Milton Irving Shadur

Tunu Shakari sought judicial review of the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for widow's insurance benefits after her conviction for voluntary manslaughter in the death of her husband. The court denied her motion for summary judgment, affirmed the Commissioner's decision, and dismissed the case with prejudice. The ALJ had found her ineligible under the regulation barring benefits for anyone convicted of a felony or act in the nature of a felony of intentionally causing the insured's death. The core reasoning was that under Illinois law a pardon does not obliterate the conviction or its legal effects unless the pardon explicitly states innocence or authorizes expungement, neither of which occurred here.

criminal law

In Green v. Scurto Cement Construction, Ltd., African-American union members Ronald Green Sr. and Donald Green sued Operative Plasterers & Cement Masons International Association, Local 11, Area 161 under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, alleging racial discrimination in the union's job referral system that assigned them shorter, lower-paying work and retaliation for filing grievances with the union, EEOC, Illinois Department of Human Rights, and NLRB. After earlier dismissal of Title VII claims and time-barred Section 1981 claims, the union moved to dismiss the amended complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for insufficient pleading of intentional discrimination, interference with contract rights, and retaliation. The court denied the motion, holding that the amended complaint provided sufficient factual allegations to state plausible claims under the Twombly/Iqbal pleading standards, gave fair notice of the claims, and complied with the prior order limiting the timeframe of allegations.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Terry Jones filed a pro se motion seeking to challenge and correct what he claimed was an illegal federal sentence for violating 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1) as a felon in possession of a firearm, arguing that letters from Illinois restoring certain civil rights after his prior state convictions meant those convictions should not count under 18 U.S.C. § 921(a)(20). The court reviewed the indictment, plea agreement, sentencing documents, and appeal history and found that Jones had known about the restoration letters before his guilty plea but never raised the issue with counsel, in the presentence report, at sentencing, or on appeal. The court held that the motion, however characterized, was untimely under the one-year statute of limitations for a potential 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and could not qualify for relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b) because the judgment was not void and Jones had failed to act promptly even after the Buchmeier decision. Jones' motion was therefore denied.

criminal lawprocedure

Ramon Pickens sued parole officer Robert Moore under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Moore violated his Fourteenth Amendment due process rights by submitting a false parole violation report that caused Pickens to be wrongfully held for nine additional months after his scheduled release. Moore filed a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). The court denied the motion, applying the Twombly-Iqbal plausibility standard to the well-pleaded facts and concluding that Heck v. Humphrey does not bar the claim because Pickens was no longer incarcerated and lacked access to habeas relief.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case concerns a fire protection district's attempt to enter the private alarm monitoring business by enacting regulations that effectively required customers to use its services, which private security companies challenged as exceeding the district's statutory authority under Illinois law. After granting partial summary judgment and issuing a permanent injunction barring the district's actions, the court addressed the district's motion to stay enforcement of that injunction pending appeal. The court denied the stay, finding that the district had not made the required strong showing of likely success on the merits, that any harm to the district was self-inflicted and outweighed by harm to the alarm companies, and that the public interest favored maintaining the injunction to preserve the status quo before the district's unauthorized expansion. The analysis applied the four-factor test from Hilton v. Braunskill, emphasizing that injunctive relief differs from money judgments by requiring an affirmative showing for a stay.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a patent infringement dispute in which Midtronics, Inc. alleged that defendants Aurora Performance Products LLC (d/b/a Argus Analyzers) and BPPower Inc. infringed U.S. Patent No. 5,821,756 through the sale and importation of certain battery tester products. After a bench trial, the court ruled entirely in Midtronics' favor, finding that the accused products infringed Claims 1-4 of the patent, that the infringement was willful, and that the patent was valid because the defendants failed to prove obviousness based on prior art or secondary considerations. The court further determined that the case was exceptional, entitling Midtronics to a permanent injunction as well as reasonable attorney fees and expenses under 35 U.S.C. §§ 283 and 285. The decision rested on detailed factual findings regarding claim limitations, prior art references, and the defendants' litigation conduct, which the court adopted from the prevailing party's submissions.

