Dominic J. Squatrito

In Mignault v. Ledyard Public Schools, a former paid assistant football coach sued the school district and several administrators, claiming that complaints about his conduct, an investigation into nepotism and bullying violations, his reassignment to an unpaid volunteer role, and the distribution of an investigative report deprived him of a protected property interest without procedural due process, violated his substantive due process rights, and constituted intentional infliction of emotional distress under Connecticut law. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment on all claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff lacked a constitutionally protected property interest in his at-will coaching position or in the school's adherence to internal procedures, that the defendants' actions did not shock the conscience or otherwise violate substantive due process, and that the conduct was not extreme and outrageous enough to support an emotional distress claim.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a former Wal-Mart employee suing the company for retaliation under Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act, claiming she faced hostility, discipline, and termination after participating in a deposition for a coworker's discrimination lawsuit against the employer. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiff failed to show that Wal-Mart's stated reasons for its actions—such as poor job performance and violations of company policy—were a pretext for retaliation. The reasoning centered on the lack of evidence of similarly situated employees being treated differently and the absence of temporal proximity between her protected activity and the adverse actions.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case involved a lawsuit by Paul Ferraresso against the Town of Granby, its police chief, and two officers following his July 2006 arrest, asserting federal claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments for false arrest and excessive force, a Monell municipal liability claim, and various state constitutional and tort claims. The defendants moved for summary judgment on all eleven counts after the plaintiff submitted an affidavit and damages list. The court denied a motion to strike portions of the plaintiff's materials but granted summary judgment to the defendants, finding no evidence that the officers violated Ferraresso's constitutional rights, no municipal policy or custom supporting liability, and that state-law claims were abandoned or subject to declined supplemental jurisdiction. Judgment was entered for all defendants on every count.

civil rightscriminal lawfederal power

The plaintiff sued Coca-Cola for employment discrimination and retaliation under Title VII and the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act. Coca-Cola's counsel from Proskauer Rose moved to withdraw after a conflict arose from the firm's representation of Pepsi in a separate false advertising suit against Coca-Cola. The court had granted the withdrawal and now denies Coca-Cola's motion to vacate that order. The court found that the attorney-client relationship had irretrievably broken down, as shown by threats of disciplinary action, and that Coca-Cola would not suffer undue prejudice because it could retain new counsel with time to review the pending summary judgment briefing. Under local rules and professional conduct standards, withdrawal was permissible given the circumstances.

procedurecivil rightslabor & employment

This case involved plaintiffs Edward Peruta and Harris Agricultural Enterprises suing the Town of Rocky Hill, police officers, and attorney Edward Noble for damages after Peruta's arrest on charges related to allegedly stealing a truck from a condominium resident. The suit alleged violations of the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, as well as state claims for malicious prosecution and intentional infliction of emotional distress, stemming from events where Peruta attempted to evict the resident using a power of attorney and removed the vehicle without police notification. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, finding no genuine issues of material fact. It reasoned that officers had probable cause to arrest based on the victim's report and statements, that Peruta's constitutional rights were not violated during questioning, and that the remaining claims against the municipality, officers, and attorney lacked merit or were abandoned.

criminal lawcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involved a dispute between logistics companies where Bacarella Transportation Services sued Right Way Logistics, its former independent contractor, along with Right Way's managing member Michelle Ulery and competitor ICAT Logistics. The claims included breach of a 2004 transportation services agreement that restricted Right Way from competing or diverting business, tortious interference with Bacarella's relationship with customer JC Penney, breach of the covenant of good faith, conspiracy, and statutory liability under Connecticut's LLC law for alleged de facto dissolution of Right Way after it ceased operations and transferred assets to ICAT in 2008. The court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the tort and related counts without prejudice, allowing those arguments to be raised later, but granted summary judgment on the statutory claim. It reasoned that the facts of ceasing performance, terminating the contract, and selling assets did not establish de facto dissolution under the relevant legal standards, even after considering additional discovery requests.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a dispute over a prevailing defendant's bill of costs after summary judgment was granted in its favor in a civil action. The defendant sought to recover $4,500 in occupational taxes paid by its out-of-state attorneys to Connecticut's Commissioner of Revenue Services, characterizing them as pro hac vice admission fees, while the plaintiff objected that these were not taxable. The court sustained the objection in part, approving only $1,500.61 of the bill for clerk fees, document reproduction, and transcripts, but denying recovery of the occupational taxes. The core reasoning was that these taxes are not authorized as costs under 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (which limits recoverable items like clerk fees) or local rules allowing fees to masters, receivers, and commissioners, because they are general taxes for practicing law in the state rather than case-specific fees paid to the court clerk, and the term 'commissioner' does not encompass the revenue commissioner under principles of statutory interpretation.

