preliminary injunction preventing enforcement of the statute against the plaintiff, finding that the mandatory testing likely violates constitutional protections against unreasonable searches as established in relevant Supreme Court precedents. The court denied class certification without prejudice based on the state's agreement not to enforce the law against similarly situated individuals pending full resolution. The reasoning centered on the lack of a special need justifying suspicionless testing in this welfare context, distinguishing it from permissible categories of such searches.
The United States sued Edward Sumpolec, who sold radiant barriers and liquid coatings through his business Energy Conservation Specialists, for violating the Federal Trade Commission Act and the R-value Rule through deceptive advertising claims about product effectiveness and energy savings. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment on liability, finding that the defendant made unsubstantiated R-value and energy savings claims in online ads, failed to provide required fact sheets or disclosures, and did not retain supporting records for three years. These conclusions rested on undisputed facts from the complaint, deposition testimony, and advertisements, as the defendant filed no response to the motion and presented no contrary evidence. The ruling addressed all five counts but left determination of civil penalties for a later proceeding.
This case involved an insurance coverage dispute in which an accounting firm and one of its partners sued their professional liability insurer after it refused to defend or indemnify them against a malpractice claim brought by longtime clients regarding allegedly negligent tax work. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer on cross-motions, holding that no coverage existed under either the 2005-2006 claims-made policy or the renewed 2006-2007 policy. The reasoning was that the firm failed to timely report the matter during the first policy period and that, prior to the second policy's inception, the insureds had a reasonable basis to believe the clients' complaints might give rise to a claim, triggering the policy's prior-knowledge exclusion.
The case involved a plaintiff who sued her former employer, Club Paris, LLC, and its principal for gender discrimination and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as negligent supervision and civil battery. After the defendants defaulted, the court entered judgment for the plaintiff on the remaining claims, and a jury awarded her $77,500 in damages. The plaintiff then moved for attorney's fees and costs as the prevailing party. The court granted the motion, awarding $20,912.50 in fees calculated under the lodestar method using a reasonable hourly rate and documented hours, plus $425 in taxable costs. The decision rested on Title VII's fee-shifting provision, Supreme Court precedent defining prevailing parties, and Eleventh Circuit standards for reasonable fees and costs.
This case involved a plaintiff's attempt to collect on a $1.1 million default judgment against a former Orlando police officer for sexual molestation of a minor, by seeking coverage under the city's liability insurance policy issued by North River Insurance Company. The plaintiff sued the insurer for breach of contract after it refused payment, claiming the officer's acts fell within policy coverage for occurrences in the course of employment. The court granted the insurer's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiff's, finding no coverage because the policy's terms clearly excluded acts outside the scope of employment, intentional misconduct, and other specified exclusions, with the officer's criminal conduct not qualifying as insured activity. The court interpreted the unambiguous policy language under Florida law and did not reach the insurer's alternative late-notice defense.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilitycriminal law
This case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by James Guzman, who was convicted in Florida state court of first-degree murder and armed robbery and sentenced to death after a bench trial. Guzman raised claims under Giglio v. United States and Brady v. Maryland, alleging that the prosecution presented false testimony from key witnesses Martha Cronin and Detective Allison Sylvester about any deals or consideration given to them, and failed to disclose exculpatory evidence regarding those witnesses. The district court granted the petition in part, finding that the false testimony was material and had a substantial and injurious effect on the verdict, entitling Guzman to relief on those claims, while denying relief on the remaining claims, some of which were procedurally barred or failed to meet the standards of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The court reasoned that the undisclosed information undermined the credibility of the witnesses whose testimony was central to establishing Guzman's guilt, and that the state courts' rejection of the claims was contrary to clearly established federal law.
