This case involves Hallmark Cards suing several Clipper-related entities and individuals for allegedly misusing Hallmark's confidential information, obtained through Monitor's consulting work, to evaluate and acquire a competitor, Recycled Paper Greetings. Hallmark asserted claims including RICO violations, unjust enrichment, misappropriation of trade secrets, conversion, and fraud, stemming from an arbitration award against Monitor and subsequent discovery. The court dismissed without prejudice the claims against Monitor Clipper Equity Partners II, LP, RPG Investment Holdings, LLC, Charles Yoon, William Young, and Mark Thomas for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient minimum contacts with Missouri. It also dismissed the RICO and fraud in the inducement counts for failure to state a claim, as the alleged acts did not qualify as racketeering activity and the fraud allegations were inadequate. The remaining claims against the other defendants were allowed to proceed.
The United States brought this civil action under IRC § 7408 seeking an injunction to stop the defendant, a lawyer and tax advisor with extensive education and professional experience, from promoting arrangements involving Roth IRAs and related entities. After a bench trial, the court ruled for the government, finding that the defendant had organized plans and furnished statements about the allowability of tax deductions, exclusions, and benefits that he knew or had reason to know were false or fraudulent, in violation of IRC § 6700. The court applied the statutory factors for scienter, including the defendant's sophistication and failure to rely appropriately on independent professionals, and concluded that injunctive relief was necessary to prevent recurrence of the penalized conduct.
This case is a collective action under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) in which plaintiffs claim that AT&T required them to log into phone and computer systems before their shifts started without compensation for that time. The court ruled that individuals who opted into the lawsuit are not subject to the full scope of discovery requests that would apply to named parties, limiting them to answering one interrogatory about their job details and producing limited documents. The reasoning is that FLSA collective actions function similarly to class actions, where opt-in members are not full parties, damages are calculated formulaically from the employer's records rather than individual testimony, and broad discovery would undermine the efficiency benefits of such collective proceedings.
This case involves a contract dispute between DynaSteel Corporation, a supplier of ductwork and related materials, and Black & Veatch Corporation, the buyer, for a power plant retrofit project. DynaSteel sued for breach of contract and related claims seeking payment of over $1.4 million allegedly owed under the contract, while B&V counterclaimed for breach of contract and warranty, seeking to recover costs for alleged defects through backcharges totaling millions. The court denied DynaSteel's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues of material fact on issues including notice requirements under the contract and UCC, liquidated damages, and most defect claims. However, the court granted B&V partial summary judgment on liability for DynaSteel's failure to install insulation with a required 2-foot setback, as the contract unambiguously required this and DynaSteel did not dispute the obligation.
In Castro-Gaxiola v. United States, the movant, who had been convicted by a jury in 2005 of federal drug conspiracy, distribution, interstate travel, and illegal reentry charges and sentenced to 151 months, sought postconviction relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 more than 18 months after his conviction became final upon denial of certiorari in October 2007. The district court denied the motion as untimely under AEDPA's one-year statute of limitations, denied the accompanying request for equitable tolling, and granted the government's motion to dismiss. The court reasoned that the movant failed to show extraordinary circumstances beyond his control or due diligence, as delays from relying on a non-attorney inmate, difficulties obtaining case files, limited prison library access, and lack of Spanish-language materials did not qualify; it also rejected an alternative limitations start date under § 2255(f)(4) based on a co-defendant's later successful motion, citing Eighth Circuit precedent that judicial decisions are not "facts" for this purpose.
This case involves a patron who was injured in a parking lot by a drunk driver after both had been served alcohol at the defendant's bar and restaurant; the plaintiff sued the bar under Missouri's dram shop statute and had previously settled with the driver for the limits of his insurance policy. The defendant moved to join the driver as a party (or in the alternative to compare his fault without joining him) so that a jury could allocate fault percentages under the 2005 tort reform statute, which limits joint-and-several liability for defendants found less than 51% at fault. The court denied the motion, holding that Missouri Revised Statute § 537.060 bars allocation of fault to a settling tortfeasor for any purpose, including comparison, even after tort reform; the statute discharges the settler from contribution or indemnity and dismisses that party from the action entirely, as confirmed by the Missouri Supreme Court's interpretation in Teeter v. Missouri Highway and Transportation Commission.
