In Story v. Napolitano, a female non-Mormon TSA employee at Pasco Airport claimed she endured repeated sex and religious discrimination and harassment from Mormon male supervisors, including derogatory comments about women and non-Mormons, unfair leave scrutiny, apparent demotions, performance improvement plans, and efforts to gather information for her termination. The defendant filed motions for summary judgment. The court examined the detailed factual allegations spanning 2002-2005, the scope of the underlying EEO complaint, the use of time-barred acts as background evidence, and the distinction between mixed-motive and single-motive discrimination frameworks to assess the viability of the claims.
The case involved Muhammad Zahid Chaudhry, a Pakistani citizen, challenging the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' denial of his naturalization application. The court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment. The core reasoning was that Chaudhry provided undisputed false testimony by failing to disclose his 1996 Australian fraud convictions on U.S. visa applications and during multiple naturalization interviews within the statutory period, and he failed to create a genuine issue of material fact about his intent or claimed memory lapses.
This case involves a coverage dispute under London Market Insurance policies issued to Teck Metals regarding liability for pollution at a site in Washington, specifically whether the policies' Qualified Pollution Exclusion Clause bars coverage. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether an actual conflict exists between British Columbia and Washington law in interpreting the clause's 'sudden, unintended and unexpected' language, and if so, which jurisdiction's law applies. The court concluded there was insufficient proof of an actual conflict, as British Columbia law on the clause is unsettled and does not clearly require a temporal element for 'sudden,' unlike some Ontario decisions. It therefore applied Washington law per Queen City Farms, under which the clause is ambiguous and construed against the insurer to allow coverage for unexpected and unintended pollution events.
This case involves a dispute between Teck Metals and its London Market Insurers over the scope of coverage under successive excess liability insurance policies issued from 1972 to 1985 for pollution-related losses stemming from Teck's operations in British Columbia dating back to 1908. Teck sought a ruling that, once triggered, the policies require the insurers to indemnify all of Teck's losses up to policy limits without any allocation to Teck for periods when it lacked insurance. The court held that Washington law governs the policies under the significant relationship test, as there is no conflict with British Columbia law, and Washington precedent requires an "all sums" approach under which insurers must pay all covered losses without pro-rata allocation to the insured. The decision was based on the policy language promising to indemnify "all sums" for which the insured becomes liable due to an occurrence, and on the insurers' inability to rewrite that language after drafting it.
This case concerned whether Teck Metals could recover costs for a Remedial Investigation/Feasibility Study performed under a 2006 settlement agreement with the EPA at the Upper Columbia River Site as covered "damages" under its London Market Insurance policies. The policies indemnified the insured for sums it was obligated to pay by reason of liability imposed by law for property damage. Applying Washington law, the court granted Teck's motion for summary judgment and denied the insurers' cross-motion, holding that the response costs qualified as damages because they were incurred to resolve Teck's potential CERCLA liability for releases at the site, consistent with precedents such as Boeing Co. v. Aetna and Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Aetna. The ruling rested on the policy language covering liability imposed by law and the fact that the settlement effectively resolved claims that could have led to enforcement of an EPA order against Teck.
This case concerns disputes between Stanley Steemer International and its former franchisees, Rex Rozmus and the Fleetwood plaintiffs, regarding the termination of carpet cleaning franchises due to unpaid royalties, debts, and defaults on promissory notes following forbearance agreements. The plaintiffs sought partial summary judgment while the defendant moved for summary judgment on the claims, which involved interpretations of franchise agreements, termination agreements, and potential implied covenants of good faith. The court reviewed undisputed facts showing material breaches by the franchisees, opportunities to cure, and subsequent agreements to transition the businesses, and applied contract principles under Washington law to conclude that no fiduciary relationship existed and that terminations were proper under the agreement terms. It granted the defendant's summary judgment motions, dismissing the claims based on the explicit integration clauses and absence of enforceable additional promises.
