In Walker v. Massanari, consolidated with Garris v. Commissioner of Social Security, plaintiffs' counsel sought court approval of contingency fee agreements and payment of withheld past-due Social Security benefits as attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. § 406(b) after obtaining favorable administrative decisions on remand. The district court denied both motions as untimely, finding that counsel had received written notice of the awards years earlier (in 2004 and 2005) but filed the motions in 2007, well beyond any applicable deadline. The court noted that counsel had already received EAJA fees for the same court work, failed to substantiate the fee amounts or notices, and offered no valid excuse for the delay despite an evidentiary hearing on remand from the Third Circuit.
This case involves a wrongful death and medical negligence lawsuit brought by the parents of a five-year-old child who died after receiving steroid treatment for autism from an Illinois doctor and his practice. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or alternatively to transfer venue, arguing their contacts with Pennsylvania were insufficient since the initial treatment occurred in Illinois. The court denied the motion, holding that it could exercise specific personal jurisdiction because the doctor provided ongoing medical monitoring and dosage instructions via telephone to the plaintiffs while they were in Pennsylvania, creating sufficient minimum contacts. The court also found venue proper in the Western District of Pennsylvania since a substantial part of the events giving rise to the claims occurred there.
The case concerned disputes arising from the 1988 formation of Delta Star, Inc. as a spin-off from H.K. Porter via an employee stock ownership plan (ESOP) financed by bank loans, in which former president and ESOP trustee Andrew Patton participated as a key decision-maker and beneficiary of related benefit plans. Delta Star and the ESOP trustees brought ERISA claims against Patton for breach of fiduciary duty and self-dealing in the transaction, while Patton asserted counterclaims for unpaid amounts under promissory notes, director fees, and indemnification. The court held that Patton had breached his ERISA fiduciary duties, that certain of his contract and note claims had been resolved or waived for lack of supporting evidence at trial, and that he was not entitled to indemnification because ERISA prohibits agreements relieving fiduciaries of liability for breaches and his conduct involved willful misconduct. Core reasoning relied on the detailed facts of the financing structure, stock allocation favoring management, Patton's refusal to appoint independent trustees, and explicit ERISA provisions barring indemnification.
The case was a civil enforcement action by the United States against the Municipality of Penn Hills for alleged violations of the Clean Water Act at four of its sewage treatment plants. The government sought injunctive relief and civil penalties based on unauthorized bypassing of waste and discharges exceeding NPDES permit effluent limits. The court granted summary judgment in part on liability under Counts I and II, holding Penn Hills liable for bypassing in violation of permit conditions and section 402 and for exceeding effluent limits in violation of sections 301 and 402. The ruling rested on the undisputed terms of the NPDES permits and evidence from the municipality's discharge monitoring reports; the court denied summary judgment on the precise number of violations and deferred that issue to trial.
The case involved vendors who held city-issued licenses to sell goods near Three Rivers Stadium; after the City of Pittsburgh amended its vending ordinance in 1995 to prohibit sales within 30 feet of the stadium property (where most of their revenue was earned), the plaintiffs sued the city and stadium authority alleging that the change effectively revoked their licenses. They claimed violations of substantive and procedural due process, equal protection under the U.S. and Pennsylvania constitutions, federal antitrust law, and related provisions, and sought an injunction to restore prior vending rights. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment and denied the plaintiffs' cross-motion, holding that the vendors had no constitutionally protected property interest in vending at any particular location and that the remaining claims likewise failed as a matter of law on the undisputed facts.
business & regulatorycivil rightspropertyprocedure
In Williams v. Price, death row inmates at SCI Greene brought a § 1983 action challenging prison conditions in the capital case unit, including strip searches before non-contact attorney visits under the Fourth Amendment, denial of contact legal visits and equal outdoor exercise time and activities under the Equal Protection Clause, and lack of confidential attorney meeting rooms under a constitutional privacy right. After de novo review of the magistrate judge's report and the parties' objections, the court granted defendants' motion for summary judgment on the strip-search, equal-protection, and related claims, finding no constitutional violations based on security concerns, differences between facilities, and plaintiffs' concessions on certain issues. The court denied summary judgment on the privacy claim regarding confidential meeting rooms, allowing that issue to proceed. The ruling adopted the magistrate's recommendations in full under the Magistrates Act.