proceduretaxes

The plaintiff, a longtime employee of a Realogy subsidiary, sued the company alleging age discrimination (both disparate treatment and disparate impact) and retaliation under the ADEA and Connecticut's Fair Employment Practices Act after she was terminated in a 2007 reduction in force. The defendant moved under Rule 12(b)(6) to dismiss any Title VII claims, the disparate impact claims, and the retaliation claims. The court granted the motion in full, holding that no Title VII claims had been pled, that the disparate impact allegations were impermissibly duplicative of the treatment claims, and that the retaliation claims had not been exhausted because they were not raised in the administrative charge.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The plaintiff, a former Pfizer employee, sued the company alleging sex, age, race, and national origin discrimination, sexual harassment, retaliation, and other claims under the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, plus whistleblower retaliation, breach of implied contract, and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The defendant moved to dismiss some of the discrimination, retaliation, and negligent infliction of emotional distress claims as untimely or for failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, finding that certain discrete discriminatory acts fell outside the statutory filing deadlines and were time-barred while other claims could proceed.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved the widow of a deceased Connecticut judge filing suit as executrix against the state and state officials, claiming interference with salary and benefits rights under state law as well as violations of Article I, Section 10 and the Fifth, Eleventh, and Fourteenth Amendments based on the denial of workers' compensation survivorship benefits after the judge's fatal heart attack. The defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim. The court granted the motion, holding that the Eleventh Amendment barred federal court jurisdiction over claims seeking monetary relief from the state, that the complaint did not seek cognizable prospective injunctive relief, and that related state-law and constitutional claims could not proceed.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a Title IX lawsuit brought by Jane Doe on behalf of her minor daughter, Mary Doe, against the Coventry Board of Education. The plaintiff claimed that the school district failed to adequately respond to reports of student-on-student sexual harassment and ongoing contact with the alleged perpetrator following an off-campus assault, depriving Mary Doe of educational opportunities. The court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment, finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether the school's actions constituted deliberate indifference under Title IX. Specifically, the evidence could support a finding that the district's refusal to separate the students, requests for details of the assault, and handling of peer harassment were unreasonable.

civil rights

The case involved Kathleen Nanos suing the City of Stamford after her termination from her position as an Office Support Specialist in the Police Department, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act due to her alcoholism, as well as state law claims for wrongful termination and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The decision was based on Nanos's failure to comply with local procedural rules, leading to many facts being deemed admitted, including her signing of a Last Chance Agreement following alcohol-related incidents and subsequent violations resulting in her termination. The court reasoned that the ADA does not protect employees from termination for misconduct caused by alcoholism, such as absenteeism and public intoxication, and that her state claims lacked sufficient evidence of extreme and outrageous conduct or other required elements.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

In Zainc v. City of Waterbury, two plaintiffs sued the city and multiple police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of their constitutional rights along with state-law claims including false arrest, malicious prosecution, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and assault and battery. The claims arose from an October 2005 incident at a bar where off-duty officers accused the plaintiffs of theft, leading to a physical altercation, the plaintiffs' arrests for breach of the peace and interfering with an officer, and the eventual dismissal of those charges. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, finding probable cause supported the arrests and thus dismissing related false-arrest and certain unreasonable-force claims, while allowing other claims such as malicious prosecution and excessive force by the off-duty officers to proceed. The court applied federal and state standards for probable cause and qualified immunity, noting that the off-duty officers' conduct raised triable issues of objective reasonableness.

