Mosher Joseph Blumenfeld

This case involved a corporate taxpayer, Barnes Group, Inc., seeking a refund of taxes paid after the IRS disallowed certain deductions for the 1978 and 1979 tax years. The dispute centered on two sets of transactions: Barnes's acquisition and immediate liquidation of three closely held corporations, for which it claimed stepped-up bases and depreciation deductions on employment contracts (including covenants not to compete) and other assets, and its currency contracts involving Swedish kronor, for which it sought ordinary loss treatment on a net loss from offsetting positions. The court ruled against Barnes on both issues, granting the government's motion in limine and entering summary judgment for the IRS. It held that the value allocated to the employment contracts constituted nondepreciable goodwill or going-concern value rather than separate amortizable assets, and that the currency loss was a capital loss under I.R.C. § 1221 because the contracts were capital assets whose treatment was not altered by the taxpayer's hedging motive, as clarified in Arkansas Best Corp. v. Commissioner.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned Regina Graham, a longtime teacher and former Middle School Head at Renbrook School, who sued under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act after her administrative position was eliminated during a 1985 reorganization that merged school divisions. Renbrook moved for summary judgment, contending that Graham had not established a prima facie case of age discrimination or shown that the school's stated reasons for not offering her a new position were a pretext for age bias. The court reviewed the facts of performance complaints about Graham's administrative style, the elimination of her role, unsuccessful efforts to place her in another position, and comments from faculty and trustees. It analyzed the applicable legal standards for proving pretext under the ADEA, including burdens of proof and whether circumstantial evidence could suffice. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant.

labor & employmentcivil rights

This case arose from allegations that a former employee of Federal Paper Board Company accepted bribes and kickbacks from wastepaper suppliers, leading to inflated prices and reduced competition in purchases for the company's Connecticut mill. Federal sued multiple suppliers and the employee, asserting violations of the Sherman Act sections 1 and 2, the Robinson-Patman Act section 2(c), RICO based on mail and wire fraud predicates, and related state-law claims. Various defendants moved to dismiss the federal counts under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(c). The court treated the motions as seeking judgment on the pleadings, accepted the well-pleaded facts as true, and applied the standard that dismissal is improper unless no set of facts could support relief. It concluded that the antitrust conspiracy and RICO enterprise allegations were sufficiently pleaded to survive dismissal.

business & regulatorycriminal law

The case involved a former employee suing his employer under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act for alleged discriminatory actions in promotions and demotions from 1977 to 1982. The court considered the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the earlier claims. It held that the 1977, 1979, and 1981 claims were time-barred because the plaintiff did not file charges with the EEOC within the required 300 days, and there was no evidence of a continuing violation that would make the claims timely. The court reasoned that the incidents were separate and distinct acts, not part of a single continuous policy that would extend the filing deadline.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved defendant George Sitka, who was indicted on counts of failure to file income tax returns, failure to disclose income to Social Security administrators, and conversion of U.S. property; he moved to dismiss on grounds that the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Amendments had never been properly ratified. The court denied the motions to dismiss. It reasoned that the Secretary of State's certification of ratification is conclusive and binding on courts under precedents such as Field v. Clark and Leser v. Garnett, rendering challenges to the ratification process nonjusticiable political questions. The court further held that the statute authorizing the Secretary's certification conferred only ministerial power, which was properly delegated by Congress and consistent with Article V of the Constitution.

