Ross N. Sterling

This case involved former and current police officers and support staff from the City of Clute Police Department suing the city, the State of Texas, and various officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 1986, and 1988 for alleged violations of their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The plaintiffs claimed they faced harassment, suspensions, reassignments, and other employment actions in retaliation for submitting a letter and detailed grievance list to the City Council criticizing the police chief's management, favoritism, and personal conduct. After a pretrial conference, the court dismissed the action, concluding it was improper for a federal jury trial. The core reasoning was that the officers' communications primarily addressed personal grievances and animosity toward the chief rather than matters of public concern, so they did not qualify for First Amendment protection under precedents like Connick v. Myers and Pickering v. Board of Education.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

This case arose from a final 1979 Texas divorce decree that awarded the plaintiff wife a one-half interest in her ex-husband's ERISA-governed pension plan, including rights to a segregated account and to direct its investments. The wife sued in federal court seeking enforcement of those rights, damages for alleged losses, an accounting, and information about the account, while the husband counterclaimed for sole ownership of all plan benefits. The central issue was whether ERISA preempts Texas community-property law regarding division of pension interests in divorce. The court held that ERISA does not preempt the state law on these facts but nonetheless dismissed the action, reasoning that federal jurisdiction should be declined to avoid unnecessary interference with ongoing state-court regulation of divorce and marital property matters. The proper forum for enforcing the divorce judgment was determined to be Texas state court.

family lawfederal powerprocedure

This case involves a claim for damages due to the non-delivery of eight bundles of steel pipe shipped from Venezuela to Texas aboard the M/V MORNING PARK. The plaintiff sued the vessel owner under the Carriage of Goods by Sea Act (COGSA), and the parties stipulated to liability, leaving only the measure of damages in dispute. The court held that each bundle qualified as a "package" under COGSA § 1304(5), limiting the defendant's liability to $4,000. It reached this conclusion by applying Fifth Circuit precedent that follows the Second Circuit's approach, considering that the bundling facilitated handling, the shipping documents referred to the bundles as lifts or packages, and the bundles had the appearance of packages. A later order amended the judgment to exclude an award of attorney's fees.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim by a former assistant county treasurer alleging wrongful termination by the Harris County Treasurer. After prior proceedings and remands from the Fifth Circuit, the district court addressed issues of Eleventh Amendment immunity, whether the county qualified as a "person" under § 1983, whether the termination reflected official policy, and the amount of attorney's fees. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, concluding that Harris County is an independent entity not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection and thus suable as a person under § 1983, that the treasurer's dismissal decision constituted official policy, and that $7,500 in fees was reasonable under the Johnson factors based on time expended, case complexity, counsel's skill, and prevailing rates.

civil rightsprocedure

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition by Sammie Felder, who was convicted of capital murder in Texas state court and sentenced to death for stabbing a quadriplegic victim during a robbery at an apartment complex for disabled residents. Felder raised multiple constitutional challenges, including claims that his confession was obtained unlawfully, that prosecutors concealed evidence and engaged in misconduct, that he received ineffective assistance of counsel, that a prospective juror was improperly excluded, and that death by lethal injection violated the Eighth Amendment or constituted an ex post facto law. The district court denied the petition in all respects, holding that the claims lacked merit under applicable precedents such as Pulley v. Harris and Estelle v. Gamble, that state court factual findings were entitled to deference, and that no evidence supported allegations of racial animus in the sentencing. The court also denied related motions for an evidentiary hearing and to proceed in forma pauperis.

criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power

This case involves Philippine workers and representatives of deceased workers suing U.S. corporations for unpaid wages and injuries or deaths from hydrogen sulfide gas exposure on a drilling rig off Saudi Arabia in 1980. The court addressed motions to transfer venue and to dismiss on forum non conveniens grounds. It denied the transfer motion and dismissed the case, holding that foreign law rather than U.S. law governed the claims. The decision rested on a choice-of-law analysis weighing factors such as the place of the incident and plaintiffs' domicile and contracts in the Philippines against the U.S. flag and corporate defendants, concluding that Philippine interests predominated and that a U.S. forum was inappropriate.

