Fern M. Smith

This case was a class action lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of California's Proposition 69, which expanded mandatory DNA testing to include people arrested for but not convicted of felonies and certain former felons no longer under supervision. Plaintiffs argued that these provisions violated the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by subjecting individuals who had not been convicted or were no longer under criminal justice supervision to compulsory DNA sampling. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing and that their claims were not ripe for adjudication. The court reasoned that Proposition 69 is not retroactive, so the named plaintiffs faced no realistic threat of DNA testing, there was no history of enforcement against similarly situated persons, and no specific warnings or threats of testing had been issued.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involves a class action lawsuit filed in California state court by consumers against manufacturers of head lice remedies, alleging the products are ineffective due to lice resistance, with claims under California law seeking damages, injunction, and fees. Defendants removed the case to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction, but plaintiffs moved to remand. The court remanded the case to state court, finding that defendants failed to establish complete diversity of citizenship among all parties and that the amount in controversy did not exceed $75,000 per plaintiff, as individual damages were minimal, claims could not be aggregated, and arguments regarding injunctive relief costs, punitive damages, and attorneys' fees were insufficient. The court also granted plaintiffs' request for attorneys' fees and costs incurred due to the removal.

procedure

In Danh v. Demore, two lawful permanent residents who had been convicted of fraudulently obtaining AFDC benefits challenged their mandatory detention without bond under Immigration and Nationality Act § 236(c) while facing removal proceedings. The petitioners sought a writ of habeas corpus, arguing that the statute violated their substantive due process right to freedom from arbitrary detention and their procedural due process right to an individualized hearing on flight risk and dangerousness. The district court granted the application, vacated its prior dismissal order, and directed the immigration judge to hold a bond hearing within two business days, concluding that § 236(c) impermissibly required detention without any opportunity to assess the individuals' circumstances. The court reasoned that the mandatory detention provision was not narrowly tailored to legitimate government interests and deprived detainees of a meaningful opportunity to be heard.

immigrationcivil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case involves four authors who sued UnCover, a document retrieval service owned by CARL and Dialog corporations, for allegedly infringing their copyrights by copying and delivering their individual articles from periodicals without the authors' permission or payment, though UnCover had paid publishers. The plaintiffs sought partial summary adjudication to construe section 201(c) of the Copyright Act, which grants publishers a limited privilege to reproduce contributions in collective works. The court granted the motion, holding that section 201(c) permits reproduction only as part of the original collective work, any revision of it, or later collective works in the same series, and does not authorize separate copying of individual articles. The court reasoned that the statute's plain language limits the publishers' privilege in this way, leaving reproduction rights with the authors, and rejected arguments for a broader reading based on efficiency or publisher contributions.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Anthony challenging his state criminal conviction. After an initial mixed petition was dismissed, Anthony filed a petition with one exhausted claim, obtained a stay to exhaust five additional claims in state court, and then moved to amend the stayed petition to add those claims. The court denied the motion to amend, holding that adding the claims would constitute an abuse of the writ under Rule 9(b) and precedents like McCleskey v. Zant. The reasoning was that Anthony lacked cause for his delay in exhausting and presenting the claims earlier, as no external impediment or new evidence was shown, and he failed to demonstrate a fundamental miscarriage of justice through factual innocence. The court lifted the stay and reinstated proceedings on the single remaining claim.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves a dispute over the proper construction of three patents related to the design and manufacture of EEPROM computer memory chips used in devices like programmable car radios. Plaintiff Atmel Corp. sued defendant Information Storage Devices, Inc. for patent infringement in 1995, prompting a Markman hearing on claim construction along with related motions. The court construed the claims of the '750, '776, and '811 patents based primarily on intrinsic evidence from the claims, specifications, and prosecution history, applying ordinary meanings unless otherwise indicated and special rules for means-plus-function claims under 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 6. It denied the parties' cross-motions to strike declarations and set a briefing schedule for the remaining issues on defendant's motion for summary judgment of indefiniteness.

