Richard Fred Suhrheinrich

In this case, plaintiff Peter Kovacs sued his former employer, Electronic Data Systems (EDS), alleging wrongful discharge, fraud, and intentional infliction of emotional distress after his termination in 1989. Kovacs had signed an at-will employment agreement that could only be modified in writing by an EDS officer, and he claimed that a supervisor promised job security and assistance with his home sale in connection with a transfer to Detroit. The U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan granted EDS's motion for summary judgment, finding no genuine issue of material fact. The court reasoned that the at-will contract barred any expectation of just-cause termination, the alleged promises did not constitute fraud because they were not shown to be false when made and could not modify the written agreement, and there was insufficient evidence to support the emotional distress claim.

labor & employmenttorts & liabilityprocedure

This case involves a petition by the National Labor Relations Board for a temporary injunction under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act against Brewery Products, Inc., alleging unfair labor practices in union negotiations. The court found reasonable cause to believe violations had occurred, based on evidence that the company withheld requested information for months, facilitated a non-union employee switch during a lockout while extending benefits only to that employee, and canceled scheduled negotiation sessions after announcing the lockout to speed up talks. With the company's assets sold and operations ceased, the court determined that sequestering funds was just and proper to preserve the status quo and potential Board remedies. The court granted the injunction, requiring retention of $82,526.08 during the proceedings.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This case was a civil in rem forfeiture action brought by the United States against a 1985 Ford F-250 pickup truck owned by Jose Navarro, a construction foreman, after Border Patrol agents discovered multiple undocumented aliens traveling with him and his work crew at a Detroit motel following a job in Massachusetts. The government alleged the vehicle had been used to transport illegal aliens within the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B). The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment and ordered the vehicle forfeited, holding that the government had established probable cause for the forfeiture under 8 U.S.C. § 1324(b) and that Navarro had failed to raise any genuine issue of material fact by presenting evidence of his lack of knowledge or other forfeiture defenses.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

This case is a civil in rem forfeiture action by the U.S. government against a 1985 Ford F-250 pickup truck owned by permanent resident Jose Navarro. The government seized the vehicle after Border Patrol agents, acting on a tip, discovered multiple undocumented aliens at a motel in Detroit where Navarro and his coworkers were staying; the truck had transported the group from a job site in Massachusetts. Navarro moved to dismiss, contending he was only an employee without hiring authority and not responsible for the aliens' unlawful presence or transport. Treating the motion as one for summary judgment, the court denied it, concluding that the record showed Navarro may have been more than incidentally connected to the violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1324(a)(1)(B) and thus the forfeiture could proceed.

immigrationcriminal lawproperty

The case concerned whether various Sztanyo business entities and Lloyd L. Sztanyo personally were jointly and severally liable under ERISA for withdrawal liability previously assessed against Apollo Truck Lines, Apollo Expediting, and Jordan Engineering, on the theory that all entities were members of the same controlled group and thus a single employer. The district court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment and ruled that the defendants qualified as trades or businesses, that several of their affirmative defenses (including accord and satisfaction and laches) were inapplicable, and that further evidence was needed on the precise issue of common control. The court applied the MPPAA's controlled-group liability rules, examined ownership percentages and business operations, and used the Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 standards requiring no genuine issue of material fact for summary judgment.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

This antitrust case involved plaintiff Vintage Wine Selections alleging that defendant Aura Promotions violated Section 2 of the Sherman Act through three actions: filing a $10 million state court lawsuit claiming trade secret misappropriation, disparaging plaintiff's products to clients, and acquiring a competing wine promotion company. The court reviewed the magistrate's report and conducted a de novo analysis under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) standards for dismissal. It adopted the magistrate's conclusion that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunized Aura from antitrust liability for instituting the state lawsuit and therefore dismissed that portion of the complaint. The court rejected full dismissal under the doctrine, instead dismissing the disparagement and acquisition claims without prejudice for failure to state a claim while granting leave to amend, and it declined to exercise jurisdiction over any pendent state-law claims.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The consolidated cases arose from the 1986 UAW Region 5 Regional Director election between incumbent Ken Worley and challenger Jerry Tucker, involving claims that certain local delegate elections violated LMRDA sections 401(a), (e), and (g), that the union's 90-day rule improperly barred Tucker from campaigning, and that union funds and resources were used to support Worley's candidacy. The Secretary of Labor sued to void the election results after Tucker's internal union protests were rejected, while additional suits addressed related procedural and constitutional issues in the UAW. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court examined the application of federal labor statutes to the delegate selection process, the validity of the 90-day rule under union policy and regulations, and whether specific campaign practices constituted prohibited use of union resources.