criminal lawtaxesfederal power

The case concerned whether defendant Jackson “Rip” Holmes was competent to stand trial on two counts of threatening a person protected by the Secret Service in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 879(a)(2), after he sent letters to Jeb Bush containing threats tied to his delusions about a conspiracy involving experimental drug testing. Following a government motion and de novo review by the district court, including additional expert testimony, the court ruled Holmes competent to stand trial. Experts for both sides agreed on the existence of Holmes’s delusions, but defense experts testified that the delusions did not prevent him from rationally assisting counsel, and his composed behavior during the hearing supported that conclusion. The ruling applied the two-prong statutory test under 18 U.S.C. § 4241(d), focusing on the defendant’s ability to understand the proceedings and assist in his defense, with the government bearing the burden of proving incompetency.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a claim under the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 by plaintiff Lian Dexler, who has achondroplastic dwarfism and stands four feet five inches tall, after the U.S. Postal Service rejected his application for a distribution clerk position through its program for severely handicapped individuals. Dexler had relevant mailroom experience and was certified as capable of performing the job with accommodations like lowered duty stations or a step stool, but Postal Service officials concluded after site visits and reviews that such changes would require restructuring operations and impose undue hardship. The court, after considering testimony, evidence, and arguments, ruled in favor of the defendant Postal Service, finding that Dexler was not a qualified handicapped individual entitled to the position because reasonable accommodation was not feasible without significant operational disruption. The decision emphasized distinctions between affirmative action obligations and requirements for evenhanded treatment, while noting that certain essential tasks could not be performed even with aids.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves 67 plaintiffs who purchased limited partnership interests in satellite communication facilities and sued a law firm, accounting firms, and others, alleging a fraudulent scheme violating federal securities laws, RICO, and state statutes and common law. The law firm moved for summary judgment, judgment on the pleadings, and dismissal, raising issues including failure to plead fraud with particularity, lack of a RICO claim, statute of limitations, and state law theories. The court treated the motions as one for judgment on the pleadings, dismissed the RICO claims against the law firm for insufficient allegations that it participated in the conduct of the enterprise's affairs through a pattern of racketeering, and addressed related state law claims such as breach of contract while noting opportunities for amendment or further proceedings.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

In Jackman v. D'Agostino, plaintiff Ronald Jackman sued IRS Revenue Officer Bruce D'Agostino for $10 million, alleging that a levy on his wages was improperly issued and served even though he had no outstanding tax liabilities. The court determined that the action was effectively a suit against the United States because the levy was an official act by a federal employee, the officer had no personal involvement, and the United States had not waived sovereign immunity or been properly served. The complaint was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, failure to follow statutory refund procedures under the Internal Revenue Code, and immunity protections, with the court noting the plaintiff's exclusive remedy was an administrative claim for overpayment followed by a potential refund suit against the United States.

taxesfederal power

This case involves 67 plaintiffs who purchased limited partnership interests in satellite communications facilities and alleged that various defendants, including the accounting firm Peat Marwick, participated in a fraudulent scheme violating federal securities laws, RICO, and state laws. Peat Marwick moved to dismiss the amended complaint, arguing among other things that the fraud claims lacked the particularity required by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b). The court granted the motion and dismissed the claims against Peat Marwick with prejudice, finding that the allegations remained too general and conclusory despite prior opportunities to amend, and that plaintiffs had not adequately specified each defendant's role or the circumstances of the alleged misrepresentations. As a result, the court also dismissed the pendent state-law claims against that defendant.

business & regulatoryprocedurecriminal law

In Esposito v. Buonome, the plaintiff sued East Haven police officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Connecticut tort law, alleging excessive force during his 1979 arrest. The defendants moved to dismiss the pendent state claims, citing risks of jury confusion from differing legal standards. The court granted the motion and dismissed the state claims. Drawing on United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, it reasoned that pendent jurisdiction is discretionary and should be declined where differences in liability standards (state reasonable-belief test versus federal "shocks the conscience" test), punitive damages rules, and attorney-fee availability would likely confuse jurors and impair state and federal policy interests.

civil rightsproceduretorts & liability

The case involves a former Sheraton employee who sued the company under Title VII for race and sex discrimination (including pregnancy) in her termination, along with three appended state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress, wrongful discharge, and outrageous discharge. The district court addressed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state claims after a magistrate recommended granting it on the merits. The court denied the motion and instead dismissed the three pendent state claims, holding that they rested on unsettled or novel theories of Connecticut law, involved different issues of proof and law from the federal claim, and that considerations of judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity weighed against exercising pendent jurisdiction.

labor & employmentcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a § 1983 lawsuit by Melvin Mitchell against the City of Hartford and several police officers, alleging constitutional violations during five police encounters from 1976 to 1982. The Hartford defendants objected to a magistrate's recommended denial of summary judgment on four earlier incidents, primarily arguing that claims arising from a 1976 warrantless search and a 1979 arrest were barred by Connecticut's three-year statute of limitations for tort actions. The court, applying the Supreme Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia, determined that § 1983 claims are characterized as personal injury actions and thus governed by the state's general personal injury limitations period under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 52-577. It reasoned that while evidence of prior incidents may support municipal liability by showing a pattern or custom, claims based directly on time-barred incidents themselves must be dismissed if filed more than three years after the events.