business & regulatoryprocedureproperty

This case involved claims that Cargill participated in a conspiracy with other citric acid producers to fix prices and allocate market shares between 1991 and 1995. Four other major producers had admitted to the conspiracy and settled related claims, but Cargill, which had rapidly expanded its production and market share during that period, moved for summary judgment asserting it was not involved. The court granted the motion, holding that the evidence of Cargill's parallel pricing, participation in a trade association, and meetings with conspirators was consistent with independent competitive behavior and insufficient to allow a reasonable jury to infer conspiracy participation under the standards for circumstantial evidence in antitrust cases.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a shareholder class action alleging that Silicon Graphics, Inc. and its executives violated federal securities laws by issuing false statements about the company's revenue growth, product availability, and financial prospects during late 1995 in order to inflate the stock price and enable insiders to sell shares profitably before disappointing results were announced. The court considered renewed motions to dismiss the amended complaint and for partial summary judgment by certain defendants. Applying the heightened pleading requirements of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, the court held that many of the allegations failed to plead facts giving rise to a strong inference of scienter or to show direct involvement by individual defendants sufficient for primary liability. The court therefore granted the motions in part, dismissing certain claims while allowing others to proceed and granting summary judgment as to some defendants on the ground that they had not engaged in the alleged conduct.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a life insurance policy issued to Ignacio Matilla, who died within the two-year contestability period; after his death, the insurer investigated and discovered that he had misrepresented his immigration status on the application by providing a fraudulent visa number. The plaintiffs, his beneficiaries, sued for breach of contract, arguing that the misrepresentation was immaterial and that the insurer should pay the benefits. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, holding that the misrepresentation was material as a matter of law because the insurer's underwriting guidelines required a valid visa or alien registration number, and underwriters confirmed they would have handled the application differently if the true facts had been known. The court also rejected the plaintiffs' estoppel argument, finding insufficient evidence that the insurer was on notice of the issue at the time of issuance.

immigrationbusiness & regulatory

In Ducombs v. Trans World Airlines, a passenger sued the airline for negligence after a laptop stored in an overhead bin fell and injured her during deplaning on a flight from Newark to St. Louis, claiming the airline failed to properly manage baggage storage and warn passengers of risks. The airline sought summary judgment on grounds that the state-law claims were preempted by the FAAAA because baggage handling qualifies as a regulated "service" of an air carrier. The court denied the motion, ruling that the claims were not preempted. It reasoned that the FAAAA targets economic regulation of prices, routes, and services rather than personal injury actions, and that precedents narrowly define "services" to exclude such negligence claims arising outside economic aspects of air transportation.

federal powertorts & liability

This case involves Mirza Ali's challenge to his debarment by the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) from federal contracting, stemming from his company's submission of a forged certification letter in a bid for computer workstations to the Social Security Administration. Ali sought a temporary restraining order to invalidate the debarment and permit him to bid on government contracts. The court denied the motion, reasoning that Ali's significant delay in seeking relief indicated no irreparable harm, that any harm was merely economic and speculative, and that the government has a strong interest in protecting the integrity of its contracting process from dishonest contractors.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved an immigrant from El Salvador detained by the INS after attempting re-entry with a false passport; his asylum application was denied by an immigration judge with an appeal pending before the BIA, and he sought parole under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(d)(5) pending that appeal. The INS District Director denied parole on grounds including the petitioner's prior fraud, lack of close family relatives able to file a visa petition, and concerns that release would not serve the public interest by deterring immigration violations, later adjusting the family-ties rationale after the petitioner's wife obtained suspension of deportation and filed a visa petition on his behalf. The district court reviewed the denial to determine whether facially legitimate and bona fide reasons supported it and concluded that the stated reasons, including a non-individualized flight-risk assessment based on policy considerations, were not sufficient. The court therefore granted the habeas petition and ordered the petitioner's release on parole.

immigrationprocedure

This case concerned Elizabeth Bellus's challenge to IRS assessments of unpaid F.I.C.A., withholding, and F.U.T.A. taxes for her company Light Rail during its 1989 bankruptcy proceedings under chapters 11 and 7. Bellus moved for reconsideration of a prior denial of summary judgment, arguing she was not the responsible employer after entering an unapproved arrangement with a third party and after the case converted to chapter 7 with a trustee appointed. The court denied the reconsideration motion and granted the United States' motion for summary judgment, holding Bellus liable because she operated the business as debtor-in-possession during the relevant periods, the trustee never ran operations or paid wages, and the IRS was not estopped from collection by failing to file a bankruptcy claim.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved James E. Ireson challenging the Social Security Administration's reduction of his Supplemental Security Income benefits following California's statewide reduction of its state supplementary payments. The plaintiff argued that he was denied due process due to inadequate notice about the agreement between SSA and California and the lack of a meaningful administrative hearing, and that the benefit reduction was improper despite his timely appeal. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the notice provided was adequate, the hearing satisfied due process requirements as the decision was a state legislative matter outside SSA's jurisdiction, and SSA properly handled the appeal process by freezing benefits only until the first reconsideration decision. The court also noted it lacked authority to consider one argument not raised in prior proceedings.