procedurelabor & employmenttorts & liability

This case was a damages action by crude oil reseller Coastal States Trading against pipeline operator Shell for alleged misdelivery of oil, claiming breach of duties under the Interstate Commerce Act and Pomerene Bills of Lading Act or, alternatively, conversion or negligence as bailee. Shell contested subject-matter jurisdiction, arguing its record-keeping for pre-shipment "in-line transfers" among resellers did not qualify as "transportation" under the federal statutes. The court reviewed the rise of reseller chains in the 1970s-80s, the mechanics of data-gram notifications and transaction letters, and the statutory definitions of transportation to assess whether the claims fell within federal regulatory reach.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in which John M. Moses sought to have an alimony obligation to Virginia Ann Moses declared dischargeable in bankruptcy, or alternatively void as a preference or invalid due to fraud or duress in the underlying agreement. The bankruptcy court determined that the debt was in the nature of alimony, maintenance, and support, rendering it nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), and abstained from addressing claims of invalidity under state law. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's judgment, holding that whether an obligation qualifies as alimony is determined under federal bankruptcy law rather than state law, and that the agreement here met that standard. The court noted that abstention decisions under 28 U.S.C. § 1471(d) are not reviewable.

family law

This case concerns a civil action by Eugene duPont III, as settlor, against the trustees and beneficiaries of an inter vivos trust he established in 1972, seeking rescission, revocation, or modification of the trust on grounds including mistake of fact and law regarding federal transfer taxes, frustration of its purposes, and incomplete consummation, as well as removal of certain trustees and reallocation of legal fees. After a bench trial, the court granted the defendants' Rule 41(b) motion and upheld the trust's validity but ruled that trustee fees had been improperly calculated and allocated. The core reasoning was that federal courts lack authority to issue declaratory judgments on federal tax liability, that an uncompleted gift cannot be judicially compelled, and that state law governs the trust's formation and property transfers without supporting rescission.

taxespropertyprocedurefamily law

The case involves a plaintiff appealing the denial of Social Security disability benefits under the Social Security Act, claiming she was unable to work due to arthritis of the spine and deafness starting in 1979. The district court reviewed the administrative record under the substantial evidence standard, noting that the claimant bears the initial burden to show inability to perform prior work and the Secretary must then prove ability to perform other substantial work. The court found the ALJ had improperly weighed medical testimony regarding the plaintiff's subjective pain and failed to consider whether the conditions of her prior bookkeeping job would exacerbate her pain to a disabling level. Accordingly, the court denied both motions for summary judgment, reversed the ALJ's decision, and remanded the case to the Secretary for reevaluation of the evidence and proper application of legal standards.

healthcarefederal power

The case involved a retired Army Reserve colonel who sued after being denied promotion to brigadier general by a selection board in 1979, resulting in his mandatory transfer to the Retired Reserve under 10 U.S.C. § 3851. He alleged that the Army's actions were arbitrary and capricious, violated applicable regulations on command experience waivers and board procedures, and deprived him of property and liberty interests without due process in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants and dismissed the claims, holding that the plaintiff had no protected property interest in promotion or continued service because promotion boards have discretion and statutes limit entitlements after 30 years of service, that any regulatory deviations did not create a cognizable interest or cause harm, and that no liberty interest was implicated absent public disclosure of adverse information, with individual defendants also protected by qualified immunity.

civil rightsfederal powerprocedure

This case is a Bivens action brought by the plaintiff, the Speaker of the Texas House of Representatives, against FBI agents Wacks and Montague for alleged violations of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights during the Bri-Lab undercover investigation into racketeering. The plaintiff claimed the agents engaged in entrapment, overreaching investigation, and presented misleading or fabricated evidence to a grand jury that indicted him on bribery charges, though he was later acquitted at trial. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint but denied the defendants' motions to dismiss on grounds of improper venue and statute of limitations. It granted the motions to dismiss for insufficient service of process and failure to state a claim, ruling that the entrapment issue was barred by res judicata from the criminal case and that the plaintiff had not alleged the absence of probable cause as required to support a claim of fabricated evidence under Franks v. Delaware. The court dismissed the claims against the individual defendants with prejudice after the plaintiff failed to file a second amended complaint.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Poe v. City of Humble, Texas, the plaintiff sued the city for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that an ordinance regulating solicitation for religious purposes violated his First Amendment rights. The court dismissed the case after a bench trial, holding that the plaintiff lacked standing to challenge the ordinance because he failed to prove a good-faith effort to obtain a permit, had never solicited under the ordinance while it was in effect, and had no demonstrated intention of returning to the city. The court further concluded that the dispute was not ripe for adjudication and that abstention was warranted due to ambiguities in the ordinance that a state court should interpret first; alternatively, it found the ordinance constitutional on the merits.

