In this Lanham Act trademark case, Philip Morris USA sued defendants for selling counterfeit Marlboro cigarettes at retail stores, alleging violations of registered marks that caused consumer confusion. After defendants failed to answer the complaint or adequately respond to discovery, the court entered defaults and referred the motion for default judgment to a magistrate judge. The magistrate recommended, and the district court adopted, entry of a default judgment for $200,350 in statutory damages and costs, along with a permanent injunction barring future counterfeit sales and requiring cooperation with investigations, relying on the well-pled complaint allegations deemed true due to default and the need for deterrence.
This case involved a Chapter 7 bankruptcy trustee's appeal from a bankruptcy court order allowing debtors to claim a homestead exemption under New York CPLR Section 5206 for their vested remainder interest in the home where they resided with the life tenant (the debtor's mother), to whom they paid rent. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision. The court reasoned that the statute requires only that the property be "owned and occupied as a principal residence" without specifying the type of ownership interest, and that a remainder interest qualifies as ownership because it is descendible, devisable, and alienable. The debtors satisfied both the ownership and occupancy requirements, and the court rejected arguments that the statute's purpose or potential dual-homestead issues required a different result, noting the need to construe the exemption liberally.
In this bankruptcy appeal, the Chapter 7 Trustee of debtor Marine Risks, Inc. challenged the Bankruptcy Court's partial denial of leave to amend his adversary complaint against a former officer and director and the dismissal of the complaint under Rule 52; the defendant cross-appealed the partial amendment to conform to trial evidence and the lack of a fee award, while also seeking Rule 11 sanctions. The district court affirmed the Bankruptcy Order in full, dismissed both appeals, and denied sanctions. The decision rested on the conclusion that the Bankruptcy Court's factual findings and procedural rulings were supported by the record, the trustee's appeal lacked sufficient merit for reversal but was not so frivolous as to warrant sanctions, and no error occurred in handling amendments or costs.
In Toussie v. County of Suffolk, plaintiffs who successfully bid on surplus county properties at public auctions challenged the Suffolk County Legislature's refusal to approve the sales and its alleged exclusion of them from later auctions, claiming violations of their civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 along with related state-law claims such as breach of contract and defamation. The district court consolidated two related actions and ruled on the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that plaintiffs failed to establish protected liberty or property interests supporting due-process claims, that auction participation did not constitute protected speech or intimate association under the First Amendment, and that certain individual defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the federal claims while some state claims survived.
In United States v. Hatfield, the government moved for a preliminary order of forfeiture against defendants David H. Brooks and Sandra Hatfield after their convictions on counts including securities fraud, mail fraud, wire fraud, and conspiracy. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, upholding its prior decision that only the difference between the stock's fraud-inflated value and its value absent the fraud qualifies as forfeitable proceeds under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), rather than all revenue from the sales, and reserved judgment on specific amounts while requesting supplemental calculations and briefing. The court applied a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard for forfeiture as part of sentencing and rejected the government's arguments for broader forfeiture based on controlling precedent and the statutory requirement that property be traceable to the offenses.
The case concerns plaintiff James Ferrari's challenge to the temporary impoundment of his vehicle by Suffolk County after his arrest for driving while intoxicated at over 100 mph, with a prior DWI conviction and refusal of a chemical test. Following a post-seizure hearing under Suffolk County Code Chapter 270 and Krimstock v. Kelly standards, Ferrari sued the county and individual officials alleging due process violations in the hearing procedures, including improper burdens and findings. On defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the court granted dismissal in part by dismissing claims against the individual defendants without prejudice but denied it as to the county, allowing those claims to proceed based on potential municipal liability. The reasoning centered on the distinction between individual and municipal liability standards, the sufficiency of allegations regarding the hearing's compliance with due process, and the inapplicability of certain defenses to the county.