Jack D. Shanstrom

This case concerned whether the Crow Tribe could impose a 4% resort tax on the gross receipts of a non-Indian owned restaurant and motel operating on nonmember fee land inside the reservation boundaries. The debtor, Pauline Haines, challenged the Tribe's proofs of claim in bankruptcy court for nearly $99,000 in unpaid taxes, interest, and penalties. The bankruptcy court denied the claims, and the district court affirmed on appeal. The court held that under Montana v. United States, Indian tribes generally lack inherent sovereign authority to tax nonmembers' activities on nonmember fee land, and neither of the two exceptions (consensual commercial relationships with the tribe or direct effects on the tribe's political integrity, economic security, or health and welfare) applied, as the business primarily served nonmembers with no significant tribal involvement and no authorizing treaty provision existed.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Weaver v. Delta Airlines, Inc., a passenger sued the airline under the Warsaw Convention for injuries from an emergency landing on a 1996 international flight, claiming she developed post-traumatic stress disorder with accompanying physical brain changes. Delta moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Convention permits recovery only for bodily injuries with a distinctly physical scope and that purely mental or emotional harm is not compensable under Eastern Airlines v. Floyd. Weaver cross-moved, presenting medical evidence that extreme stress caused verifiable physical alterations to her brain. The court denied Delta's motion and granted Weaver partial summary judgment on liability, holding that her medically diagnosed brain injury qualified as a compensable bodily injury under Article 17, even though its symptoms overlapped with non-compensable psychic harm.

torts & liability

The Allisons appealed a bankruptcy court order dismissing their challenge to IRS tax collection actions, including liens on Ronald Allison's pension payments following a Chapter 7 discharge. They argued the IRS lacked authority to tax them and that pre-petition liens could not attach to post-petition pension benefits. The district court reviewed the bankruptcy court's legal conclusions de novo and factual findings for clear error, concluding that the pension remained subject to attachment under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 and that the bankruptcy court correctly granted summary judgment to the United States and dismissed the claim against the Boilermaker-Blacksmith National Pension Trust under 26 U.S.C. § 6332(e). The court also granted the Trust's motion for sanctions, finding the Allisons' suit against it frivolous and unsupported by any nonfrivolous legal argument.

taxesfederal power

The case concerned whether the Crow Tribe could impose a 3% ad valorem utility tax on Big Horn County Electric Cooperative's property located on rights-of-way across tribal and trust lands within the reservation, enforce an anti-pass-through regulation prohibiting the utility from billing the tax separately to customers, and exercise regulatory authority through a tribal public utilities commission. The district court granted summary judgment in part to the cooperative, holding that the tribe lacked authority to tax utility property on nonmember fee lands or equivalent rights-of-way granted under federal law, and permanently enjoined collection of the tax on such property while ordering a refund of taxes paid. The court declined to address the validity of the anti-pass-through provision because the underlying tax was invalid, and dismissed the challenge to the tribal PUC as unripe since no regulations had been enacted or applied. The core reasoning rested on distinguishing the nature of the rights-of-way from trust lands and applying limits on tribal taxing power over nonmembers' property interests.

taxesfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the State of Montana challenging the EPA's 1996 decision to grant the Sioux and Assiniboine Tribes treatment-as-a-state status under section 518(e) of the Clean Water Act, authorizing the Tribes to establish water quality standards on the Fort Peck Indian Reservation, including over non-Indian fee lands. The district court granted the EPA's and the Tribes' motions for summary judgment and dismissed Montana's declaratory judgment action. It reasoned that the EPA's case-specific determination, which presumed tribal authority based on generalized findings of serious and substantial potential impacts on tribal health and welfare plus evidence of checkerboard land ownership and pollution risks, was consistent with the standards upheld in the related Flathead TAS precedent and was neither arbitrary nor capricious under the APA.

environmentfederal power

This case involved a fatal truck accident on Interstate 90 within the Crow Indian Reservation, where a Crow Tribe member was struck and killed by a nonmember driver employed by an Idaho trucking company. The victim's estate filed a tort suit in Crow Tribal Court, prompting the defendants to seek a federal court declaration that the tribal court lacked jurisdiction over them and the dispute. Relying on precedents like Strate v. A-1 Contractors and Montana v. United States, the federal district court held that the highway right-of-way is equivalent to non-Indian fee land for jurisdictional purposes. The court ruled that no federal statute or treaty authorized tribal governance over nonmembers on the right-of-way and that neither of Montana's exceptions for consensual relationships or threats to tribal integrity applied. It therefore granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, denied the tribal judge's motion, and permanently enjoined further tribal court proceedings against the defendants.

