Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance v. J.T. Walker Industries, Inc.
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-09-22 · cited 1×
Liberty Mutual Fire Insurance filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment on its obligations under multiple commercial general liability policies issued to J.T. Walker Industries and MI Windows for defense and settlement costs in five underlying state-court construction defect cases involving progressive property damage. After earlier rulings and a certified question to the South Carolina Supreme Court, the district court modified its prior order to hold that each triggered policy covers only the portion of damage occurring during its policy period rather than the full settlement amount. The court denied the insureds' motion for partial summary judgment and ruled that the insureds must pay a full deductible for each occurrence without proration tied to allocation among successive insurers. The decision rested on the policies' unambiguous language and South Carolina precedent emphasizing time-on-the-risk allocation for progressive losses.
business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability
ASHLEY II OF CHARLESTON, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc.
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-08-19 · cited 15×
This case is a CERCLA cost-recovery action in which Ashley II of Charleston, LLC sued PCS Nitrogen, Inc. to recover expenses for remediating contamination on a 33.95-acre industrial site in Charleston, South Carolina, and to obtain a declaratory judgment of joint and several liability. PCS responded by filing contribution claims under CERCLA § 113 against Ashley and other potentially responsible parties, leading to cross-claims and counterclaims among the defendants. After a liability-phase bench trial established PCS as the successor to a prior owner, the court bifurcated the case and held an allocation-phase trial to determine each party's share of responsibility based on evidence of their involvement with the site. The court issued findings of fact and conclusions of law under Rule 52, granting partial judgments to certain defendants and allocating cleanup costs according to the parties' respective contributions and equitable factors.
environmentbusiness & regulatorypropertyprocedure
Friends of Congaree Swamp v. Federal Highway Administration
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2011-04-28 · cited 3×
This case involved environmental organizations challenging the Federal Highway Administration's approval of a project to replace bridges and expand causeways on U.S. Highway 601 in the Congaree River floodplain within Congaree National Park boundaries. The plaintiffs contended that the agencies failed to comply with environmental review requirements when authorizing the work, which would fill wetlands and alter the floodplain. The court denied the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and granted the defendants' cross-motions, thereby upholding the project's authorization via an environmental assessment and finding of no significant impact. The core reasoning was that the defendants had adequately considered the project's effects, followed required permitting processes under statutes such as NEPA and the Clean Water Act, and properly concluded that the net wetland impact was minimal after restoration efforts.
environmentfederal power
ASHLEY II OF CHARLESTON, LLC v. PCS Nitrogen, Inc.
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-10-13 · cited 2×
This case is a CERCLA cost-recovery action in which Ashley II of Charleston, LLC sued PCS Nitrogen, Inc. to recover expenses for remediating hazardous substances on a 33.95-acre site in Charleston, South Carolina, with PCS filing contribution claims against multiple other parties alleged to be potentially responsible. The court, after bifurcated bench trials on liability and allocation, found PCS liable as successor-in-interest to a prior polluting owner (Columbia Nitrogen Corporation) and allocated shares of responsibility among the parties based on their involvement with the site. Core reasoning relied on CERCLA's strict liability provisions, evidence of historical operations and asset transfers establishing successor status, and equitable factors for contribution under section 113, while dismissing claims against certain defendants who lacked ownership at the time of suit or whose releases did not contribute to costs.
environmentbusiness & regulatoryproperty
Gilliam v. Hovis (In Re Marine Energy Systems Corp.)
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-03-31
The case involved a dispute in bankruptcy proceedings over the priority of liens on $100,000 in settlement proceeds held by a Chapter 7 trustee for the benefit of William J. Gilliam. The IRS and South Carolina Department of Revenue claimed priority based on tax liens for unpaid taxes, while Gilliam argued that a later-filed security interest by the Gilliam Exempt Family Trust had priority due to erroneous releases of some tax liens. The bankruptcy court granted summary judgment to the IRS, finding its liens superior, and the district court affirmed this decision. The court reasoned that the tax liens were valid and prior in time, with any erroneous releases corrected before the competing lien was filed, and that claims regarding exemptions were irrelevant to the priority determination.
taxesbusiness & regulatoryproperty
Gleaton v. Monumental Life Insurance
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2010-01-28 · cited 8×
Luisa Gleaton sued Monumental Life Insurance Company alleging sexual harassment and discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, and sex under Title VII and 42 U.S.C. § 1981, along with wrongful termination in violation of public policy, FMLA violations, and claims under the South Carolina Human Affairs Law. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendations in part by granting the defendant's motion to strike all references to the ADEA and EEO Act from the complaint with the plaintiff's consent. It also dismissed the wrongful termination claim with prejudice, finding no violation of a clearly mandated public policy and that statutory remedies under Title VII and § 1981 were available. The court denied without prejudice the motion to dismiss the FMLA and SCHAL claims, determining that they could proceed at that stage.
