Roslyn O. Silver

In this case, plaintiff David Harris, a former fueler at a bus yard, sued his private employer Veolia Transportation Services, Inc. and supervisor Kristen Marvel under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming his constitutional rights were violated by termination following a positive random drug test; he also referenced intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding the § 1983 claim deficient because the complaint did not allege facts showing the private defendants acted under color of state law, as merely contracting to provide public transportation services or complying with federal drug-testing regulations does not establish the required close nexus to state action. The intentional infliction of emotional distress claim was dismissed because the plaintiff indicated it was not intended as a separate cause of action. The plaintiff's motion for summary judgment was denied as moot following dismissal of the complaint, with leave granted to amend within two weeks.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In this case, Firetrace USA and its subsidiary sued a former employee and his new company for patent infringement and various state-law claims including misappropriation of trade secrets under the Arizona Uniform Trade Secrets Act, unfair competition, unjust enrichment, tortious interference, breach of fiduciary duty, breach of loyalty, breach of contract, and conversion, alleging the defendants used confidential information to develop a competing fire suppression product. The court addressed defendants' motion for partial summary judgment on all claims except patent infringement. It granted the motion in part, holding that the Arizona Uniform Trade Secrets Act preempts the common-law tort and restitutionary claims to the extent they rest on misappropriation of trade secrets or other confidential information, but denied summary judgment on the surviving portions of the unfair competition, tortious interference, and breach of fiduciary-duty/loyalty claims that are based on other alleged wrongful acts during employment. The ruling rests on the statute's displacement provision and the absence of Arizona precedent directly on point, which the court resolved by predicting how the state supreme court would interpret the preemption clause.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a Pascua Yaqui Tribe member who was convicted in tribal court on multiple counts of domestic violence-related offenses arising from a single incident and sentenced to a total of eighteen months in jail. Petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief under the Indian Civil Rights Act, arguing that the tribal court lacked authority to impose more than one year of imprisonment for acts stemming from one criminal transaction. The district court first determined that the petitioner had exhausted tribal remedies because further pursuit would have been futile. On the merits, the court interpreted ICRA's one-year sentencing limit as applying to each discrete criminal offense rather than to an entire transaction, relying on the statute's plain language, historical context, and precedent regarding separate offenses. Accordingly, the court rejected the habeas petition and upheld the tribal sentence.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

The case involves a discovery dispute in an ERISA lawsuit where plaintiffs allege that defendants violated the law by amending retirement plans to reduce benefits. The court reviewed a special master's order on whether certain documents prepared during the administrative claims process were protected by privilege or subject to the fiduciary exception requiring disclosure to plan beneficiaries. The court adopted parts of the order but required production of additional documents created before the final administrative denial, reasoning that no true anticipation of litigation existed until after the administrative process concluded, at which point interests diverged and privilege applied.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved Plaintiffs Xcentric Ventures suing Defendants Bird and others for defamation and aiding and abetting tortious conduct based on an article published on a website that allegedly harmed Plaintiffs in Arizona. Defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction after removing the case from state court to federal court in Arizona. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that Plaintiffs failed to establish specific personal jurisdiction under the Calder effects test because the Defendants' conduct was not purposefully directed at Arizona. The court also denied Plaintiffs' request for jurisdictional discovery, finding it would be futile. The core reasoning focused on the absence of minimum contacts satisfying due process requirements for exercising jurisdiction over non-resident defendants.

proceduretorts & liability

The EEOC sued Love's Travel Stops on behalf of two former female cashiers, alleging that the company violated Title VII by subjecting them to a hostile work environment through repeated sexual harassment by customers and by failing to take corrective action despite complaints. The employees described multiple incidents of verbal and physical sexual harassment at the Buckeye, Arizona store, along with management responses such as laughter, dismissal, or instructions to 'deal with it.' Love's moved for summary judgment, arguing that it had taken sufficient remedial steps and that the conduct did not create an actionable hostile environment. The court denied the motion, finding genuine disputes of material fact about the severity and pervasiveness of the harassment and whether the employer adequately responded to the employees' reports.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves plaintiffs challenging the denial of Medicare benefits for extraordinary dental services under HHS policy, the Medicare statute, and the federal constitution. Plaintiffs moved to amend their complaint to add Thomas DiCecco, Jr., a Pennsylvania resident and Medicare beneficiary with a similar claim. The court granted the motion to amend, holding that the venue requirement in 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) should be interpreted in harmony with the general venue provision in 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), such that venue is proper for all plaintiffs if it is proper for at least one. This approach avoids duplicative litigation and serves judicial economy without causing undue prejudice to the defendant.

