Samuel M. Blatchford

The case concerned a dispute over customs duties on imported old india-rubber shoes, invoiced as rubber scrap, where the collector assessed 25% ad valorem duty under the 1883 tariff act as articles composed of india-rubber, and the importer protested claiming exemption as similar to crude rubber on the free list. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the importer, holding that the goods were not dutiable because their only commercial value came from the rubber content usable like crude rubber, with no added value from prior manufacture. The core reasoning applied the similitude clause in Revised Statutes section 2499, under which non-enumerated articles similar in material, quality, texture, and use to free-list items are exempt from duty, as confirmed by uncontradicted evidence that the worn-out shoes had lost value as manufactured articles and fit the description of old scrap rubber for remanufacture.

business & regulatorytaxesfederal power

This case was a patent infringement dispute in which the plaintiffs, holders of exclusive rights to a pipe patent in Connecticut, sued the defendant, an assignee with rights in Michigan, for selling and shipping pipes from Michigan that were intended for use in Connecticut. The lower court ruled for the defendant based on the precedent in Adams v. Burke, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court held that the sale was lawfully completed in Michigan and that neither the intended out-of-territory use nor the defendant's knowledge of it created infringement liability. The core reasoning was that a valid sale within an assignee's territory conveys unrestricted rights to use the item everywhere, as the patentee receives full consideration at sale and must protect territorial limits through contractual conditions rather than infringement suits against lawful sellers.

propertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a patent infringement suit in equity brought by the Underwoods against Gerber and Andreas in the U.S. Circuit Court for the Eastern District of New York, alleging infringement of U.S. Patent No. 348,073 for a reproducing transfer surface used in place of carbon paper for typewriting or writing copies. The patent described a dye-based composition applied to paper, but the plaintiffs held a related patent (No. 348,072) on the underlying composition itself, which was not asserted here. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the composition of matter described but not claimed in the companion patent was dedicated to the public under precedents such as Miller v. Brass Co. and Mahn v. Harwood; therefore, merely coating paper with the known composition involved no patentable novelty or invention. The defendants' product matched the composition from the unasserted patent combined with paper as described in the sued-on patent.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case was a creditors' bill in equity brought by the assignee in bankruptcy of David M. Smith against Smith and several transferees to set aside three conveyances of real property made in 1874 as fraudulent. The bill was filed in 1886, after Smith had been adjudged bankrupt in 1878 and discharged in 1879. The Circuit Court dismissed the bill, and the Supreme Court affirmed, applying New York's six-year statute of limitations for fraud actions and the two-year federal bankruptcy limitation in Revised Statutes § 5057. The court reasoned that the right of action belonged originally to creditors rather than the bankrupt, that the assignee therefore claimed under the creditors, and that the recorded deeds plus a related public lawsuit meant the fraud was or should have been discoverable well before the suit was filed, with no affirmative concealment shown to toll either limitations period.

procedurebusiness & regulatoryproperty

This admiralty case arose from a January 1886 collision in the Hudson River between the British steamship Servia and the Belgian steamship Noordland, both departing New York harbor slips bound for sea. The master of the Noordland sued the Servia in rem for damages in the Southern District of New York; the Servia filed a cross-libel. After trial, the District Court dismissed the Noordland's libel, finding the Servia faultless and the collision due to the Noordland's delay in starting her engines ahead. The Circuit Court affirmed on findings that the Noordland continued backing after signaling an intent to proceed, encroaching on the Servia's course, while the Servia had stopped and reversed engines appropriately under the circumstances. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Noordland's unjustifiable delay constituted negligence under special circumstances requiring each vessel to monitor the other, and that the Servia had fulfilled her duties.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case was a dispute over title and possession of approximately 4000 acres of land in Limestone County, Texas, originally part of an 11-league Spanish land grant, with the core conflict centering on the correct location of the southern boundary line of a 6000-acre tract and claims of adverse possession. The plaintiffs, Sarah B. Mexia and her husband, sued defendant T. J. Oliver in federal circuit court to recover the land, alleging ownership through a 1874 partition deed and long-acquiesced boundaries established in 1855. The Supreme Court reversed the circuit court's judgment in favor of the defendant and remanded for a new trial, holding that the lower court erred by admitting into evidence an invalid power of attorney from Mrs. Hammekin to her husband and a related deed, which under Texas law could not convey the wife's separate property without her proper acknowledgment. These evidentiary errors were deemed potentially prejudicial because they could have influenced the jury's findings on boundary acquiescence and title issues raised in the petition to try title.

