Philip Rastelli petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus after the U.S. Parole Commission revoked his mandatory release parole for associating with persons having criminal records, a violation of his release conditions; he challenged the revocation on grounds including lack of evidence, vagueness of the condition, and improper procedures in an original jurisdiction case. The court held that the Commission's regulation allowing up to 119 days for appeals in original jurisdiction cases conflicts with the statutory 60-day requirement under 18 U.S.C. § 4215(b), rendering the exhaustion process invalid in this context, and further found insufficient evidence that Rastelli had "associated" with such persons as defined. The court granted the habeas petition but stayed issuance of the writ for 30 days to allow the Commission to initiate new revocation proceedings or otherwise justify continued detention. The decision turned on statutory interpretation of parole procedures and review of the administrative record showing no adequate factual basis for the revocation.
The case centered on a 78-count RICO indictment charging 24 defendants with participating in a criminal enterprise (a "crew") involved in 80 alleged racketeering acts, including 26 murders, bribery, extortion, narcotics trafficking, and other offenses spanning 1972 to 1983. Defendants filed an omnibus motion and individual challenges seeking dismissal of counts or striking of acts on grounds such as statute of limitations under 18 U.S.C. § 3282, preindictment delay, insufficiency of the RICO theory and joinder, and various evidentiary issues. The court organized its rulings into four parts covering jurisdictional bars, the government's use of RICO for theory and joinder, particular counts or acts, and miscellaneous motions, with reasoning that superseding indictments timely preserved charges, RICO conspiracy requires an agreement to commit at least two racketeering acts (without needing an overt act), and due process or associational concerns did not bar prosecution of the alleged criminal agreement.
In United States v. Castellano, the government moved to disqualify attorney Gerald L. Shargel from representing defendant Richard Mastrangelo in a multi-defendant RICO prosecution alleging an organized crime enterprise led by Roy DeMeo. The court disqualified Shargel, finding that evidence of his receipt of cash payments from the alleged enterprise for the legal fees of multiple co-defendants was relevant and admissible to prove the enterprise's existence and structure under RICO. Although acknowledging Mastrangelo's Sixth Amendment interest in counsel of his choice, the court held that Shargel's potential testimony created a conflict that could prejudice his client and that the public interest in the testimony outweighed that right.
The case involves the government's motion to disqualify attorney Gerald L. Shargel from representing defendant Richard Mastrangelo in a criminal trial, citing Shargel's invocation of his Fifth Amendment privilege before a grand jury regarding his relationships with defendants, the possibility that Shargel might be called as a witness, and ethical concerns involving former clients. The court did not rule on the disqualification but instead ordered further proceedings to develop a record on potential conflicts, including risks of perjury or obstruction, Shargel's role as a witness, objections from former clients, and the defendant's waiver of conflict-free representation. The reasoning emphasizes the defendant's constitutional right to counsel of his choice, requiring the government to demonstrate convincingly that disqualification is necessary and that less intrusive measures, such as stipulations or in camera reviews, cannot suffice, in light of precedents like Flanagan v. United States and United States v. Cunningham.
The case involved National Survival Game, Inc. suing competing entities and their officers, the Fogals, for allegedly misusing confidential information from failed dealership talks to launch a similar game called Skirmish and for disseminating false advertising that misappropriated NSG's goodwill, in violation of the Lanham Act, unfair competition, and related state laws. The Fogals moved to dismiss the claims against them personally under Rule 12(b)(6), contending their actions were solely in their corporate capacities. The court denied the motion, ruling that corporate officers who personally participate in tortious or illegal conduct may be held jointly and severally liable with the corporation under both federal precedent and New York law, and that the complaint adequately alleged such participation. The court also sanctioned the defendants' attorneys under Rule 11 for filing a motion unsupported by any cited authority.
In this case, the trustee of a bankrupt corporation sued to recover computer assets allegedly transferred fraudulently to a spin-off entity before the bankruptcy filing, invoking federal bankruptcy law on fraudulent transfers and New York fraudulent conveyance statutes, while also bringing malpractice claims against two law firms and an attorney involved in the transaction. The defendants moved to withdraw the malpractice claims from the bankruptcy court and dismiss them for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim. The district court held that it possessed subject matter jurisdiction over the malpractice claims under principles of pendent jurisdiction because they arose from the same facts as the core fraudulent transfer claims and shared a federal nexus with the bankruptcy proceeding. The court further reasoned that the malpractice claims were premature and dependent on the bankruptcy court's resolution of whether the transfer was fraudulent, as no injury to the estate would occur if the assets were recovered, leading it to deny the motion to dismiss, retain jurisdiction, and close the case without prejudice pending the bankruptcy court's determination.
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