labor & employmentcivil rights
Bailey v. Bazzle
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2008-09-30 · cited 3×
The case involves Jomo Rashad Bailey's petition for federal habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, challenging his South Carolina state conviction for trafficking in cocaine based on claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, due process violations from alleged perjured testimony, and Fourth Amendment search issues. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granting the respondent's motion for summary judgment and dismissing the petition. The court determined that certain claims were procedurally defaulted because they were not properly exhausted in state post-conviction proceedings, while the remaining ineffective assistance and due process claims failed on the merits under applicable standards. Fourth Amendment claims were deemed not cognizable on federal habeas review where the petitioner had a full opportunity to litigate them in state court.
criminal lawprocedure
GTR RENTAL, LLC v. DalCanton
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2008-03-27 · cited 4×
This case involved a trailer leasing company, GTR Rental (formerly CitiCapital), suing its former vice president DalCanton, regional sales manager Gillion, and Gillion's competing company Capital City Trailer for diverting assets, customers, and revenue through sham leases, false credit approvals, and unauthorized sales. After a jury trial, the court granted judgment as a matter of law against Gillion on claims including breach of fiduciary duty, conversion, fraud, and violation of the South Carolina Unfair Trade Practices Act, while the jury found DalCanton and Capital City liable on overlapping claims and awarded compensatory and punitive damages totaling over $1.8 million across the defendants. The court rejected post-trial motions, including arguments for election of remedies, and entered final judgment with attorneys' fees and costs based on the verdicts and applicable law.
business & regulatorytorts & liability
Bickford v. Denmark Technical College
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2007-03-28 · cited 6×
Plaintiff Adela Bickford, a 63-year-old Hispanic woman, sued her former employer Denmark Technical College under Title VII and the ADEA, claiming national origin and age discrimination, a hostile work environment, constructive discharge via involuntary transfer and adverse conditions, denial of advancement opportunities, and retaliation. The district court adopted the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendation in part, granting summary judgment to the defendant on the retaliation and denial-of-advancement claims while denying summary judgment on the remaining discrimination, hostile-environment, and constructive-discharge claims. The court found no objections to the granted portions and determined that genuine issues of material fact existed regarding whether the supervisor's comments, work requirements, and transfer to an isolated campus constituted adverse actions motivated by protected characteristics. The decision rested on the de novo review of the record and applicable standards for summary judgment in employment-discrimination cases.
civil rightslabor & employment
Chavis v. Fidelity Warranty Services, Inc.
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2006-02-13 · cited 22×
In this case, plaintiffs Oliver and Annette Chavis filed a class action in South Carolina state court alleging that defendant Fidelity Warranty Services violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act by selling automobile warranties after disclaiming other warranties and making misleading representations. The defendant removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act, and the plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that federal jurisdiction was unavailable because the suit did not meet the Magnuson-Moss Act's requirements of at least 100 named plaintiffs and $50,000 in controversy per claim. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that even though the Magnuson-Moss Act's specific federal-question jurisdiction prerequisites were not satisfied, the Class Action Fairness Act independently provided federal diversity jurisdiction because the complaint alleged over $5 million in controversy and met the minimal diversity requirements. The court reasoned that the Class Action Fairness Act's broader jurisdictional provisions applied and took precedence in this removal context.
procedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory
United States v. Taylor
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2003-09-30
This case concerns the United States' efforts to collect Betty Taylor's unpaid 1989 federal income taxes by foreclosing a tax lien on residential property in Greenville County, South Carolina, and obtaining a court order for its sale. The intervenors, who purchased the property in 2001 after the original owners transferred it through family members, opposed the motion for a second amended order of sale, arguing they were bona fide purchasers without notice of the lien. The court granted the motion, holding that the Notice of Lis Pendens filed by the government in April 1999 provided constructive notice under South Carolina law, binding subsequent purchasers to the foreclosure proceedings and judgment that had already been affirmed on appeal. The court rejected arguments based on the state recording statute because the lien had been recorded in 1996 and the lis pendens gave adequate notice regardless of when the amended judgment was recorded.
taxespropertyfederal power
Sunex International, Inc. v. Travelers Indemnity Co.
District Court, D. South Carolina · 2001-12-17 · cited 11×
The case involved plaintiffs Sunex, Telesis, Arcan, and Hawkins suing their insurer Travelers for breach of contract and bad faith after Travelers refused to defend or indemnify them in an underlying patent infringement lawsuit brought by Shockley and Excalibur over sales of mechanic's creepers. The underlying suit resulted in a damages award against Arcan and Telesis, which was later reduced on appeal. Travelers moved for summary judgment, arguing that the insurance policies' coverage for advertising injuries did not extend to patent infringement claims. The court granted Travelers' motion and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, finding that the policy language was unambiguous and did not cover patent infringement because such claims arise from the unauthorized sale of a patented product rather than from the content of advertising. The court also denied the plaintiffs' alternative request to certify the coverage question to the South Carolina Supreme Court.
business & regulatory