healthcareprocedurefederal power

This case concerns a motion to dismiss a petition filed by an NLRB Regional Director under NLRA §10(j) seeking temporary injunctive relief against alleged unfair labor practices by the Western Professional Hockey League. The respondent argued that the two-member Board lacked authority to authorize the petition because the statute requires a three-member quorum, rendering the prior delegation to the General Counsel invalid after two members' terms expired. The court denied the motion to dismiss, holding that NLRA §3(b) permits a two-member Board to exercise the Board's powers when vacancies exist and that the December 2007 delegation remained effective, preserving subject-matter jurisdiction over properly filed §10(j) petitions.

labor & employmentprocedurefederal power

This case involves a tort class action filed by the Salt River Pima-Maricopa Indian Community and its members against the United States concerning federal power lines on reservation lands. Plaintiffs sought damages and other relief after a 1951 easement for the lines expired in 2007, alleging unauthorized presence. Defendants filed a counterclaim seeking equitable relief to reform the easement into a perpetual one, claiming it did not match the original intent under Public Law 764 or the parties' agreements. The court granted Plaintiffs' motion to dismiss the counterclaim, finding that the easement's fifty-year term complied with the Indian Right-of-Way Act regulations applied by the Commissioner and that reformation was not warranted based on the documents and legal standards.

propertyfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

Plaintiff Dylan Moore sued his former employer, Computer Associates International, Inc., alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act for failure to accommodate his mental disabilities (major depression, paranoid schizophrenia, and bipolar disorder) by denying a requested reassignment in 2003 and terminating him in January 2004, as well as a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 for race-based discrimination in the termination. The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment, and the plaintiff also moved for sanctions related to untimely witness disclosures. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment in part and denied the plaintiff's motions, after reviewing the evidence on the interactive process for accommodations, the medical documentation provided during FMLA leave, and the reasons for termination, finding no genuine issues of material fact on the claims.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involves a cross-claim by Haydon Building Corp. against Western Innovations, Inc. for breaching its contractual duty to defend Haydon in the underlying lawsuit brought by Sprint Communications. After the court ruled that Western had a continuing duty to defend and indemnify Haydon, Western refused to assume the defense, causing Haydon to incur additional litigation expenses that Western also failed to reimburse. Haydon moved to recover these expenses as damages from the breach, and the court granted the motion in full, awarding $242,865.04. The court reasoned that the fees qualified as damages for mitigation of the breach rather than attorneys' fees awarded under statute or contract, so the local rule's procedural requirements did not apply, and Western could not challenge the reasonableness of the defense costs after refusing the tender.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In Madrigal v. Mendoza, plaintiffs sued federal healthcare providers under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging medical negligence during the delivery of a macrosomic infant that resulted in a permanent brachial plexus injury from shoulder dystocia; they claimed the providers should have offered a cesarean section and used improper traction. The U.S. District Court for the District of Arizona granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court excluded the plaintiffs' expert witness under Daubert and Federal Rule of Evidence 702 because his opinions lacked reliable scientific basis or support from medical literature and guidelines. Without admissible expert testimony, the plaintiffs could not establish that the providers breached Arizona's standard of care or that any breach proximately caused the injury, as required by A.R.S. § 12-563.

torts & liabilityhealthcareprocedure

The case involved an assistant principal who alleged that his school district retaliated against him for supporting a coworker's civil rights complaint by initially declining to renew his contract in 2007, assigning him clerical duties, and other actions, asserting claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and various state laws. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff had not been deprived of a protected property or liberty interest under federal law, Arizona's Employment Protection Act barred implied claims based on public policy or district policies for non-renewal of contracts, and the remaining claims lacked legal or factual support.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a dispute over the proper measure of loss-of-use damages after Western Innovations severed a Sprint telecommunications cable, specifically whether Sprint could recover a one-time installation fee for a substitute cable as part of those damages. The court held that such a one-time fee is not recoverable unless reasonably pro-rated to reflect the actual period of use, rejecting Sprint's claim for the full fee. It reached this conclusion as a matter of law by looking to persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, particularly an Indiana federal court decision that used an apartment-rental analogy to illustrate why including one-time charges would produce absurd and overly punitive results. The court emphasized that loss-of-use damages are meant only to approximate actual harm and should not encompass every conceivable expense or serve a punitive purpose, consistent with Arizona precedent discouraging punitive awards.

