John Malach Shaw

In United States v. Daigle, the defendant sought dismissal of federal criminal drug charges on double jeopardy grounds, arguing that a prior administrative forfeiture of $14,000 in currency seized from his residence constituted punishment for the same offense. The court denied the motion to dismiss. Following Fifth Circuit precedent in United States v. Tilley, it applied a case-by-case analysis to determine whether the civil forfeiture served a punitive or remedial purpose. The court concluded the forfeiture was remedial because the amount seized did not exceed the harm caused by the underlying drug trafficking activity, and therefore did not bar the subsequent criminal prosecution.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns a personal injury lawsuit filed by Sheridan Phillip Richard after he was injured on October 5, 1987, when he slipped into a grain bin conveyor system, resulting in the amputation of his leg. The defendants Bluffton Agri-Industrial Corporation and Aetna Casualty & Surety Company moved to dismiss or for summary judgment on the ground that Richard's claims against them had prescribed under Louisiana's one-year statute of limitations before he added them as parties in 1994. The court applied Louisiana Civil Code provisions on prescription and interruption through suit against solidary obligors, along with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c) governing relation back of amendments, and found that prior suits against other defendants did not timely interrupt prescription as to Bluffton and Aetna because the relevant amendments occurred after the prescriptive period had already run.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case arose from a 1987 maritime accident in which a spud barge operated by Broussard Brothers struck and ruptured an unburied Exxon gas pipeline in Bayou Patout, causing an explosion and fire that damaged the barge and tug; the plaintiff insurers, who had paid claims under hull, P&I, and equipment policies, sued Exxon for reimbursement, while Exxon counterclaimed alleging negligence by the barge crew. The court ruled for the plaintiffs on the main demand and rejected the counterclaim, finding Exxon liable and the vessel operators not negligent. The core reasoning was that Exxon breached duties under its Corps of Engineers permit by failing to maintain the pipeline at least two feet below the mud line and by providing inadequate warnings of the crossing and its exposed condition, which proximately caused the allision; the crew had proceeded cautiously after checking overhead lines and the absence of visible warnings, and any vessel negligence was not a proximate cause since the crew could not reasonably foresee an exposed pipeline. The court applied the Pennsylvania rule shifting the burden to Exxon due to the permit violation and found Exxon's inspection practices deficient.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involves three consolidated appeals from bankruptcy court orders in the Chapter 11 case of Carlo P. Roppolo, Jr., concerning the appointment of an examiner with expanded powers to initiate and prosecute adversary proceedings to recover assets, such as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, as well as the examiner's substitution as party-plaintiff. The district court granted leave to appeal but denied relief, affirming the orders. It reasoned that any initial notice deficiencies were cured by a full hearing on reconsideration, that 11 U.S.C. § 1106(b) permits a court to assign an examiner additional duties including asset recovery when the debtor-in-possession will not act, and that substitution was allowable under the rules without violating the examiner's authority. The court also rejected claims that the orders were void or that creditors lacked standing.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved Curless Estelle's appeal of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of Social Security disability insurance and SSI benefits, based on claims of epilepsy, vision loss, shoulder pain, and an IQ of 67. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report, denied the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, and ordered benefits granted with an onset date of October 31, 1985. The core reasoning was that Estelle's impairments met or equaled the criteria of Listing § 12.05(C) because his IQ score combined with a significant work-related limitation from vision loss established disability at step 3 of the evaluation process, without regard to vocational factors or past work that the ALJ had improperly considered at that stage; substantial evidence did not support the Secretary's contrary finding.

federal powerhealthcare

This case involves Luke Romero's appeal of the denial of Social Security disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income by the Secretary of Health and Human Services. Romero, who has a seventh-grade education, is illiterate, and has a history of labor work, claimed disability since 1985 due to a back injury, mild mental retardation, and organic brain syndrome. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the Secretary's motion for summary judgment and ordering that benefits be granted with an onset date of June 15, 1986. The court found that the administrative law judge erred by not recognizing that Romero's impairments met the criteria under the Listing of Impairments § 12.05(C) for mental retardation, based on IQ scores in the required range plus additional significant work-related limitations from his organic brain disorder, as shown by medical records and testimony. The decision rested on the conclusion that substantial evidence supported a finding of disability under the listing, making remand unnecessary.