procedurefederal powerhealthcare

In United States v. Singleton, the defendant filed a § 2255 motion claiming that his criminal convictions and sentence for drug, firearms, and money laundering offenses violated the Double Jeopardy Clause because they followed a civil forfeiture of currency and automobiles to which he had consented in his plea agreement. The court denied the motion, holding that the criminal plea proceeding was the first in which jeopardy attached and that the forfeiture did not constitute a second punishment for the same conduct. The court reasoned that the forfeiture was a bargained-for term of the single plea agreement resolving both criminal and civil matters, not a separate proceeding, and that the defendant's explicit agreement to the forfeiture terms was equivalent to a waiver of any double jeopardy defense. The court further noted that the defendant had received and enforced benefits under the agreement without prior challenge on double jeopardy grounds.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an attorney's FOIA request to the Department of the Air Force for an electronic copy of U.S. Supreme Court decisions stored in its JURIS legal database, excluding any copyrighted materials. The court granted the Air Force's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment. It held that the database was not an "agency record" subject to mandatory disclosure under FOIA because it consisted of library reference materials acquired solely for reference purposes, did not directly reflect agency decision-making functions, and contained information already publicly available from other sources, following Ninth Circuit precedent in SDC Development Corp. v. Mathews.

procedurefederal power

This case involves the State of California's effort to recover costs for cleaning up hazardous materials at the Celtor site, an ore-processing facility on the Hoopa Valley Indian Reservation, from Dr. Carmelo Celestre under the federal CERCLA statute and the parallel California HSAA. Dr. Celestre, president and board member of the operating company, moved for summary judgment arguing he was not an operator, the claims were time-barred, oversight fees were not recoverable, and state authority was preempted by federal law on tribal land. The court denied the motion in full, holding that factual disputes existed regarding operator status based on Celestre's visits and involvement in related proceedings, the claims were timely under applicable limitations periods and exceptions, oversight costs could be recovered, and CERCLA did not preempt the state claims because they were compatible with federal interests and tribal sovereignty.

environmentfederal power

This case is a securities fraud class action brought by purchasers of Gupta Corporation stock against the company, its executives, a major shareholder, and outside directors, alleging violations of Sections 10(b), 20(a), and 20A of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 through false and misleading statements about the company's financial condition during the class period from September 13, 1993 to July 6, 1994, in order to inflate stock prices for insider sales. The court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motions to dismiss under Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), while denying as moot the plaintiffs' motion to strike certain exhibits. The partial dismissal rested on insufficient particularity in pleading some alleged misrepresentations, accounting practices from the fourth quarter of 1993, and reliance on analyst reports, while allowing other claims related to first-quarter 1994 reports and insider trading to proceed under theories of group publication, control person liability, and fraud on the market.

business & regulatory

This case involves a court-appointed referee seeking to recover costs for cleaning up lead contamination from a former shooting range on property he was ordered to sell, under CERCLA and state claims for negligence and waste. The plaintiff alleged that the United States, California, Mendocino County, and Fort Bragg were liable because their employees had used the range and deposited lead there. The court denied the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment on CERCLA liability, finding that the action was one for contribution rather than joint and several liability because the property owners might also bear responsibility, and it denied the United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings while granting leave to amend the complaint to substitute the owners as plaintiffs. It granted the defendants' unopposed motions for summary judgment on the negligence and waste claims and identified several undisputed facts, including that the site was a CERCLA facility, a release of hazardous substances had occurred, and the defendants were responsible parties.

environmentpropertyprocedure

The case concerned debtor Julio Acosta's appeal from a bankruptcy court judgment approving a settlement agreement with his creditor and the bankruptcy trustee over his interests in two pension plans, as well as an award of prejudgment interest. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's rulings that the plans were not excluded from the bankruptcy estate under ERISA's anti-alienation provisions or the I.R.C., that ERISA preempted California's pension exemption statute, and that the settlement was enforceable because the plans were not the exclusive source of funding for the $200,000 payment. The court further upheld the prejudgment interest award, finding it compensatory rather than penal given the delay caused by Acosta's motions. Core reasoning included that the plans did not qualify for ERISA protection because Acosta was the sole shareholder and beneficiary of the medical corporation, that the I.R.C. provided no separate private right of action, and that extrinsic evidence showed the parties did not intend the plans as the sole funding source.

propertyprocedurebusiness & regulatory