business & regulatory

The case involved a patent infringement complaint filed by ArrivalStar S.A. and Melvino Technologies Limited against Geo-Comm, Inc. in the Northern District of Illinois. The court, acting on its own initiative, reviewed the venue allegations under 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), the exclusive statute governing venue in patent infringement actions. It determined that the defendant, incorporated in Minnesota, did not reside in the district and that the complaint failed to allege a regular and established place of business there, despite references to transacting business and offering infringing services. The court scheduled a status hearing to consider whether the action could remain in the district.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved private fire alarm monitoring companies suing the Lisle-Woodridge Fire Prevention District over an ordinance that required subscribers to switch to a district-mandated wireless radio network operated by a chosen contractor, nullifying existing customer contracts with the plaintiffs. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for partial summary judgment against the district and ordered a permanent injunction. The decision rested on the finding that the Illinois Fire Protection District Act provided no statutory authority for the district to engage in or mandate fire alarm monitoring services, as its powers were confined to fire prevention and control activities. The court rejected the district's reliance on other statutory sections and administrative regulations as insufficient to authorize the program.

business & regulatorycivil rights

Brenda Adkins sued the Local 705 International Brotherhood of Teamsters Pension Fund under ERISA Section 502(a)(1)(B) for pension benefits based on her work as a dispatcher from 1995 to 2006, plus a federal common law restitution claim. The court granted the Fund's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action. The pension plan documents gave the administrator discretion to interpret eligibility, triggering arbitrary-and-capricious review, and the collective bargaining agreements expressly limited the bargaining unit to drivers who make deliveries, a category that excluded dispatchers like Adkins. The court rejected arguments that custom and practice could override the unambiguous contract language and found no basis for a restitution claim once benefits were properly denied under the plan terms.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Engel v. Buchan, plaintiff Gary Engel brought state-law tort claims against former FBI agent Robert Buchan and the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging intentional infliction of emotional distress, malicious prosecution, and civil conspiracy stemming from a prior criminal prosecution. The United States moved to dismiss, contending that Missouri law governed the claims and that they failed to state a plausible basis for relief. Applying pleading standards from Twombly and Iqbal, and determining that Illinois law controlled due to related prior litigation, the court granted dismissal of the emotional-distress claim while denying dismissal of the malicious-prosecution and conspiracy claims.

criminal lawcivil rightstorts & liability

In Santana v. Cook County Board of Review, a former Board employee turned government and real estate consultant sued the Board, its Commissioners, and employees under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and RICO, alleging violations of procedural due process, First Amendment free speech and association rights, equal protection, and related conspiracy claims. The claims stemmed from closed-session Board discussions and media reports about his role in assisting taxpayers with property tax appeal forms and his connections to a state representative. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the Fourth Amended Complaint in full. It reasoned that the allegations failed to meet the Twombly/Iqbal plausibility standard, as Santana no longer claimed a complete ban from Board premises or client interference sufficient for a due process violation, lacked allegations of retaliatory motive for the speech claim, and did not plead illegitimate animus for equal protection, rendering the conspiracy count unsustainable as well.

civil rightsfree speechprocedure

This case is a consolidated antitrust class action brought by purchasers of containerboard products against several major manufacturers, alleging a conspiracy to restrain trade and fix prices in violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act. Defendants filed a motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), contending that the allegations of parallel conduct and related factors failed to state a plausible claim. The court denied the motion, applying the plausibility standard from Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly and finding that the complaint's details regarding capacity reductions, mill closures, pricing patterns, and opportunities to conspire were adequate to survive dismissal.

business & regulatory

Paul Turner and Andrew Warren, former servers at a restaurant operated by Millennium Park Joint Venture, LLC, sued their ex-employer alleging that its tip-pooling arrangement violated the Fair Labor Standards Act, the Illinois Minimum Wage Law, and the Illinois Wage Payment and Collection Act by allowing silverware rollers to share in tips. Both parties moved for summary judgment. The court granted Millennium’s motion, denied the plaintiffs’ motion, and dismissed the action. It held that the statute permits tip pooling with any employees who regularly receive tips from the pool itself, without requiring direct customer contact, and found the silverware rollers qualified under that standard.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