labor & employmentelectionsprocedure

This case arose when plaintiff Richard Fitzgerald, a golf course greenskeeper, suffered mercury poisoning after spilling and inhaling dust from the defendant's inorganic mercury-based fungicide Calo-Clor while mixing it for application; he sued the manufacturer alleging state common-law claims based on inadequate warnings and labeling. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA) preempts such state tort claims. The court first held that the preemption defense was not waived even though it was raised in the pretrial order rather than the initial answer. On the merits, the court granted summary judgment, reasoning that FIFRA's express preemption provision (7 U.S.C. § 136v(b)) bars states from imposing any labeling or packaging requirements different from or in addition to federal requirements, so state tort recovery on a failure-to-warn theory would improperly allow juries to impose additional regulatory duties preempted by federal law.

environmentfederal powertorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

The case involves the Michigan State Podiatry Association's antitrust claims against Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Michigan under Section 1 of the Sherman Act, alleging a conspiracy and unreasonable restraint of trade affecting podiatrists in the foot care market. Plaintiffs moved for rehearing after the court granted summary judgment to the defendant, attempting to introduce untimely affidavits and unfiled trial exhibits to challenge findings on conspiracy, restraint of trade, and interstate commerce effects. The court denied the motion, holding that the new materials were improperly submitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56, that plaintiffs had not shown a genuine issue of material fact or injury to competition rather than just competitors, and that purchases from out-of-state suppliers and occasional out-of-state patients did not establish the required nexus with interstate commerce. The ruling applied Local Rule 17(m)(3) on reconsideration and Sixth Circuit precedent on antitrust pleading requirements.

business & regulatoryhealthcareprocedure

This case arose from the plaintiff's arrest after he vandalized a police car following the 1984 World Series game in Detroit, during which officers allegedly used force while arresting him for arson and resisting arrest; he was later acquitted at trial and sued the officers, city officials, and the City under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violations of his civil rights, including excessive force, lack of probable cause, and related claims of improper staffing and failure to produce witnesses. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on all § 1983 claims. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to establish a genuine issue of material fact regarding municipal liability under an official policy, that the officers' conduct did not shock the conscience given his admitted resistance, lack of injury, and no medical treatment sought, and that he did not overcome the standards for summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 by designating specific facts on essential elements of his case.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case concerns antitrust claims brought by the Michigan State Podiatry Association against Blue Cross Blue Shield of Michigan under Section 1 of the Sherman Act. The podiatrists alleged that BCBSM conspired with the Michigan State Medical Society and medical doctors to implement a predetermination program for foot surgeries and to lower reimbursement screens for podiatric procedures, amounting to a horizontal boycott and price fixing that harmed competition for certain patients. The district court addressed BCBSM's third motion for summary judgment after full discovery, incorporating prior partial rulings by another judge and new Supreme Court precedent from Matsushita Electric Industrial Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. The court evaluated whether factual questions remained on the existence of a conspiracy, whether BCBSM's structure constituted an unlawful combination, whether the claimed injuries qualified as antitrust injury, and whether a state insurance commissioner's decision created collateral estoppel.

business & regulatoryhealthcare

The case Taylor v. Watters was a lawsuit brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 by plaintiffs seeking damages from Ferndale police officers and the City of Ferndale after Karen Taylor was shot and killed by gunman Alvin Freeman during a hostage situation at the Rialto Restaurant on July 3, 1984. The court addressed defendants' motion for summary judgment on claims that officers failed to protect Taylor. The court granted summary judgment to defendants, concluding that plaintiffs failed to state a claim because there is no constitutional duty for police to protect individuals from private violence absent a special relationship. Core reasoning relied on precedent such as Bowers v. DeVito establishing no right to state protection from criminals, the lack of conduct shocking to the conscience, and policy concerns that liability would hinder effective law enforcement in emergencies.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerned whether CNA Insurance had a duty to defend Grant-Southern Iron & Metal Company and Detroit Briquetting Company in a state court class action alleging injuries from ongoing air pollution emissions at their Detroit plant. The court granted the insurers' motion for partial summary judgment and denied the insureds' cross-motion, holding that no duty to defend existed under the policy. The policy contained a pollution exclusion that barred coverage for bodily injury or property damage from discharges of pollutants unless the discharge was sudden and accidental. The underlying complaint alleged regular, continuous, and ongoing emissions, supported by repeated violation notices from health authorities, which the court found inconsistent with any sudden or accidental event. The court further determined that facts developed outside the complaint, including the insureds' knowledge of equipment issues, confirmed the absence of coverage.

business & regulatoryenvironment

The case involved the Estate of Essiy Fink seeking a refund of over $156,000 in income taxes paid for 1970-1974 on returns filed in the decedent's name for an ovenware business. Although the Tax Court had determined that the business income was not taxable to Essiy and that overpayments occurred, the district court addressed whether the estate could claim the refund. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss with prejudice, holding that the estate lacked standing under IRC § 6402(a) because Essiy was not the person who made the overpayment. The core reasoning was that the taxes were paid using funds from the ovenware business, which Essiy did not own or control and from which he received no benefit, making the actual proprietors (the Bruseloffs) the proper parties to seek any refund.