civil rightscriminal lawproceduretorts & liability

The plaintiff, a property owner in the Town of Bridgewater, sued the town's First Selectman (who also served as police chief) and the town itself, alleging violations of his Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights arising from the denial of a zoning variance and driveway permit applications, as well as actions by the defendant that blocked access to his property. The court addressed the defendants' motion to dismiss (construed as one for judgment on the pleadings) and motion for summary judgment, along with the plaintiff's related motions to strike. It granted the motions in part and denied them in part, determining that certain due process and other constitutional claims failed as a matter of law due to the plaintiff's inability to show a protected property interest or improper conduct, while other claims presented triable issues of fact regarding the defendant's use of official authority.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The case concerned Sarah Colby, as executrix of Stuart Colby's estate, suing Pye & Hogan LLC after the company terminated Colby from his full-time purchasing agent role following his request for time off to undergo chemotherapy for recurrent cancer; the suit alleged violations of the ADA and Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act for disability discrimination and failure to accommodate, plus a promissory estoppel claim based on the employer's statement that it would "work with" him. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the claims failed as a matter of law. The district court granted the motion in full, holding that there were no genuine issues of material fact and that the plaintiff could not establish the required elements of the discrimination, accommodation, or estoppel claims under applicable standards. The court addressed the claims together, noting Connecticut's reliance on federal precedent for employment discrimination statutes.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a car dealership that contracted to buy a pre-engineered steel showroom building from the defendant manufacturer, which referred the dealership to a third-party builder for erection; after installation of HVAC units and other modifications caused roof leaks, the dealership sued for breach of contract, breach of express and implied warranties, and violation of the Connecticut Unfair Trade Practices Act. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on all claims. Core reasoning included application of the economic loss doctrine under Tennessee law, which barred warranty and related claims absent privity or physical damage to other property, failure to prove the steel structure was defective or failed to conform to express warranties, and absence of apparent agency linking the manufacturer to the builder's installation errors.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a plaintiff suing the administrator of an employer-sponsored long-term disability plan under ERISA, alleging that the denial of his benefits violated 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(1)(B) and seeking an order to reinstate them. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The ruling rested on evidence including the plaintiff's orthopedic surgeon's assessments that he could perform sedentary work with restrictions, a nurse's field evaluation confirming his daily activities and capabilities, and a transferable skills analysis identifying qualifying occupations, which together showed the administrator's decision was not arbitrary or capricious under the plan.

labor & employmenthealthcare

The case involves a school principal who sued her superintendent for alleged violations of the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments, the Stored Communications Act, the Wiretap Act, and the Rehabilitation Act, along with state-law claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress and invasion of privacy, arising from disputes over special education policies and the defendant's access to the plaintiff's work email account. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion as to the First Amendment, Fourteenth Amendment, Stored Communications Act, Wiretap Act, and Rehabilitation Act claims, but denied it as to the Fourth Amendment, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and invasion of privacy claims, finding genuine issues of material fact remained on those issues. The decision was based on the factual record regarding the parties' employment relationship, the nature of the email access, and the applicable legal standards for each claim.

civil rightsprocedurefree speechlabor & employment

The plaintiff, an auditor employed by the Defense Contract Audit Agency, sued the agency under the Privacy Act of 1974 for allegedly disclosing his Social Security Number to Bank of America without consent while processing a required government travel charge card application, after which BoA lost the data in a breach. The defendant moved for summary judgment. The court granted the motion, holding that even assuming a disclosure occurred, the plaintiff presented no evidence of actual damages, whether pecuniary or sufficiently severe emotional harm, as required to recover under the statute. Disputes over whether consent was given were not dispositive because the damages element was unmet.

federal powerprocedure

The case involved Call Center Technologies suing Grand Adventures Tour & Travel Publishing Corp. (GATT) and Interline Travel & Tour for breach of contract and successor liability under Connecticut law, stemming from an alleged agreement and subsequent corporate transactions including loans and a foreclosure. Call Center moved for a default judgment against GATT, while Interline sought summary judgment. The court granted the default judgment against GATT in the amount of $560,576.22 due to its failure to appear or defend. It also granted summary judgment to Interline, finding no evidence of successor liability after deeming certain facts admitted because Call Center failed to properly contest them under local procedural rules or provide supporting evidence from the record. The decision rested on application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and District of Connecticut local rules regarding statements of material facts.

business & regulatoryprocedure