civil rightsprocedure

Salvatore DiMartino sued the City of Hartford and its former police chief under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, alleging he was denied reinstatement to the police force because of his age. After discovery and negotiations, the parties signed a settlement agreement in which DiMartino agreed to withdraw the lawsuit in exchange for the opportunity to undergo testing and potentially be rehired as a probationary officer. The City moved for summary judgment, asserting that the agreement was valid and fully performed, while DiMartino challenged its enforceability on grounds including duress, lack of consideration, and incomplete performance. The court held that the settlement agreement was enforceable under the ADEA and that DiMartino failed to present concrete evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact regarding its validity or the City's compliance. Accordingly, the court granted the City's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the action.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The plaintiff, a Black female former Postal Service employee, sued the Postmaster General under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 for alleged race-based employment discrimination and retaliation, including a letter of reprimand and failures to promote. The defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint or for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by missing the 15-day deadline to file a formal agency complaint after her EEO counseling. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the EEOC regulations requiring an employee to contact an EEO counselor within 30 days and file a formal complaint within 15 days are valid and enforceable preconditions to suit. Because the plaintiff conceded she missed the 15-day filing deadline and presented no grounds for equitable tolling or waiver, she had not exhausted her remedies and could not proceed in federal court.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a land development company suing a Connecticut town under the Sherman Antitrust Act, alleging that the town's Zoning Commission conspired to restrain trade by enacting a moratorium on new mobile home park developments after initially considering the plaintiff's proposal alongside another. The court granted the town's motion for summary judgment. It held that the municipality qualified for the Parker "state action" exemption from federal antitrust liability because the commission's actions were taken pursuant to clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy authorizing zoning regulations that could displace competition. The core reasoning relied on precedents establishing that local zoning authority, including the foreseeable anticompetitive effects of limiting development, implements state policy to replace competition with regulation.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case is a product liability action in which the plaintiff, as administratrix of her husband's estate, alleges that the decedent developed leukemia from workplace exposure to benzene sold in bulk by defendant Ashland Oil to his employer, Pfizer. The claims rest on theories of strict products liability, negligence, and breach of warranty for failure to test, warn of dangers, or provide safe-use instructions. Ashland moved for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, arguing it had no duty to warn the employees of a knowledgeable industrial purchaser. The court denied the motion, holding that Ashland failed to show the absence of genuine issues of material fact, particularly regarding the adequacy of warnings and the parties' respective knowledge of benzene risks under applicable Connecticut tort law.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves numerous plaintiffs suing multiple asbestos manufacturers and suppliers, including Owens-Corning Fiberglas Corp., for personal injuries and deaths allegedly caused by asbestos exposure in Connecticut. The court addressed a motion by defendant Standard to dismiss all claims against it for lack of personal jurisdiction. The court granted the motion, holding that the Connecticut long-arm statute did not authorize jurisdiction because the claims did not arise from any tortious conduct by Standard in the state. Even if the statute applied, the court reasoned that exercising jurisdiction would violate due process, as Standard had no minimum contacts with Connecticut and mere foreseeability that its products might reach the state was insufficient under Supreme Court precedent.

torts & liabilityprocedure

This case involved a cable television franchise holder challenging Connecticut state regulations and related orders that required line extensions to additional areas without customer contributions, claiming they conflicted with the federal Cable Communications Policy Act of 1984. The plaintiff sought a permanent injunction against enforcement by the Department of Public Utility Control along with declaratory relief that the state measures were preempted. Defendants moved to dismiss the action for failure to exhaust administrative and judicial remedies or on abstention grounds. The court analyzed the Cable Act's provisions permitting franchise modifications when compliance is commercially impracticable and addressed the availability of federal judicial review under the statute.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

The case involves a Connecticut nursing home operator suing the state Commissioner of Income Maintenance under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that Medicaid reimbursement rates violated due process, equal protection, and Title XIX of the Social Security Act by disallowing salaries of the owner and administrator after their convictions for Medicaid fraud and larceny. The defendant moved to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6), arguing Eleventh Amendment immunity and the absence of any protected property interest in specific reimbursement rates. The court reviewed the factual background of the convictions, subsequent rate adjustments under Conn. Gen. Stat. § 17-83k and § 17-314, and the prospective payment system's time lags, while applying the standard that well-pleaded facts are taken as true but conclusory legal allegations are not.

healthcarecriminal lawbusiness & regulatory