Thomas Michael Shanahan

In this ERISA case, Virgilia Givens was injured in an accident, and the Wal-Mart Associates' Health and Welfare Plan paid her medical bills totaling $91,312.18. After she settled with the tortfeasor's insurer for $100,000, the plan sought reimbursement pursuant to its subrogation and reimbursement provisions, which allow recovery from any settlement regardless of whether the participant is made whole. The court granted the plan's motion for summary judgment, holding that the plan's clear terms entitled it to reimbursement and imposing a constructive trust on the settlement proceeds.

healthcarelabor & employmentprocedure

The case concerned whether Mutual of Omaha Insurance Company qualified for a special 31.6% tax rate under transitional provisions in the Tax Reform Act of 1986 and the Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988 on capital gains from pre-1984 market discount bonds, or whether the standard 34% corporate rate applied. The court held that gains from Category A securities (called early by the issuer under explicit call provisions) qualified for the lower rate as redemptions at maturity, while gains from Category B securities (partial serial prepayments of principal) did not and remained taxable at 34%. The core reasoning was that the statutory term "redemption at maturity" encompassed issuer calls that accelerated the maturity date but excluded partial prepayments that neither occurred at full maturity nor retired the entire bond.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case involved Virgilia Givens, who received medical benefits from the Wal-Mart Associates' Health and Welfare Plan (an ERISA self-funded plan) after a 2000 accident, followed by a $100,000 settlement with the tortfeasor's insurer. The Plan's Administrative Committee filed a counterclaim seeking equitable relief under ERISA § 502(a)(3) to enforce subrogation and reimbursement rights against the settlement proceeds, which the Givens had deposited with the court. The court denied the Plan's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that factual disputes existed over the amount of medical bills paid by the Plan and the impact of a separate lien by Syndicated Office Systems, making judgment premature under the standards of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and the limits on equitable relief established in Great-West Life & Annuity Ins. Co. v. Knudson.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between James Menking and the Wal-Mart Associates Health and Welfare Plan over entitlement to $25,000 in underinsured motorist insurance proceeds after the Plan paid Menking's medical expenses from a 1997 car accident. The Plan, governed by ERISA, asserted subrogation rights under the plan terms and filed suit in federal court under ERISA section 502(a)(3) seeking the funds; Mid-Century Insurance had initiated an interpleader action that was removed to federal court. The court consolidated the two related cases, denied Menking's motions to dismiss and for summary judgment, and granted the Plan's motion for summary judgment. The reasoning was that ERISA completely preempts any state-law claims regarding subrogation and authorizes the Plan's fiduciary to obtain appropriate equitable relief to enforce the plan's terms.

healthcarefederal powerprocedure

The case concerned whether Paige Ann Sweeney's student loans could be discharged in bankruptcy on the grounds of undue hardship under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8). The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling discharging the loans, holding that the bankruptcy court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous. The court applied the totality of the circumstances test from Andrews and Andresen, which requires considering the debtor's financial resources, necessary living expenses, and unique circumstances, including the spouse's income, and determined that the debtor's obligation to support her children outweighed repayment of the over $45,000 in loans given the family's limited income.

federal powerfamily lawprocedure

This case involved a proposed class action by over 67,000 property owners and tenants against ASARCO, alleging that the company's long-term operations released airborne contaminants onto their land, causing damage. The plaintiffs sought recovery of response costs under CERCLA section 107(a), a declaratory judgment for future costs, and state-law claims for trespass, nuisance, negligence, strict liability, unjust enrichment, and medical monitoring. The court granted ASARCO's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction after a factual attack, finding that the plaintiffs had not alleged or incurred necessary response costs consistent with the National Contingency Plan to support federal-question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and that individual claims failed to meet the $75,000 amount-in-controversy requirement for diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 because remediation costs per property were below the threshold and medical monitoring expenses did not qualify. The court also declined to recognize a novel Nebraska-law claim for a medical-monitoring fund as a basis for jurisdiction.

environmentproceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involved plaintiff Pamela Timm, who after divorcing defendant Russell DeLong in Nebraska state court, filed a federal action under the civil rights provision of the Violence Against Women Act alleging gender-motivated violence by her ex-husband. DeLong moved to dismiss on grounds of res judicata from the divorce proceedings, failure to allege a qualifying crime of violence, equitable estoppel, and the unconstitutionality of VAWA. The court converted the motion to one for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 and 56, applied Nebraska preclusion law to the res judicata claim, and analyzed whether VAWA validly rests on Congress's Commerce Clause or Fourteenth Amendment enforcement powers, noting distinctions between its civil and criminal provisions and potential state-action issues.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal powerfamily law

