This case concerned whether the methods of solving Rubik's Cube and Rubik's Revenge puzzles infringed claims 3-5 of U.S. Patent No. 3,655,201, which describe a general approach to restoring a preselected pattern by engaging eight cube pieces and rotating sets of them about axes. After remand from the Federal Circuit on the doctrine of equivalents, the court held that the puzzles infringed because they performed substantially the same function in substantially the same way to give substantially the same result as the claimed method. The core reasoning was that the patent claims a method as it appears to the puzzle user, with differences in the number of apparent pieces or engagement mechanisms not substantially altering the function, way, or result of randomizing and restoring the pattern through rotations about three axes.
This diversity case concerns two injured workers and one spouse who sued their employer's workers' compensation insurer, PMA, for repeatedly failing to pay or delaying payment of medical bills related to compensable industrial accidents. The plaintiffs sought remedies under Delaware workers' compensation statutes, including liquidated damages and attorneys' fees, as well as tort damages for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing and intentional infliction of emotional distress. PMA moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and, alternatively, for summary judgment. The court granted the motion in part and denied it in part, holding that certain statutory remedies were available while limiting or precluding some common-law tort claims based on the exclusivity provisions of the workers' compensation system and the Delaware Unfair Trade Practices Act.
This case is a patent infringement action by Schering Corporation against Precision-Cosmet Co., Inc. concerning a gas-permeable hard contact lens made principally of tertiary butyl styrene. After a jury returned a verdict for Schering awarding $1,263,482 and finding the patent valid, the defendant moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or a new trial, while Schering sought enhanced damages, prejudgment interest, and attorney fees. The court denied the JNOV and new-trial motions, concluding that substantial evidence supported the jury's determination that the invention would not have been obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art in light of the cited prior art. The court granted Schering's motions in part by doubling the damages, awarding prejudgment interest at the Treasury bill rate under 28 U.S.C. § 1961, and allowing reasonable attorney fees.
This case is a personal injury suit by a Florida citizen against Delaware corporations arising from a 1980 slip-and-fall at a McDonald’s restaurant in Germany; the plaintiff filed suit in Florida federal court in 1983 and the case was transferred to Delaware under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) for lack of personal jurisdiction. The defendants moved for summary judgment, asserting that Delaware’s two-year statute of limitations barred the claim. The court held that Delaware’s statute of limitations governs regardless of whether the transfer is characterized under § 1404(a) or § 1406(a), because the transferor court lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants and therefore could not have applied Florida law. Accordingly, the action was time-barred.
This case involved railroad companies operating an intermodal facility in Delaware that sued the state Attorney General and environmental officials to block enforcement of the Delaware Noise Control Act and its regulations against noise from refrigerated trailers. The plaintiffs argued the state rules were preempted by the federal Noise Control Act of 1972. The court granted a preliminary injunction, finding a likelihood of success on the preemption claim because Congress intended to occupy the field of interstate railroad noise regulation, leaving no gap for state rules even on activities like refrigerated units not specifically addressed in federal standards. The decision rested on the federal statute's language, legislative history, and the absence of any EPA approval for state enforcement under the federal law's savings clause.
This diversity case concerns plaintiff Robert Goffe’s claims against Stephen Blake, AMW, Inc., and Avanti Motor Corporation for breach of an oral and written pre-incorporation agreement, common-law fraud, and breach of fiduciary duty arising from services allegedly performed to help acquire Avanti Motor Corporation. After denying dismissal as to two defendants and finding venue improper as to Blake, the court addressed competing transfer motions. It granted Goffe’s motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1406(a) to transfer the action to the District of Columbia, holding that personal jurisdiction existed over all defendants there because Avanti’s contacts satisfied the D.C. long-arm statute and the claims arose from those contacts; it denied the defendants’ competing motion under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) to transfer to the Northern District of Indiana. The core reasoning was that the interest of justice favored transfer to D.C.—where the key meetings, incorporation, and services occurred and where the plaintiff resides—rather than dismissal or transfer elsewhere, and that the acquisition-related evidence in Indiana was not central enough to override that conclusion.