Gary Engel sued former FBI agent Robert Buchan and former police officer Robert Quid, alleging Brady violations and RICO claims arising from his 19-year incarceration on kidnaping charges that were later overturned. The court addressed partial motions to dismiss those claims and Buchan's assertion of qualified immunity. It denied the motions as to the Brady-based claim, holding that Buchan was not entitled to qualified immunity under precedent from a related case involving the same underlying investigation. It granted the motions as to the RICO claims, applying Heck v. Humphrey to bar civil claims that would undermine the validity of a prior conviction and finding additional deficiencies in pleading the required elements of a RICO pattern. The ruling rests on Rule 12(b)(6) standards requiring plausible allegations and on the need to avoid collateral attacks on convictions through civil damages actions.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved Meyer Intellectual Properties suing Bodum for infringing two patents on an apparatus and method for frothing liquids, with a jury finding the patents valid, the infringement willful, and awarding $50,000 in damages. Meyer then moved under 35 U.S.C. §§ 284 and 285 for treble damages and attorneys' fees on the grounds that the case was exceptional. The court granted the motion, increasing damages to $150,000 and awarding $756,487.56 in fees after analyzing the Read factors, including evidence of deliberate copying of Meyer's commercial product design, the jury's willfulness finding, and Bodum's litigation conduct. The decision emphasized that Bodum's actions supported enhanced damages and fees under the totality of circumstances.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Kathleen Cooley, a probationary school counselor, sued the Chicago Board of Education and her principal for Title VII pregnancy discrimination and retaliation, FMLA interference and retaliation related to her planned maternity leave, a Section 1983 equal protection claim, and state-law tortious interference with contract. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the FMLA claims against both, the Section 1983 claim against the Board, and the tortious interference claim. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, dismissing the tortious interference claim because Cooley, as a probationary employee, had no contract for continued employment, and noting that the Title VII retaliation claim had been voluntarily dismissed; it allowed the remaining claims to proceed because genuine issues of material fact existed as to whether the non-renewal decision interfered with or retaliated for FMLA-protected leave. The court viewed the facts in the light most favorable to Cooley and found that her proposed maternity leave, not a later short leave, was central to the FMLA analysis.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

Isie Brindley sued Target Corporation under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging age-based disparate treatment, retaliation, and a hostile work environment, along with related claims under the Illinois Human Rights Act. The suit stemmed from her experiences as a Soft-lines Team Lead, including denied training and promotions, hostile treatment by younger colleagues and supervisors, and her eventual resignation in 2010, after which she filed an EEOC charge. Target moved to dismiss the complaint in part under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing timeliness bars on pre-October 2009 events and insufficient relation of the hostile environment claim to the EEOC charge. The court denied dismissal of the federal ADEA claims, finding the EEOC charge timely and reasonably related to the allegations, but granted dismissal of the state IHRA claims. Earlier discrete acts could serve as background evidence for timely claims.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved the National Rifle Association filing Section 1983 lawsuits against the Village of Oak Park and the City of Chicago, challenging their handgun possession bans under the Second Amendment as incorporated by the Fourteenth Amendment, shortly after the Supreme Court's Heller decision. The district court initially ruled against NRA based on then-existing precedent, a decision affirmed by the Seventh Circuit, but after the Supreme Court held in McDonald that the Second Amendment applies to the states, the municipalities repealed their ordinances, leading the Seventh Circuit to vacate the judgments and direct dismissal on mootness grounds. NRA then moved for attorney's fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 as a prevailing party. The court denied the motions, holding that NRA did not qualify as a prevailing party because there was no enforceable judgment on the merits or court-ordered consent decree creating a material alteration in the parties' legal relationship, and the municipalities' voluntary repeal of the ordinances lacked the required judicial imprimatur under Buckhannon. The reasoning emphasized that a plaintiff's success via a defendant's voluntary conduct, even if prompted by the lawsuit, does not support fee awards absent judicial relief.

gunscivil rightsprocedure

The case involves Great American Insurance Company filing a complaint against a corporate defendant and an individual, seeking to invoke federal subject matter jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The court found the complaint defective because it alleged the parties' residences rather than their citizenship, as required by 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and longstanding precedent from Strawbridge v. Curtiss. Citing Adams v. Catrambone, the court explained that residence allegations do not establish citizenship and that such defects typically mandate dismissal. It directed the plaintiff to cure the jurisdictional allegations within 14 days, if possible, and prohibited counsel from billing the client for the corrective work.

procedurefederal power

Jay Mau sued L.A. Fitness over a fitness services agreement, alleging that its uniform early termination fee violated Illinois law by functioning as an unenforceable penalty. Fitness moved for summary judgment, but the court denied the motion and held the Voluntary Termination Clause unenforceable. The court reasoned that the clause required payment of 50% of the remaining balance regardless of the company's performance or actual damages, and it did not qualify as legitimate alternative performance or liquidated damages under Illinois precedent such as River East Plaza. The decision focused on whether the provision secured performance through a penalty rather than compensating for variable harm.

business & regulatory