healthcare

This case involved a government forfeiture action seeking to seize and condemn quantities of Margesic #3 tablets manufactured by Mikart and distributed by Marnel, on grounds that the product qualified as an unapproved 'new drug' under the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act. The manufacturers contended the drug was generally recognized as safe and effective for its labeled uses and moved to stay the proceedings for administrative review by the FDA. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and denied the referral request. It reasoned that the product failed to meet the statutory criteria for general recognition because there were no adequate and well-controlled published clinical investigations demonstrating safety, effectiveness, and the contribution of each active ingredient, nor any expert consensus based on such data; the court further held that it could resolve the new-drug status issue directly without remanding to the agency.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

This case arose from a 1984 injury to a cook employed by SHRM Catering aboard the M/V TECHE I, a jack-up vessel chartered by Mobil, when a vessel leg broke; after settling with the vessel interests, Mobil and others pursued insurance coverage and indemnity claims against Angelina Casualty, Zurich, and the Louisiana Insurance Guaranty Association (LIGA). The court reformed Angelina’s policy to exclude marine P&I and contractual liability coverage for the watercraft operation, consistent with the parties’ intent at issuance. It further held that LIGA must reimburse SHRM for maintenance and cure benefits plus attorney’s fees and costs, because the underlying Transit employers’ liability policy was not “ocean marine” insurance under LSA-R.S. 22:1377 and thus fell within LIGA’s coverage obligations.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

The case concerned plaintiff Christopher Webster, a diver employed by Martech International, who filed a second motion for summary judgment seeking a legal determination that he qualified as a seaman following an injury aboard the vessel Saltón Seahorse in 1983. The court granted the motion after reviewing evidence of Webster's work assignments across multiple vessels during the 1983 diving season. It concluded that Webster spent substantially all of his work time on vessels, was more or less permanently assigned to an identifiable fleet, performed duties co-extensive with vessel missions, ate and slept aboard, and faced maritime perils. The decision relied on precedents requiring evaluation of the plaintiff's entire period of employment and the fleet concept rather than solely the circumstances of the injury.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved claims by the mother of four illegitimate minor children of a deceased offshore oil worker who died in a helicopter crash on the high seas. The defendant helicopter company sought summary judgment, arguing lack of standing, time-bar, improper collateral attack, and that claims were settled by the widow. The court denied the motion, holding that the children's claims under the Death on the High Seas Act were not compromised by the widow's settlement because she could not adequately represent their adverse interests, and the children could proceed through a properly appointed tutor. The suit was timely under the three-year statute, and not barred as a collateral attack.

torts & liabilityprocedurefamily law

The case involved a plaintiff injured while working as an electrician on vessels in the Persian Gulf off Saudi Arabia who sued ARAMCO under the Jones Act for unseaworthiness and sought maintenance and cure, with his alleged wife also claiming loss of consortium. Plaintiffs attempted service by mailing summons and complaint to CT Corporation in Houston under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(c)(2)(C)(ii), but ARAMCO moved to dismiss for insufficient process, service, and lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that the federal mail service rule applies only where the defendant has an agent within the state and that the Louisiana long-arm statute could not reach ARAMCO because the injury occurred outside the state, there was no nexus between any Louisiana business and the claim, and ARAMCO's subsidiary operated as a separate entity without the requisite control to impute contacts. Without valid service, the court lacked personal jurisdiction over ARAMCO.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. suing Garrett Corporation, the manufacturer of helicopter flotation devices, for property damage after a helicopter emergency-landed in the Gulf of Mexico, with jurisdiction invoked under admiralty and maritime law. Garrett, a California corporation whose relevant division operated in New Jersey, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction after being served via the Louisiana long-arm statute. The court first determined that, because service relied on the state long-arm statute in a federal-question case, Louisiana law governed whether the defendant was amenable to jurisdiction. It then concluded that the statute did not authorize jurisdiction because there was no sufficient nexus between the plaintiff's claims and Garrett's business activities in Louisiana. The court therefore granted the motion to dismiss without reaching constitutional due-process issues.

procedure

The case involved employees of Teledyne Movible Offshore suing under the Fair Labor Standards Act for overtime compensation for time spent on offshore derrick barges when not actively working or allowed to leave, beyond time for eating, sleeping, and personal activities, as well as claims by some plaintiffs that their layoffs were in retaliation for filing the suit. The trial court, after a bifurcated proceeding, entered judgment for the defendant on the wage and hour claims and granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the retaliatory discharge claims, overturning the jury's verdict for the plaintiffs. The court reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to prove the layoffs were retaliatory, as the defendant followed a legitimate seniority-based layoff plan due to business needs.