free speechreligious liberty

In Hopper v. Mayeaux, plaintiffs sued a Mississippi resident for breach of contract and fraudulent misrepresentations concerning the assignment of an interest in a Michigan oil and gas lease, seeking to assert jurisdiction under the Texas Long-Arm statute based on telephone and mail contacts with Texas. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction. The core reasoning was that the defendant's contacts with Texas were insufficient under federal due process because they were not purposeful or substantial enough to satisfy the requirements, the lease was located in Michigan, and the effect in Texas was minimal.

procedureproperty

In Hicks v. Crowley Maritime Corp., three plaintiffs employed on Invader class tugboats sued their employer under the Jones Act and general maritime law, seeking damages for hearing loss allegedly caused by excessive engine noise on the vessels, with one plaintiff also claiming a knee injury from a fall. The court ruled in favor of the defendants, finding that the plaintiffs did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that their injuries resulted from the company's negligence or from unseaworthy conditions on the tugboats. The core reasoning was that the employer had conducted noise surveys, provided hearing protection, and insulated engine rooms sufficiently to prevent permanent hearing loss, making the vessels reasonably safe; any hearing damage was due to the plaintiffs' failure to wear the provided protection, and the knee injury was not caused by negligence.

torts & liabilitylabor & employment

This case was a Section 1983 lawsuit brought by Troy Burris, a school administrator whose one-year contract as Vocational Education Director was not renewed by the Willis Independent School District board. The plaintiff alleged violations of his constitutional rights, including deprivation of a property interest in continued employment without due process and retaliation for protected speech. After trial, the court granted the defendants' motion for a directed verdict and dismissed the action. The court reasoned that the elected board members were entitled to absolute legislative immunity for their policy-driven decisions, that Texas law and district policies created no property interest or expectation of renewal beyond the contract term, and that the plaintiff failed to show his speech was a substantial motivating factor in the non-renewal under the Mount Healthy standard or to establish any other constitutional violation.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The plaintiff, a university employee, sued the University of Houston System and its officials under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and Title VII, alleging sex discrimination in employment practices that led to the denial of promotion and tenure. The court dismissed the § 1981 claim because that statute does not cover sex discrimination claims, dismissed the Title VII claim because it was filed more than 90 days after receipt of the EEOC right-to-sue letter, and dismissed the back-pay claim against the university and officials in their official capacities on Eleventh Amendment immunity grounds. The court rejected the limitations defense, finding the action timely under federal accrual rules tied to the end of the plaintiff's terminal contract. It denied the remainder of the motion to dismiss, allowing claims for declaratory and injunctive relief against officials and back-pay claims against them in their individual capacities to proceed.

civil rightslabor & employmentfederal power

The case involved a plaintiff suing a stockbroker and his brokerage firm for alleged misrepresentations regarding the purchase of securities, asserting claims under the federal Securities Exchange Act of 1934, the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices-Consumer Protection Act (DTPA), the Texas fraud statute, and common law fraud. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment on the DTPA claim, arguing that the plaintiff was not a consumer because the transaction involved securities rather than goods or services. The court granted the motion, holding that the broker's advice was part of a securities transaction governed by the Texas Blue Sky Law and general fraud statutes, which include defenses such as due diligence and scienter requirements that would be undermined by applying the DTPA's strict liability provisions. The court reasoned that specific securities laws take precedence over the more general DTPA in this context, despite the Blue Sky Law's savings clause for other remedies.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a machine tool distributor suing its manufacturer and related defendants after being terminated as a distributor in favor of a competitor, alleging violations of Sherman Act sections 1 and 2, plus state-law claims for breach of distributorship and purchase-order contracts and tortious interference. The court granted the defendants' motions for leave to amend and for summary judgment, dismissing the Robinson-Patman Act claim and all remaining federal and state claims. It reasoned that the record showed no genuine dispute over relevant markets or the defendants' low market share, that the termination was a unilateral business decision rather than part of an anticompetitive agreement, and that the defendants had just cause for termination with no evidence of personal misconduct by individual defendants. The court applied settled precedent allowing suppliers to select distributors absent an illegitimate purpose.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this case, Armada Petroleum Corporation moved to quash a grand jury subpoena duces tecum issued in connection with an IRS investigation into the company's potential criminal liability for failing to pay over $10.6 million in federal income taxes for 1977. Armada argued that the IRS had violated its own procedures, that any tainted evidence should be excluded from the grand jury, that the government was misusing the grand jury for a future civil tax suit, and that the subpoena was overbroad. The court denied the motion, holding that the exclusionary rule does not apply to grand jury proceedings, that Armada failed to show any subversion of criminal procedure or improper intent, and that the requested documents were relevant to determining tax liability and described with reasonable particularity over an acceptable time period.

criminal lawtaxesprocedure