propertyprocedurefamily law

This case is a patent infringement suit in equity brought by the National Meter Company against the Yonkers water board, alleging that meters used by the defendant infringed claims 3-6 of a reissued patent for water-meter piston improvements originally granted to Nash. The court compared the patented design, which requires an eccentric side-rocking piston motion with unequal projections creating compound movement and reversible inlet/outlet ports, to the defendant's meter. The defendant's device uses equal projections on piston and cylinder, produces only simple sliding motion without compound rotation or cross-movement, employs differently adapted valves, and has fixed non-reversible ports. Finding these structural and operational differences meant the accused meters did not practice the claimed invention, the court held there was no infringement and affirmed the circuit court's decree for the defendant.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved an intervening petition by Perry Brothers, a jewelry sales firm, against the receivers of the Wabash railway seeking damages after a trunk containing watches, jewelry, and merchandise was destroyed in a derailment and fire while being transported as baggage. The petitioners' partner had purchased a passenger ticket, paid extra for the trunk, and checked it without disclosing its commercial contents, which violated the receivers' rules against accepting such items as baggage. The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's award to the petitioners and directed dismissal of the petition, reasoning that the concealment meant the railway had not undertaken to carry the merchandise and bore no liability for its loss.

torts & liability

The case concerned whether a federal tax on bank deposits under the Act of June 30, 1864 (later § 3408 of the Revised Statutes) applied to funds that the State of New York deposited with Manhattan Co. pursuant to a contract for the bank to disburse interest payments to state creditors. The bank argued that the funds were not taxable deposits because it held them only as a salaried disbursing agent and trustee, and that the tax would unconstitutionally burden state revenues. The Supreme Court held that the deposits were taxable because the money became the bank's property upon deposit, was subject to payment by check or draft, and fit the statutory definition; the bank acted as both debtor to the state for the funds and agent for disbursement, but the tax fell on the bank in its capacity as a recipient of deposits rather than on the state itself. The Court rejected claims that the arrangement created an irrevocable trust or that the tax impaired state functions, and affirmed the judgment upholding the tax.

taxesfederal power

This case involved a patent infringement suit brought by Henry Huber and James E. Boyle against the N.O. Nelson Manufacturing Company over two patents for improvements in water-closets. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's decision that U.S. patent No. 260,232 was void. The core reasoning was that under Revised Statutes § 4887, a U.S. patent for an invention previously patented abroad must expire no later than the foreign patent; here the English patent to Peters and Donald had lapsed after seven years due to nonpayment of stamp duty, and the U.S. application was filed after that expiration. The Court also addressed a reissue patent (No. 291,139) and rejected expanded claims that omitted elements present in the original, citing precedents on reissue limitations.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case stems from the Hot Springs litigation involving disputes over title to lots in the Hot Springs reservation in Arkansas, where the Hot Springs Commission allegedly erred in awarding purchase rights, leading to claims that subsequent purchasers held the property as trustees for prior occupants, along with related accounting for rents, taxes, and improvements. The Supreme Court had previously reversed circuit court decrees on the allowance of pre-filing rents but affirmed rulings on title and possession, remanding for further proceedings consistent with its opinions. The present matter concerns petitions for mandamus to direct the circuit court on how to handle the remands in specific cases, including whether to apply doctrines from related decisions like McDonald v. Belding regarding innocent purchasers under quitclaim deeds. The court examined the scope of its prior mandates and the discretion afforded to the lower court in applying the law to the facts.

propertyprocedure

This case involved letter carriers employed by the U.S. Post Office in Salt Lake City who sued the government in the Court of Claims for extra compensation under the 1888 federal statute limiting their workday to eight hours. The carriers had performed various duties, including sorting and distributing mail inside the post office between delivery routes, totaling more than eight hours per day over specified periods, but the Post Office Department had denied their claims for overtime pay. The Court of Claims awarded them recovery, and the Supreme Court affirmed that judgment. The Court reasoned that the statute entitled carriers to extra pay for any lawful employment exceeding eight hours a day in their role as carriers, without regard to the precise nature of the tasks, provided the work complied with Post Office regulations and was not performed in a clerical capacity.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case involved Frank Gates, a letter carrier in New York, who petitioned the Court of Claims for extra pay under the Act of May 24, 1888, for overtime work exceeding eight hours per day from May to July 1888, totaling 165 hours and 9 minutes. The Court of Claims awarded him compensation at his hourly rate without deducting for shorter workdays on Sundays and holidays, and the United States appealed. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, holding that the statute requires extra pay for any day exceeding eight hours without averaging across days or offsetting deficits unless the carrier was absent without leave. The Court rejected the Post Office Department's method of calculating net excess time, as it would improperly insert the words 'on an average' into the law.

