In this case, Tourist Village Motel sued Massachusetts Engineering Co. for damages from a leaking 10,000-gallon fuel oil tank installed in 1983, alleging negligence, strict liability, nuisance, breach of implied and express warranties, and violations of New Hampshire oil pollution statutes. The defendant moved to dismiss several counts under Rule 12(c) on statute of limitations grounds. The court denied the motion as to the negligence, strict liability, and nuisance claims, applying New Hampshire's discovery rule to find that the claims accrued only when the leak was discovered in 1989 testing and thus were timely filed. For the warranty claims, the court applied the UCC's four-year limitations period running from delivery without a discovery rule and granted dismissal in part, reasoning that the tank constituted goods under the UCC but that the breach occurred at tender of delivery.
This case involves parents challenging the individual education plan (IEP) for their child developed by the Westmoreland School District under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) and the Rehabilitation Act. The court had previously dismissed the IDEA claim as untimely, and upon reconsideration, upheld that dismissal, reasoning that the thirty-day statute of limitations begins when the hearing officer issues the decision rather than when notice is received, to promote prompt resolution of disputes. The court also denied the defendant's motion to dismiss the Rehabilitation Act claim, finding that proof of discriminatory animus is not necessarily required and that the claim could proceed independently.
This case involves claims by Conductron Corporation (d/b/a Hendrix Wire & Cable) and Hitchener Manufacturing against multiple defendants under CERCLA, New Hampshire environmental statutes, and common law for contamination at the Savage Well Superfund Site in Milford, New Hampshire, seeking declaratory relief and apportionment of remediation costs. The court addressed several pretrial motions, including granting plaintiffs' unopposed motion to substitute the executrix of a deceased defendant as a party under Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(a). It denied defendant Allan Foster's motion for summary judgment, finding genuine factual disputes about his role as an owner or operator based on affidavits alleging his direction of hazardous waste disposal practices. The court also denied defendant John C. Pappas, Jr.'s motion for summary judgment (and related counter-motion), determining that issues of material fact existed regarding his liability under CERCLA section 107(a) due to his ownership and control of the responsible company at relevant times.
This case involved a civil rights lawsuit brought by Gail Trask under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Strafford County, New Hampshire, its commissioners, and the jail superintendent. The suit alleged that defendants' inadequate training, screening, monitoring, and policies caused the suicide of her son Daniel while he was a pretrial detainee in the Strafford County Jail in 1986. Defendants moved for summary judgment on grounds including that any failures amounted only to negligence rather than constitutional deliberate indifference, that respondeat superior does not apply under § 1983, and that the statute provides no remedy for state constitutional violations; the motion was uncontested. The court granted summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact because negligence claims do not meet the deliberate indifference standard required for a custodial suicide claim under the Constitution, as established by precedents like Daniels v. Williams and Torraco v. Maloney. With the federal claims dismissed before trial, the court also dismissed the pendent state-law claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.
This case involves a student challenging the individual education plan offered by the Westmoreland School District, claiming violations of procedures under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) in Count I and protections under the Rehabilitation Act in Count II. The court considered a motion to dismiss Count I on grounds that the claim was filed two days after the applicable 30-day limitations period following the hearing officer's March 11, 1991 decision. Following its prior precedent, the court ruled that the limitations period begins to run upon issuance of the administrative decision rather than receipt by the plaintiff, and found no basis for equitable tolling given that the plaintiff had counsel familiar with the rule. The court also rejected application of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6(e) to add three days for mailing. As a result, the court granted the motion and dismissed Count I.
This case arose after Garland & Lachance Construction Company appealed a city planning board decision revoking approval of its shopping plaza site plan; the parties settled the appeal via a stipulation and decree approved by the state superior court, but the city later claimed Garland breached the decree. After Garland filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, it removed the city's breach claim to federal district court, prompting the city to seek abstention. The court granted abstention and remanded the case to Cheshire County Superior Court, reasoning that the question of compliance with the state-approved stipulation is best resolved under state law by the court that originally entered the decree, exercising its discretion under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1334(c)(1) and 1452(b) in the interest of comity and respect for state law.
