In this case, plaintiff Jamie Lichtenstein alleged that her termination from UPMC Braddock violated the Family and Medical Leave Act after she requested leave to care for her seriously ill mother. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the termination resulted from her repeated attendance violations, tardiness, and scheduling demands rather than any FMLA-protected activity. The district court granted summary judgment to the defendants on both counts of the amended complaint. It found insufficient evidence that the decision was motivated by the leave request, noting that supervisors had documented concerns about her reliability well before the request and that her pattern of absences exceeded policy limits. The court concluded there was no genuine issue of material fact supporting claims of FMLA interference or retaliation.
The case involves plaintiff David E. Pounds challenging the Social Security Commissioner's denial of his application for supplemental security income benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act, based on claims of disability due to learning disabilities, low IQ, depression, bipolar disorder, and related behavioral and functional limitations. The court considered cross-motions for summary judgment and reviewed the administrative record, including medical opinions, psychological evaluations, and vocational expert testimony regarding possible jobs. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to the extent it sought remand for further consideration by the Commissioner and denied the defendant's motion. The core reasoning centered on deficiencies in the ALJ's evaluation of medical evidence, such as incomplete or biased summaries of treatment records from providers like Dr. Matta and Dr. Kolli, inconsistencies in assessing the plaintiff's mental impairments and work-related limitations, and issues with the hypothetical questions posed to the vocational expert.
The case concerned a dispute following an asset purchase agreement in which Partners Coffee acquired Oceana's coffee business assets, leading to mutual claims of breaches, misrepresentations about equipment and finances, and violations of a related consulting agreement. Oceana and Mrs. Gilson asserted counterclaims including breach of the APA, breach of the consulting agreement, fraud in the inducement, negligent misrepresentation, and veil piercing. The court ruled on Partners' motion to dismiss, granting it in part by dismissing the APA breach claim regarding Mrs. Gilson's employment for lack of any contractual duty and addressing the applicability of the economic loss doctrine to the fraud and misrepresentation claims under Pennsylvania law, while denying dismissal as to the remaining counterclaims that were adequately pled.
In Lewis v. Ford Motor Co., plaintiffs filed a class action in Pennsylvania state court alleging that Ford violated warranty provisions of the Magnuson-Moss Act and the Pennsylvania Consumer Protection Law due to defects in certain vehicles. Ford removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA) based on diversity, class size, and amount in controversy. After the district court denied class certification on grounds including lack of commonality and predominance, plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that CAFA jurisdiction required a certified class or that the amount in controversy could no longer be met. The court denied the renewed motion to remand, concluding that CAFA jurisdiction is determined at removal and continues regardless of later denial of certification. The ruling relied on the statute's text, Third Circuit precedent, and rejection of contrary authority from other circuits.
The case involved Mario Luther, who applied to become a Kia vehicle franchisee after providing confidential business and financial information as requested by Kia representatives. Luther signed a Kia application form that explicitly stated the document created no obligation on Kia's part to approve the application, that Kia could accept or reject it in its sole discretion, and that only a written dealer agreement signed by a Kia executive officer would constitute approval. After regional-level discussions in which Luther was told he was the proposed candidate, national-level approval was not granted, and Luther sued Kia after incurring expenses in anticipation of the franchise. The court granted Kia's motion for summary judgment, reasoning that the clear disclaimers in the application and the absence of any express promise or authority to bind Kia precluded claims such as promissory estoppel or breach of contract.
This case involves a contract dispute in which Pittsburgh Logistics Systems, Inc. (PLS), a Pennsylvania freight brokerage firm, sued C.R. England, Inc., a Utah-based company, for breach of an implied-in-fact contract after England failed to pay over $82,000 on 40 invoices for shipping services arranged for several customers. England moved to dismiss the Pennsylvania suit under the first-filed doctrine or Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(7) for failure to join necessary parties, or alternatively to transfer venue to the Eastern District of Michigan, where England had filed an earlier declaratory judgment action involving the same transactions. The court denied the motion to dismiss in full, finding no basis for dismissal on joinder or first-filed grounds at that stage, but stayed the entire case, including any venue decision, pending resolution of PLS's motion to dismiss in the Michigan action to avoid duplicative litigation between the same parties.