torts & liabilityproperty

The case involves a dispute between Sprint Communications and Western Innovations over damages arising from damage to Sprint's fiber optic cable, including loss of use damages and issues of contractual indemnity and negligence. The court granted Western's motion for clarification and ruled that loss of use damages are properly measured by the reasonable rental value of a substitute cable system for the necessary period, not by any phantom costs to construct a new cable solely for rental. It denied Western's motion for reconsideration of prior rulings that the work was covered by contract, that contractual indemnity applied, and that negligence was not solely attributable to Haydon, because the motion raised new arguments that could have been presented earlier and failed to demonstrate clear error, manifest injustice, or new evidence or law.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liabilityproperty

This case involves ERISA claims brought by health plan participants and beneficiaries, a physical therapy provider (Spinedex), and a chiropractic society against multiple employee welfare benefit plans and their administrators/fiduciaries, alleging wrongful denial of benefits and compensation for medical services. The court ruled on several procedural motions and granted in part the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6). It denied plaintiffs' request to file a separate statement of objections and motion to strike evidence, citing local rules that require such objections to be included in responsive memoranda. The court granted requests for judicial notice of certain public and court documents and considered plan documents incorporated by reference in the complaint when evaluating the motion to dismiss.

healthcareprocedurelabor & employment

The case involved a breach of contract, unjust enrichment, and conversion dispute between two businesses that was removed to federal court on diversity grounds. After the court denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, the defendant failed to file a timely answer, leading the plaintiff to seek and obtain entry of default followed by a motion for default judgment. The defendant then answered and moved to set aside the default. The court denied the motion for default judgment and granted the motion to set aside default under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c), finding good cause based on the absence of culpable conduct by the defendant, lack of prejudice to the plaintiff, the existence of potentially meritorious defenses, and the technical nature of the default combined with the plaintiff's delay in seeking it.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

In this case, Sogeti USA LLC sued former employee Christian Martinez and his wife, alleging breach of a non-compete agreement and trade secret misappropriation after Martinez left to work for a competitor and allegedly recruited other employees. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing Sogeti lacked standing because it was not a party to the original employment contract with SARK and the restrictive covenant had not been validly assigned without Martinez's express consent. The court, applying Arizona law, denied the motion, holding that contractual rights including reasonable restrictive covenants are generally assignable without the employee's consent unless the contract or public policy provides otherwise, and that the complaint sufficiently alleged a valid assignment. The court assumed the facts in the plaintiff's favor at the pleading stage and concluded Sogeti had standing to enforce the agreement.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

In Carey v. Maricopa County, a physician who served as chair of obstetrics and gynecology at a county medical center alleged that officials removed him from leadership positions in a residency program after he supported optional abortion training for residents, claiming this stemmed from retaliation for his pro-choice views informed by his Methodist faith as well as investigations into his conduct. He sued the county defendants under the First and Fourteenth Amendments, federal and state religious discrimination laws, defamation, and contract interference. On the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that the health system and medical center were suable entities rather than immune political subdivisions, that punitive damages were unavailable on state-law claims against public entities or employees acting within their duties, and that genuine issues of material fact existed on the defendants' motives sufficient for certain constitutional, discrimination, and related claims to proceed to trial.

religious libertycivil rightshealthcareabortion

In this case, an unlicensed Utah mortgage broker sued an Arizona borrower, its managers, and the escrow agent for breach of contract, unjust enrichment, fraud, conversion, tortious interference, and civil conspiracy after the borrower directed release of a $750,000 broker fee from escrow following a multi-million-dollar loan for Arizona real property. The court had previously dismissed the contract and unjust enrichment claims because Arizona law bars unlicensed persons from receiving compensation for arranging mortgage loans. On the motion to dismiss the remaining tort claims, the court granted dismissal of the tortious interference claim but denied dismissal of the fraud, conversion, and conspiracy claims, reasoning that the licensing statute does not bar tort recovery because duties to avoid fraud and conversion exist independently of any contract and the economic loss doctrine does not preclude such claims.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability