William Elwood Steckler

The case involved plaintiff Alfred Stone's claims against guaranty agency USA Funds arising from two federal guaranteed student loans he obtained in 1985 and 1986, which entered default after he made no payments and failed to secure a continuing deferment while in law school. USA Funds had paid the lender after the loans became delinquent for 180 days following collection attempts, then pursued repayment via its counterclaim. The court granted summary judgment to USA Funds on Stone's complaint and on the counterclaim, finding that Stone did not dispute the loan amounts, his non-payment, or the agency's compliance with federal due diligence and notice requirements under the Higher Education Act regulations, and that no due process violation occurred.

federal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a Chapter 13 bankruptcy debtor who appealed a bankruptcy court ruling allowing the IRS to file an amended proof of claim after the bar date for 1983 federal income taxes. The IRS had timely filed a claim for 1982 taxes and later sought to amend it to include the 1983 liability, which the debtor had listed in her schedules and plan as a priority claim to be paid in full. The district court affirmed, holding that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion by applying equitable factors to permit the amendment to relate back, given the close relation between the tax years, the debtor's prior notice and intent to pay the 1983 taxes, and the lack of prejudice to other creditors.

taxesprocedurefederal power

This case concerns Alleghany Corporation's federal lawsuit challenging the constitutionality of the Indiana Insurance Holding Company Act after the Indiana Insurance Commissioner denied its application to acquire more than 10% of the stock of an Indiana insurance company as part of a larger acquisition effort. Alleghany sought declaratory and injunctive relief on grounds that the Act violated the Commerce, Supremacy, and Due Process Clauses, without first seeking review in Indiana state courts. The district court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss under Younger and Burford abstention doctrines, holding that abstention was inappropriate because no state judicial or administrative proceedings were pending, the plaintiff had not violated any law triggering enforcement, and no complex state law issues required resolution in a designated state forum. The court subsequently amended its order to certify the abstention ruling for interlocutory appeal.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involved a Chapter 7 debtor who filed a statement of intent to retain two vehicles subject to a security interest held by Merchants National Bank but later amended it to indicate she would not reaffirm the underlying debt and instead sought to redeem the collateral through continued installment payments. The bankruptcy court denied the bank's motion to compel reaffirmation and ordered the debtor to choose within ten days among surrendering the vehicles, executing a reaffirmation agreement, or redeeming them via a lump-sum payment of their fair market value. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that 11 U.S.C. § 722 permits redemption only by a single payment in full rather than installments, consistent with Sixth Circuit precedent in In re Bell and the need to protect creditors from post-discharge defaults on depreciating collateral. The court reasoned that installment redemption would create monitoring difficulties for the bankruptcy court and leave the secured creditor without adequate remedies after discharge.

propertyprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by the parents of Troy Browning, a fourteen-year-old student identified as seriously emotionally handicapped under the Education for All Handicapped Children Act (EHA), challenging school disciplinary actions including suspensions and an attempted expulsion that initially did not follow required procedures for handicapped students. After a series of administrative proceedings under Indiana regulations implementing the EHA, including case conferences and a due process hearing that resulted in orders for a new individualized education program, the parents filed suit in federal court under the EHA, the Rehabilitation Act, and 42 U.S.C. § 1983 without completing all available administrative appeals. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), holding that the EHA and related claims require exhaustion of administrative remedies before federal court review unless futility or inadequacy is shown, which the plaintiffs did not demonstrate.

civil rightsprocedurefederal power

This case involved two judgment debtors whose bank accounts, containing exempt federal benefits such as Social Security, were frozen by Indiana banks after small claims courts issued orders under Ind.Code 28-1-20-1.1 to facilitate collection of money judgments. The plaintiffs brought a § 1983 action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming the statute's post-judgment garnishment procedures violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by providing no notice to the account holder of the freeze, no information about exemption rights, and no prompt hearing opportunity. The court determined that the freezes amounted to state action depriving the plaintiffs of property interests, and concluded that due process mandates immediate notice of the seizure along with notice of exemption rights and a right to a prompt hearing. Because the Indiana statute contained none of these protections, the court granted the plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment and declared the statute unconstitutional.

civil rightsprocedureproperty

This case arose from the United States' action under CERCLA and other environmental statutes to recover response costs and obtain injunctive relief for hazardous waste contamination at the Seymour site, which had been leased by the City of Seymour and its Board of Aviation Commissioners to a recycling company. Generator defendants filed cross-claims against the City and Board seeking contribution, prompting motions to dismiss by the City and Board and a motion for partial summary judgment by the generators. The court denied the motions to dismiss, holding that federal CERCLA contribution claims are not barred by Indiana's Tort Claims Act notice requirements. It also denied summary judgment because the generators had not yet resolved their own liability to the United States, rendering their contribution claims unripe under CERCLA Section 113(f).

environmentproceduretorts & liability

This case was an action by a union to confirm an arbitration award under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, arising from a pre-hire collective bargaining agreement with an interest arbitration clause that required arbitration of new contract terms after negotiations failed. The court denied the employer's motion to stay proceedings pending NLRB charges and granted the union's motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that the court had primary jurisdiction to enforce the unanimous award from the National Joint Adjustment Board, which bound the employer to a new four-year agreement retroactive to the expiration of the prior contract, and the employer's challenges did not warrant a stay or denial of confirmation. Each party was ordered to bear its own attorney's fees.

labor & employmentprocedure

The case involved the United States suing Indiana Woodtreating Corporation (IWC) for violations of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) arising from its operation of a woodtreating plant that generated and stored hazardous waste containing creosote without proper compliance measures. The court granted the government's motion for partial summary judgment on liability after finding no genuine issues of material fact. Evidence from facility operations, inspections, and records established that IWC had not filed complete hazardous waste notifications, obtained a RCRA permit or interim status, conducted required waste analysis or groundwater monitoring, maintained financial assurances for closure, or followed standards for waste piles and impoundments, and that sludge from the waste had accumulated without removal. The court concluded that these failures constituted RCRA violations and triggered liability for corrective action under section 3008(h) due to releases of hazardous constituents into the environment.

environmentbusiness & regulatory

In Blaker v. U.S. Mineral Products Co., plaintiff Robert Blaker sued thirty corporate defendants, including U.S. Mineral Products Company and Owens-Illinois, Inc., alleging personal injuries from exposure to asbestos-containing products under a products liability theory. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing that Indiana’s ten-year statute of repose for product liability actions (Ind. Code 33-1-1.5-5) barred the claims because their asbestos products had been delivered to initial users by 1958 or 1959, more than ten years before the May 1981 complaint. The court denied the motions, holding that the statute of repose did not bar the action. It adopted the reasoning from Covalt v. Carey-Canana, Inc. and Barnes v. A.H. Robins Co., under which the cause of action for injuries from long-term exposure to a foreign substance accrues upon discovery (or when it should have been discovered), creating an exception to the repose period. The court also granted a motion to certify the order for interlocutory appeal and consolidate it with related cases.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case concerned a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 brought by Kenneth Dinger and others against a New Albany police officer and the City of New Albany, alleging that the officer used excessive force during an arrest on January 22, 1983. After voluntarily dismissing an initial timely complaint due to service issues, the plaintiffs refiled an identical complaint on July 11, 1985, which the defendants moved to dismiss as untimely. The court granted the defendants' motion to reconsider and vacate its prior order, holding that the refiled complaint was barred by Indiana's two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions. The decision rested on the Supreme Court's ruling in Wilson v. Garcia requiring application of state personal injury limitations periods to § 1983 claims, with retroactive application deemed appropriate here because the city had been subject to a two-year limit even before Wilson and no inequity resulted from barring the action.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned the United States' efforts to address hazardous waste at the Seymour Recycling Corporation site through actions under RCRA, the Clean Water Act, and later CERCLA Sections 106 and 107 against the site's operators and numerous generator defendants. After a partial surface cleanup via consent decree and completion of the EPA's Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study, the United States moved for a ruling that any judicial review of the EPA's selected remedy would be limited to the administrative record under the arbitrary and capricious standard. The Generator Defendants opposed this, seeking de novo review and arguing that the relevant CERCLA provisions did not apply to pending cases or Section 106 actions and would violate due process. The court granted the motion, ruling that Section 113(j) of CERCLA, added by SARA, expressly requires record-based arbitrary and capricious review in any judicial action under the Act and aligns with established administrative law principles limiting equitable discretion.

environmentprocedure

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court order setting aside transfers of two parcels of real estate from Thomas E. Graham and Purnell-Graham Company, Inc. to Ontario, Inc. as fraudulent conveyances. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's July 1986 order, which divested title from Ontario and vested it in the bankruptcy trustee. The court found the bankruptcy court's factual findings were not clearly erroneous, including the lack of adequate consideration for the transfers and the presence of creditors at the time. It upheld the conclusion of fraudulent intent based on evidence such as Graham's statements about avoiding creditors, the transfers leaving him with no unencumbered assets, and the unusual circumstances of the transactions involving a Canadian corporation without proper documentation.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

The case involved a contract dispute between Monroe County Oil Co., an Indiana petroleum products distributor, and Amoco Oil Co. under a 1981 Jobber Contract, where Monroe faced payment defaults leading to cash-on-delivery requirements and Amoco's termination of the contract amid Monroe's attempt to sell assets to a third party. Monroe sued Amoco on multiple counts alleging improper termination, interference with business relations, and violations of franchise laws. The court granted Amoco's motion for summary judgment, holding there were no genuine issues of material fact. It reasoned that most claims were barred by res judicata from a prior bankruptcy court order approving asset sales and by the statute of limitations on a deceptive practices count, while Amoco had no obligation to consent to an assignment under the contract terms and Indiana law does not recognize an implied covenant of good faith.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved three inmates at the Indiana State Prison who filed a pro se complaint seeking to represent a class of all present and future inmates, requesting injunctive relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. The plaintiffs alleged that prison officials failed to screen inmates for AIDS or segregate homosexuals despite a suspected case, and they asked the court to order such measures. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, reasoning that federal courts traditionally defer to prison administrators on such matters and that the complaint did not demonstrate a sufficient risk of contracting AIDS to implicate constitutional rights.

criminal lawcivil rightshealthcare

This case involves motions by Canadian asbestos mining companies Asbestos Corporation, Ltd. and Bell Asbestos Mines, Ltd. to dismiss product liability and negligence lawsuits filed in Indiana federal court, alleging lack of personal jurisdiction under the state's long-arm statute and the Due Process Clause. The defendants argued their limited sales of raw asbestos fiber to Indiana buyers (less than 1% of total sales) and lack of other in-state activities did not meet minimum contacts requirements or international law standards. The court denied the motions, following its prior decision in Morris v. Asbestos Corp. and finding that the companies' ongoing sales of asbestos to Indiana manufacturers established sufficient contacts for jurisdiction, consistent with due process and exceptions under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act for commercial activity affecting the U.S.

proceduretorts & liability

This case was a product liability suit by Hazel McDowell against asbestos companies including Asbestos Corporation Limited (ACL), alleging negligence and strict liability for an asbestos-related disease she developed after workplace exposure from 1966 to 1975. ACL moved for summary judgment on grounds that the claims were untimely under Indiana's two-year statute of limitations and ten-year product liability cutoff period. The court denied the motion, holding that the cause of action accrued upon McDowell's diagnosis in June 1980 so the April 1981 filing was timely, and that ACL's last delivery of asbestos to her employer in 1976 fell within the ten-year window.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case is a product liability lawsuit brought by Martha Groce and her husband against asbestos companies, including ACL, alleging negligence and strict liability for asbestos exposure at her workplace that caused her disease. The court denied ACL's motion for summary judgment, ruling that the claims were not barred by the two-year statute of limitations or the ten-year product liability cutoff. The court reasoned that under Indiana law, the cause of action accrues when the plaintiff discovers the injury, which occurred upon her diagnosis in 1980, and that ACL's last delivery in 1976 fell within the ten-year period. Since the wife's claims were timely, the husband's loss of consortium claim was also not barred.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involved a plaintiff's application for attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act after the Social Security Administration found her still disabled and entitled to continued benefits following a court-ordered remand under the 1984 Reform Act. The court denied the fee request, holding that even assuming the plaintiff qualified as a prevailing party under the catalyst test, the Secretary's original position terminating benefits was substantially justified. The core reasoning was that the administrative record contained objective medical and psychological evidence on which the Secretary could reasonably have relied when deciding to end benefits in 1983, so the government met its burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2412 despite ultimately losing on the medical-improvement standard.

federal powerprocedure

This case concerns Thomas E. Graham's motion for appointment of counsel to represent him in a pending bankruptcy appeal. The court denied the motion, concluding there is no provision in the Bankruptcy Code or Federal Rules of Civil Procedure that requires or permits appointment of counsel for a debtor. Even assuming authority exists under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) for indigent litigants, the court found Graham had not shown diligent efforts to secure counsel, his appeal had an extremely slim chance of success, and he would not be prejudiced because of overlapping issues in related appeals by associated companies.

procedure