This case is an appeal from the Social Security Administration's denial of disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income to plaintiff Debra R. Call, who claimed she became disabled in 1990 due to back problems along with hearing and speech issues. The ALJ found that Call was not disabled after applying the five-step evaluation process, determining that her impairments did not prevent substantial gainful activity despite her subjective complaints of pain. The district court reviewed the record under the substantial evidence standard and affirmed the Commissioner's final decision, concluding that the ALJ properly discounted the severity of Call's pain based on objective medical evidence, her limited use of pain medication, and her daily activities such as childcare and housework. The court noted that the medical records did not support the claimed level of impairment and that Call had not sought treatment for back issues for many years after her initial surgery.

healthcarefederal power

The case involved Robert Lee Weaselhead, Jr., an enrolled member of the Blackfoot Indian Tribe, who was arrested by Winnebago tribal police for sexually assaulting a minor on the Winnebago Reservation, entered a no-contest plea in tribal court, and later faced a federal superseding indictment under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2243 and 1153 for the same and related conduct. Weaselhead moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that the federal prosecution violated the Double Jeopardy Clause and was barred by his tribal plea agreement. The magistrate recommended granting dismissal of the overlapping count but denying suppression of statements; the district court accepted the suppression recommendation without objection and conducted de novo review of the dismissal objections. The core reasoning examined whether tribal prosecution of non-member Indians rests on inherent sovereignty or a congressional delegation under Pub. L. No. 102-137, referencing Duro v. Reina and Congress's plenary power over Indian affairs under the Constitution.

criminal lawfederal power

This case is a bankruptcy appeal in which the U.S. Department of Education challenged a lower court's ruling that a student loan held by debtor John Scott was dischargeable in Chapter 7 proceedings. The central dispute concerned the date the loan "first became due" under the pre-1990 version of 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(8)(A), which allowed discharge if that date was more than five years before the bankruptcy filing. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, holding that the loan first became due on November 28, 1984—the day after the six-month grace period ended following Scott's departure from school—rather than the later date of the first scheduled installment payment. The court reasoned that the promissory note's terms established repayment obligations at the end of the grace period, and the lender's subsequent issuance of a payment coupon book did not alter that contractual due date, consistent with precedents such as In re Brinzer. Because the dischargeability threshold was met, the loan was ruled dischargeable.

procedure

This case involved defendant Larry G. Wright, who faced a three-count indictment under 18 U.S.C. § 2262(a)(1) for traveling from Nebraska to Iowa with the intent to violate a state court protection order by entering the protected person's premises, throwing a brick through her window, and following her across state lines on Interstate 80. Wright moved to dismiss the indictment on grounds that the statute is unconstitutional because it exceeds Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause, depriving the court of subject matter jurisdiction. After de novo review, the district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, granted the motion, and dismissed the indictment. The core reasoning was that, under United States v. Lopez, the statute regulates non-commercial activity without any jurisdictional element connecting the conduct to interstate commerce, and the mere act of crossing state lines does not provide the required commerce nexus, especially given the sparse legislative history.

criminal lawfederal power

Ana Moore, a Nicaraguan citizen who entered the US without inspection, filed a habeas corpus petition under 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) and 28 U.S.C. § 2241 seeking to halt her deportation and pursue adjustment of status based on her marriage to a US citizen. She claimed she had not received required written and oral notice in Spanish about the penalties for failing to comply with a voluntary departure order granted after her 1994 deportation hearing. The court reviewed the administrative record, hearing transcript, and evidence showing that the immigration judge had advised Moore of the consequences (including ineligibility for adjustment of status) both orally through an interpreter and in writing in English and Spanish. The opinion addresses the petitioner's eligibility for relief, the effect of her failure to depart by the October 1994 deadline, and related jurisdictional questions under statutes such as the AEDPA.

immigration

Maria Angelina Sanchez, a Mexican citizen who entered the US without inspection in 1988, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after the INS denied extensions of her voluntary departure order and while her applications for adjustment of status and suspension of deportation were pending. The District Court considered whether it had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, which requires the petitioner to be "in custody." The court determined that Sanchez was not in the physical or constructive custody of the INS, as she had been released on her own recognizance and granted voluntary departure, making any future custody speculative. Therefore, the court dismissed the petition for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.