civil rightsfederal powertorts & liability

The case involved a challenge by Montana Right to Life Association and related plaintiffs to several Montana statutes regulating campaign contributions, expenditures, election-day advertising, and false statements about candidates, arguing that they violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The court held that Mont. Code Ann. § 13-35-227 was unconstitutional as applied to the nonprofit plaintiff because the organization shared the key characteristics of the exempt entity in FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, including a political purpose, lack of shareholders, and no corporate funding; it also struck down § 13-35-233 on its face and § 13-35-236 as applied to the plaintiff for similar reasons under precedents like Buckley v. Valeo. Parts of § 13-37-131 prohibiting certain false statements were invalidated as overbroad, while claims regarding contribution limits were left unresolved or dismissed. The rulings rested on the determination that the restrictions burdened core political speech without sufficient tailoring to compelling interests.

electionsfree speech

This case is a bankruptcy appeal in which the Chapter 7 trustee for debtor William Edward Towe sought to recover assets held by entities including Towe Farms, Inc., Towe Foundation, Towe Antique Ford Foundation, Grant Investments, and Heartland Trust. The Bankruptcy Court entered judgment for the trustee ordering surrender of the assets, and the District Court affirmed. The court held that the trustee had standing to assert alter ego claims to collect property for the estate, as the debtor had commingled funds with the entities and controlled them. It further determined that Heartland Trust was not a valid express trust under Montana law due to lack of formal creation and commingling of assets, resulting in the assets belonging to the bankruptcy estate.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case involved environmental groups suing mining companies Crown Butte Mines, Crown Butte Resources, Noranda Minerals Corporation, and related entities for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act at the New World Mine District in Montana. The plaintiffs claimed the defendants discharged pollutants into creeks without required MPDES permits under a citizen suit provision. The court granted the plaintiffs partial summary judgment on standing for three groups and on the defendants' liability for unpermitted discharges, while denying the defendants' cross-motions for summary judgment. It reasoned that once standing was established for some plaintiffs, others need not be addressed separately, that the CWA prohibits discharges without permits regardless of applications or storm water classifications, and that the case was not moot due to potential civil penalties and evidence of ongoing corporate control. Defendants' motion to strike was deemed moot.

environmentbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved enrolled members of the Fort Peck Tribes challenging section 207 of the Indian Land Consolidation Act (25 U.S.C. § 2206), which requires small fractional interests in allotted Indian trust land (those earning less than $100 in recent years and representing 2% or less of a tract) to escheat to the tribe upon the owner's death, without compensation to heirs or devisees. Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief, arguing that the provision effected an uncompensated taking in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court granted summary judgment for the plaintiffs, holding the escheat provision unconstitutional under the Takings Clause and enjoining its application to the decedent's land. The decision followed Hodel v. Irving, finding that even after amendments permitting limited devises to other owners or tribal plans, the statute still completely abrogated the entrenched right to pass certain property interests by descent or devise, with the character of the government action outweighing its mitigation of fractionation problems.

federal powerpropertycivil rights

The Childers family sued the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for the death of their son in a winter hiking accident on an unmaintained trail in Yellowstone National Park, alleging negligence by the National Park Service in failing to close the trail or warn of dangers. Applying Wyoming law as required by the FTCA, the court found that the Park Service owed no duty to remove or warn about natural accumulations of snow and ice. It reasoned that Wyoming precedent, including Sherman v. Platte County and O'Donnell v. City of Casper, establishes that property owners are not liable for obvious dangers from naturally occurring snow and ice, and that Park Service guidelines do not create an enforceable duty under state tort law. The court therefore concluded that the claim was barred.

torts & liabilityfederal powerenvironment

The Crow Tribe of Indians sued Campbell Farming Corporation and numerous other defendants, seeking a declaratory judgment that the defendants' ownership of land within the Crow Reservation violated the acreage limits in Section 2 of the Crow Allotment Act of 1920, along with an injunction, conveyance of the excess land to the Tribe, and damages for trespass and illegal use. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint or for summary judgment on multiple grounds, including that the statute did not authorize the relief sought after fee patents had been issued and land transferred. The court granted dismissal, holding that the Tribe lacked standing because the requested relief would require a court to unwind settled fee simple titles long after initial conveyances, which exceeded judicial equitable authority and was not contemplated by the statute, and that such policy questions were for Congress rather than the courts.

propertyfederal power

The case was a qui tam action brought by an enrolled member of the Crow Tribe against a bank, alleging that a series of unapproved loans to the Tribe violated 25 U.S.C. § 81 and seeking to void the contracts along with recovery of setoff amounts applied to the loans. The court dismissed the suit, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to proceed as a relator. The reasoning centered on the absence of any injury in fact to the government, as the loans were for ordinary business and operating expenses rather than matters relative to Indian lands or trust resources protected under the statute.

federal powerprocedure