In Lakhani v. USCIS, the petitioner sought habeas relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 for delayed adjudication of his visa petition as a battered spouse and to stay his removal order pending resolution. Following denial of his visa application, the government moved to dismiss, arguing lack of jurisdiction and mootness. The district court granted dismissal, reasoning that the REAL ID Act limits jurisdiction over removal matters to courts of appeals and that visa decisions involve unreviewable agency discretion under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B), rendering the claims either moot or beyond the court's authority.
In this case, plaintiff Samantha Madden sued defendant Dr. Joseph Abate after he performed vaginal examinations on her during treatment for hip and groin pain without obtaining explicit consent, wearing gloves, using lubrication, documenting the exams, or having a chaperone present. Madden initially brought claims for battery and medical malpractice, later seeking to amend her complaint to recharacterize the claim as one for "sexual assault and battery" and to add claims for outrageous conduct or intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted Abate's motion to dismiss the "sexual assault" claim, ruling that Vermont law does not recognize a civil cause of action for sexual assault even though it is a criminal offense, while allowing the battery claim to proceed; it denied the motions for summary judgment and to further amend the complaint, and partially granted the motions to seal. The court reasoned that criminal statutes do not automatically create private rights of action and that the plaintiff had failed to properly disclose expert witnesses or meet procedural deadlines for amendments.
This case involves a plaintiff seeking underinsured motorist benefits from his auto insurer after being injured by an underinsured driver, with the only remaining issue being the amount of damages for medical expenses and lost income. The plaintiff moved in limine to value his medical bills at the full amounts charged by providers rather than the discounted amounts paid by insurance, and to measure lost income on a pre-tax basis while excluding after-tax evidence. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that Vermont's collateral source rule bars evidence of insurance payments to reduce the reasonable value of medical services but permits Allstate to introduce other relevant evidence of that value, while allowing evidence of post-tax lost income and declining a tax-consequences jury instruction. The core reasoning rests on the principle that a tortfeasor should not benefit from a victim's independent insurance arrangements and that compensation aims to restore the plaintiff to his pre-injury position.
In United States v. Campbell, the defendant was charged with possessing oxycodone and cocaine with intent to distribute, along with violating supervised release conditions by possessing controlled substances. The district court addressed motions to suppress evidence obtained during a parking lot encounter, to dismiss one count, and to sever charges. The court granted the motion to suppress, ruling that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion or probable cause to justify the initial stop and subsequent arrest, as the observations of a rental vehicle, air fresheners, nervous behavior by a companion, and other factors did not meet Fourth Amendment standards for detention at gunpoint and handcuffing. The other motions were denied as moot after the government agreed to dismiss one count. The ruling emphasized that the encounter escalated to a full arrest without sufficient justification.
In United States v. Jacques, the defendant, facing federal kidnapping charges related to the murder of Brooke Bennett, moved to suppress statements he made to his friend Michael Garcia, who became a government informant after Jacques contacted him from jail seeking help to fabricate exculpatory evidence. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that statements made before Garcia registered as a confidential human source on July 16, 2008, are admissible, while later statements referencing the charged conduct must be excluded from the guilt phase and, if reached, the penalty phase. The reasoning centers on the Sixth Amendment right to counsel under Massiah v. United States, which prohibits post-indictment government interrogation without counsel, though the government may submit sanitized versions of post-July 16 statements for possible use in the penalty phase.
This case involves RLI Insurance Company's declaratory judgment action seeking to void a personal umbrella liability policy issued to the Klonskys after an automobile accident that injured Maria Rosatone. RLI denied coverage, claiming the policy was void due to Arthur Klonsky's material misrepresentations about the household's driving history on the application and renewal. The Klonskys and Rosatone counterclaimed for bad faith, breach of contract, and violations of Massachusetts laws and the federal Fair Credit Reporting Act. The court granted RLI's summary judgment motion in part, ruling that the policy was void based on the undisputed misrepresentations and the policy's terms allowing rescission, while dismissing the counterclaims for bad faith and breach but denying summary judgment on the FCRA claim due to factual disputes over the timing and purpose of obtaining motor vehicle reports.