immigrationprocedure

Lindsay Manufacturing Co. sued its insurer Hartford seeking coverage under two comprehensive general liability policies for costs to clean up soil and groundwater contamination at its Nebraska plant caused by disposing spent pickle liquor, a hazardous waste, in an unlined earthen pit from 1972 through 1982. After EPA and state regulators required remediation under CERCLA and related laws, Lindsay notified Hartford years later and received some payments before Hartford refused further coverage, prompting the lawsuit. The court ruled that Nebraska law applies to interpret the policies and that the policies afford no coverage for the environmental cleanup costs. It therefore granted summary judgment to Hartford, dismissed Lindsay's petition, and ordered Lindsay to repay more than $2.3 million in prior payments as restitution.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved defendant Gary L. Dolan, who was indicted on two counts: conspiracy under 18 U.S.C. § 371 to conceal assets (including a Ferrari, a Texas lawsuit, and settlement checks) from a bankruptcy court and creditors in David Anderson's Chapter 11 proceeding between 1988 and 1989, and aiding and abetting concealment of bankruptcy estate property under 18 U.S.C. § 152. Dolan moved to reconsider denial of his motion to dismiss Count I and to dismiss Count II, arguing both were barred by the five-year statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282 since the indictment was returned in August 1994. The court conducted a de novo review of the magistrate judge's report, which noted uncertainty over whether the bankruptcy dismissal triggered § 3284's limitations period or § 3282 applied from the last act of concealment, but concluded that factual questions about when any concealment occurred within the alleged period ending September 5, 1989, should be resolved at trial rather than on pretrial motion. The court overruled Dolan's objections, accepted the magistrate's recommendation, and deferred ruling on the motion to dismiss Count II until trial.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved Floyd's Sales & Service, Inc. seeking a declaratory judgment that insurance policies issued by Universal Underwriters Insurance Company from 1970 to 1982 covered costs it paid to settle a CERCLA claim for environmental response and cleanup. The insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the policies' coverage for sums the insured must pay "as damages" because of injury did not extend to such response costs. The court granted summary judgment in part, holding that the phrase "as damages" in the two policies covering July 1981 to December 1982 did not include CERCLA response costs, based on the policy language and rules of construction under Nebraska law that distinguish between damages and statutory cleanup obligations. The motion was denied without prejudice as to the other policies because their coverage periods were not at issue in the case.

business & regulatoryenvironmentprocedure

This case involved the U.S. Secretary of Labor alleging that trustees of a multi-employer construction industry pension fund and a local union violated ERISA by directing the fund to pay interest earned on excess contributions when those contributions were refunded to certain union employees and the union itself. The excess contributions had been made in lieu of wage increases, and after an arbitration ruling limited benefits to the amounts specified in the collective bargaining agreement, the trustees refunded the overpayments plus interest totaling about $43,684. The court ruled in favor of the trustees and the union, holding that the interest payments did not violate ERISA sections on exclusive purpose, fiduciary duties, or prohibited transactions because the refunds aligned with the arbitration stipulation, caused no financial harm to the fund, and did not improperly benefit parties in interest. The court also rejected the statute of limitations defense due to inconclusive evidence on when the Secretary gained knowledge of the payments but granted declaratory relief confirming the payments were lawful.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Best v. United States, the personal representative of Alma Anderson's estate sought a refund of federal estate taxes and interest paid after the IRS included the corpus of a testamentary trust created by her late husband in her gross estate. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiff, holding that Alma Anderson possessed only a limited power of appointment because the trust permitted invasions of principal only for amounts reasonably necessary for her comfort, support, and maintenance. This language created a power limited by an ascertainable standard relating to health, education, support, or maintenance under 26 U.S.C. § 2041(b)(1)(A), so the trust assets were excluded from her taxable estate. The court therefore ordered a refund of $504,006 plus applicable interest.

taxesfederal power

This case involved a claim by Gary Kipp that the United States was negligent in screening blood donors at a military blood center in Kentucky in 1985, resulting in his wife Cheryl receiving HIV-contaminated blood during surgery and subsequently dying of AIDS. The court decided in favor of the government, entering judgment for the defendant and dismissing the complaint with prejudice. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to prove a breach of the applicable standard of care for blood donor screening at the time, as there was no reliable HIV test available, the procedures followed the industry practices including FDA recommendations, and the donor screening was reasonable under the circumstances.

torts & liabilityhealthcare

The case concerned whether US WEST Communications violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 by firing employee Christine Wilson, a Roman Catholic, after she refused to cover or remove an anti-abortion button she wore pursuant to a religious vow. The court found that US WEST had offered a reasonable accommodation by permitting Wilson to wear the button if the image was covered, but that her proposed alternatives, such as an unrestricted display or a transfer, could not be implemented without more than minimal cost or disruption. Transfers were infeasible due to company downsizing policies and the collective bargaining agreement with the union, which would have caused lost productivity, coworker stress, and potential grievances. The court therefore held that US WEST had demonstrated undue hardship and was not liable for religious discrimination, entering judgment for the defendant.

abortionreligious libertycivil rightslabor & employment