taxesbusiness & regulatoryfederal power

The case concerned debtors who filed for bankruptcy and later moved to compel Detroit Edison to restore electrical service that had been disconnected after the utility discovered illegal meter bypassing and theft amounting to over $4,000. The court affirmed the bankruptcy judge's denial of the debtors' motion for an order to show cause and request for a temporary restraining order. Although 11 U.S.C. § 366 bars a utility from refusing service solely because of an unpaid pre-petition debt, the court held that the statute's use of the word 'solely' permits refusal on other valid grounds, such as the debtors' post-petition tampering with utility equipment, which constitutes a legitimate basis for denial even absent bankruptcy. Restitution for the stolen services was therefore an appropriate condition for restoring service, and the debtors were directed to pursue relief before the Public Service Commission if needed.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a railway worker who sued his employer in state court under the Federal Employers' Liability Act for on-the-job injuries and under the Michigan Handicappers’ Civil Rights Act after being placed on disability status. The defendant removed the action to federal court asserting diversity jurisdiction, and the plaintiff moved to remand on grounds that FELA claims filed in state court are non-removable. The court denied remand, holding that the state-law claim was separate and independent under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c), allowing removal of the entire case, and that § 1445(a) did not bar removal when a removable claim is joined. After the FELA claim was later dismissed by stipulation, the court again denied remand, concluding that diversity jurisdiction required it to retain the remaining state-law claim rather than decline jurisdiction due to interpretive uncertainties in state law.

procedurecivil rightslabor & employmentfederal power

This case involves a dispute over attorney fees requested by counsel under section 206(b) of the Social Security Act in a case seeking past-due benefits for the plaintiff. The magistrate reduced the claimed hours from 52.25 to 37, set a $100 hourly rate, and imposed $3,700 in Rule 11 sanctions for overstated time entries not grounded in fact. On review, the district court found the magistrate's sanctions appropriate but adjusted the reasonable hours downward to 30.25 total (at $75 per hour for non-court work and $100 for court appearances), resulting in an award of $2,293.75, while affirming the sanctions based on the patently unreasonable itemization of administrative and other tasks. The court rejected arguments that the sanctions were improper or based on personal bias, emphasizing that the fee petition was not well-grounded and that prior similar issues with counsel supported the ruling.

procedurehealthcare

Stand Buys, Ltd. sued Michigan Bell Telephone Co. and related defendants alleging breach of contract, misrepresentation, negligence, slander, and intentional interference with contractual relations arising from delays, disconnections, and interruptions in interstate WATS telephone services for its travel discount hotline. The defendants removed the case to federal court and moved for summary judgment, relying on AT&T Tariff FCC No. 259, which limits liability for damages associated with telephone service to the monthly recurring charge unless the provider engaged in willful misconduct. The court defined willful misconduct as intentional acts or omissions done with knowledge that injury would probably result or in reckless disregard of probable consequences. Finding no evidence of such misconduct and only possible negligence from service issues and miscommunications related to divestiture, the court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims requiring proof of willful misconduct.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In Taylor v. Watters, plaintiffs filed a § 1983 action against Ferndale police officers and the city seeking damages for the shooting of Karen Taylor during a July 1984 hostage incident at the Rialto Restaurant, where gunman Alvin Freeman had wounded officers and patrons before taking Taylor hostage. The court considered defendants' motion to dismiss or for summary judgment, granting it as to the procedural due process claim on the ground that adequate state remedies existed, while denying summary judgment on the substantive due process claim pending further verification of an expert's background. The core reasoning examined whether officers' conduct in the hostage rescue— including perimeter setup, negotiation attempts, and eventual entry—shocked the conscience, applying factors such as the need for force, its relationship to the amount used, resulting injury, and officers' motivations, along with precedents like Rochin v. California.

civil rightsprocedure

The case concerned whether Oakland and Macomb Counties had standing to sue the City of Detroit for alleged antitrust violations and RICO infractions arising from overcharges for sewage disposal services. The court had granted summary judgment to the defendants and, on the counties' motion to alter the judgment, reaffirmed that ruling. The counties described their role in contracting with Detroit, administering interceptor systems, and billing municipalities from segregated funds, but the court found these facts showed the counties suffered no direct injury from Detroit's actions. Instead, any dissipation of funds resulted from municipalities failing to pay their obligations, making the counties mere conduits and raising risks of duplicative recovery by end users or municipalities. The same lack of injury-in-fact precluded standing under RICO.

business & regulatorycriminal lawprocedure