labor & employmentfederal power

The case concerned two lawsuits brought in Missouri state court by owners of imported Scottish cattle against the New York, Lake Erie & Western Railroad, a New York corporation, for damages arising from a September 1883 train collision in Ohio while the animals were being shipped westward. The petitions alleged negligence by the railroad as common carrier, resulting in physical injuries to the cattle, premature loss of calves by pregnant cows, and related expenses, with the suits removed to federal court on diversity grounds and involving challenges to service of process and attachments. The Supreme Court opinion reviewed the jurisdictional issues, including attempted service on a local agent and the scope of Missouri court authority over a foreign railroad not operating in the state, and included jury instructions directing that liability be limited to harms directly caused by the collision, excluding losses from contagion, plaintiffs' failure to mitigate, or unrelated factors like climate or voyage stress.

torts & liabilityprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case was a patent infringement suit brought by Alanson Cary and Edward A. Moen against Lovell Manufacturing Company for allegedly using the process described in U.S. Patent No. 116,266, which covered tempering coiled furniture springs by applying heat of about 600 degrees after coiling to restore elasticity and strength lost during forming. The lower courts had sustained the patent and issued injunctions, relying on an earlier decision that found the process novel despite prior uses of heat treatment in other contexts. The Supreme Court reversed and ordered dismissal of the complaint, concluding that the claimed method was not patentable because it applied a known principle of heat treatment—previously used in making wire clock-bells and hair-balance springs—to a new article without any inventive difference. The Court determined that the patent therefore covered only an unpatentable double use of an old process.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case concerned whether a party appealing an interlocutory injunction order under the Act of March 3, 1891, § 7, had an absolute right to a supersedeas staying the injunction during the appeal, or whether the trial court retained discretion to deny one. The Supreme Court held that the Circuit Court had discretion to grant or refuse a supersedeas and that mandamus could not compel it to issue one. The opinion reasoned that § 7 contains no express requirement to stay the injunction itself and only authorizes the lower court to decide whether to stay proceedings in other respects; any implied right to an automatic stay was not sufficiently clear to override the plaintiff's rights under the injunction order. The Court therefore denied the petition for mandamus.

procedure

The case concerned agreements made in 1883 between the American Rapid Telegraph Company and the Bankers’ and Merchants’ Telegraph Company for the construction of telegraph lines connecting various cities, in exchange for $3 million in bonds secured by a mortgage on Rapid’s property and after-acquired assets, along with related stock exchanges and debt assumptions; disputes later arose over control of the lines, foreclosures under Bankers’ mortgage, and whether the Western lines fell under Rapid’s mortgage held by the Boston Safe Deposit and Trust Company. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court’s ruling that the Western lines were subject to Rapid’s mortgage and should pass under its foreclosure. The core reasoning was that after-acquired property became encumbered by the mortgage upon acquisition, the Bankers’ Company and its bondholders had received benefits from the agreement and were bound by it, and neither Rapid nor the trustee was a party to the Bankers’ foreclosure proceedings so their rights remained unaffected.

business & regulatoryproperty

The case involved an indictment under Revised Statutes § 3894, as amended in 1890, charging Edward H. Horner with knowingly depositing in the mail a circular that promoted Austrian state bonds featuring periodic drawings by lot to select bonds for early redemption and to award large cash prizes. The trial court convicted Horner after a jury trial, and he challenged the conviction on the ground that the bonds did not constitute a lottery or similar enterprise offering prizes dependent on chance. The Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the scheme's mechanism—determining which bonds would be repaid early and which would receive enhanced payments entirely by random drawings—made the bonds a prohibited lottery-like enterprise under the statute, so mailing promotional materials about them was unlawful.

criminal law

The case concerned a suit by architects John L. Smithmeyer and Paul J. Pelz against the United States in the Court of Claims seeking payment of $210,000 for general plans and drawings they prepared for the Library of Congress building between 1873 and 1886, which the government accepted and used in construction. The Court of Claims awarded the claimants $48,000 as the reasonable value of their services after applying an 1888 appropriations statute that repealed prior commission authority, placed control with the Chief of Engineers, and authorized the Secretary of the Interior to adjust the value of the plans submitted by Smithmeyer. The Supreme Court considered jurisdictional challenges based on that statute but noted that the United States had not appealed the award and would accept affirmance if jurisdiction existed, with the award limited to pre-1881 plan preparation and excluding post-acceptance work or office expenses.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a suit by a former U.S. marshal against the United States to recover fees and disbursements for services rendered between 1886 and 1888 that had been disallowed by the First Comptroller of the Treasury. The disputed items included fees for distributing venires, purchasing blanks, travel to attend court sessions, expenses attempting arrests, travel to serve precepts, and transporting prisoners. The Circuit Court found for the marshal on most claims after reviewing admissions that the services were performed and an agreed statement of facts, and the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the charges were allowable under applicable statutes and prior practice, with any maximum compensation issues left for Treasury adjustment. The Court reasoned that the marshal's accounts had been properly approved by the district court and that the fees were supported by the facts and law governing such expenses.

procedurecriminal law