labor & employment

The case concerned Datamatic's lawsuit against IBM alleging a redhibitory defect in used computer equipment that Datamatic purchased from ITEL in 1974-1975, originally sold by IBM under contracts containing one-year limited warranties excluding consequential damages and implied warranties. IBM moved for summary judgment, contending that Datamatic's remedies were confined to the original purchasers' rights under those warranties. The court held that Louisiana law applied and that Datamatic was bound by the original warranty limitations, as it had notice of them through its purchase and the equipment had been used for many years, preventing any claim that the warranty failed of its essential purpose.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved plaintiffs injured in a 1981 vehicular accident with a jeep previously sold by the U.S. government, who sued alleging negligence by government employees in the sale process. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss, holding that the employees' actions fell under the discretionary function exception to the Federal Tort Claims Act, which shields such decisions from tort liability. The specific claims regarding failure to provide manuals, enforce specifications, or avoid selling a wrecked vehicle were deemed to involve discretionary functions protected by 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a).

torts & liability

In this case, plaintiffs, including several Louisiana corporations and an officer, sued state Warehouse Commission and Department of Agriculture officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants arbitrarily suspended a warehouse license and seized operations without proper notice or hearing, damaging business reputations and causing financial losses, in violation of due process protections for property and liberty interests. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting justification based on financial audits showing insolvency and interconnections between entities. The court granted summary judgment to all defendants on the federal claims, rendering other motions moot. It reasoned that while the actions were taken under color of state law, they did not violate the Constitution because adequate post-deprivation remedies, including a hearing that led to reinstatement, satisfied procedural due process under cases like Parratt v. Taylor, and the statute permitted temporary suspension without prior hearing.

civil rightsprocedureproperty

In this case, parents Hardy and Alma Ryland sued District Attorney Edwin Ware and Assistant District Attorney Edward Roberts under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the defendants, acting in their official capacities, violated the plaintiffs' civil rights by interfering with access to state courts for a wrongful death claim. The interference allegedly included canceling a scheduled autopsy, directing the coroner to list the death as a suicide without examination, and delaying the police investigation into the shooting death of the Rylands' daughter at the home of a former assistant district attorney. After a bench trial, the court found that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity because they lacked knowledge that their reliance on the police investigation would contribute to any coverup, acted without malicious intent, and reasonably followed standard procedures and past practices. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to substantiate the allegations and dismissed the suit with prejudice.

civil rightscriminal law

This case concerns a garnishment proceeding initiated by Vaughn Flying Service in state court to enforce a money judgment against Paul Costanza by seizing approximately $8,000 held in a supervised FHA bank account. The United States intervened on behalf of the FHA, asserted a superior security interest through a pledge under a deposit agreement, and removed the action to federal court. Following United States v. Kimbell Foods, the court applied Louisiana pledge law as surrogate federal law to determine priority between the government's claimed pledge and Vaughn's garnishment lien. The core issue was whether a pledge of an incorporeal bank credit is valid against third parties without a written act stating the debt amount, and the court analyzed La. R.S. 9:4321-4323 and the 1938 Act to conclude that written notice to the obligor suffices to perfect the pledge without additional formalities like symbolic delivery or a debt-amount statement.

propertyprocedure

In Hale v. Co-Mar Offshore Corp., plaintiff David Hale sued for injuries sustained aboard a supply vessel time-chartered in connection with an offshore drilling operation on the Outer Continental Shelf, asserting claims under the Jones Act and unseaworthiness against multiple parties including Noble Drilling and Anadarko Production Company. Noble moved for summary judgment on its cross-claim seeking contractual indemnity from Anadarko under a drilling contract that chose Oklahoma law and required Anadarko to indemnify Noble regardless of Noble's negligence. The court ruled that the indemnity claim arose from the performance of a maritime obligation—the furnishing of the supply boat—so admiralty jurisdiction applied and federal maritime law governed the enforceability of the indemnity and choice-of-law provisions. The core reasoning was that the contract was mixed, containing both non-maritime drilling elements and separable maritime elements, and when an injury occurs during a maritime obligation, maritime law rather than state law (such as Texas's anti-indemnity statute) controls.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case concerned a dispute over contractual indemnity claims arising from an injury to a platform worker on the Outer Continental Shelf off Louisiana, where operations involved a vessel pumping drilling mud under a workover contract between Forest Oil, Mallard, and Garber. The court addressed whether maritime law or Louisiana platform law, including the Oilfield Anti-Indemnity Act, governed the indemnity provisions in the drilling contracts. The court decided that platform law applies to the indemnity claims because the injured party was a platform worker rather than someone employed to perform maritime services. The core reasoning clarified and restated the rule from Hale v. Co-Mar Offshore Corporation, holding that admiralty law governs indemnity only when the injured party was directly engaged in maritime obligations under the contract, not merely when injury results from maritime operations.

business & regulatorytorts & liability