In Simmons v. United Parcel Service, plaintiffs sued UPS in Texas state court for breach of contract and violations of the Texas Insurance Code after the carrier failed to deliver packages containing antelope meat by the contracted second-day air service, resulting in spoilage. UPS removed the case to federal court under the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. § 11707, which governs claims against carriers for loss or damage to shipments. Plaintiffs moved to remand, arguing that the amount in controversy was insufficient under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337 and 1445(b), that removal could not rest on a preemption defense, and that certain state-law claims fell outside the Amendment's scope. The court denied the motion, holding that the complete preemption doctrine applies because the Carmack Amendment fully displaces state-law claims against carriers, converting them into federal claims from the outset, and that the pleaded damages satisfied the $10,000 jurisdictional threshold.
The case concerned a challenge by Hispanic and African-American residents of the North East Independent School District to its at-large system for electing school board trustees, alleging that the system diluted minority voting strength and violated Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 as well as the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments. After a five-day bench trial, the court initially found the record insufficient to decide whether plaintiffs satisfied the first prong of the Thornburg v. Gingles test regarding a sufficiently large and geographically compact minority group. It then sua sponte ordered supplemental testimony from the plaintiffs' demographics expert and additional proposed findings from the parties. The opinion sets out extensive findings of fact on district population demographics (minorities at 29.8%), the at-large election mechanics, and expert analysis of racially polarized voting.
This case involves the FDIC, as receiver for two failed Texas banks, suing six former directors and officers for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with approving and renewing loans to a borrower and related entities between 1980 and 1989, as well as authorizing dividend payments upstream to a holding company. The defendants moved for summary judgment on multiple grounds, including the business judgment rule, lack of evidence of gross negligence or fiduciary breach, and statutory protections under Texas corporation law. The court denied the motions, holding that the FDIC's expert affidavit and bank records created genuine issues of material fact on whether the defendants' conduct constituted gross negligence, while also addressing procedural issues such as relation back of amended claims and attendance at board meetings.
The case involves the FDIC, as receiver for failed banks, suing former directors for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty in connection with various loans and regulatory violations. Defendants moved to reconsider the denial of their motion to dismiss the claims as time-barred under Texas statutes of limitations, arguing that a recent Fifth Circuit decision in RTC v. Acton established that gross negligence does not trigger tolling under the adverse domination doctrine. The court reviewed the evolution of Fifth Circuit precedent on adverse domination, including RTC v. Seale and RTC v. Dawson, which require proof of more than mere negligence by a controlling majority of directors for tolling to apply. After analyzing the FDIC's evidence of regulatory violations and policy breaches, the court ordered the FDIC to amend its complaint to clarify the dates of renewals and extensions for one specific loan so that timeliness could be determined, while deferring rulings on other loans.
The case involves the FDIC, acting in its corporate capacity, suing former directors and officers of two Texas banks for gross negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from their approval and handling of loans to various borrowers between 1980 and 1989, as well as the payment of dividends to a holding company. The FDIC moved for partial summary judgment to eliminate 22 affirmative defenses, including failure to mitigate damages, independent intervening causes, contributory negligence by the FDIC or others, unclean hands, waiver, and lack of proximate cause based on the agency's post-closure conduct. The court granted the motion as to most defenses, applying the no-duty rule to bar claims that the FDIC's own actions or omissions caused or increased the damages, while noting that defendants could still challenge causation through third-party conduct. The reasoning drew on Fifth Circuit precedent like FDIC v. Mijalis and post-O'Melveny district court decisions holding that the rule protects the FDIC when suing in its corporate capacity, though the court certified aspects of the ruling for potential interlocutory appeal due to conflicting authority.
business & regulatoryfederal powerproceduretorts & liability
The case involved Chapter 7 debtors E.C. and Phyllis Henderson who moved to avoid a judicial lien obtained by creditor Lee Belknap on their 131-acre Texas rural homestead under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f)(1), after the bankruptcy court had denied their discharge. The bankruptcy court denied the motion on the ground that the lien did not impair the exemption because, under Texas law, a judicial lien does not attach to homestead property. On de novo review, the district court reversed, holding that federal law governs lien avoidance and that the mere existence of the judgment lien impairs the state-created homestead exemption by clouding title, satisfying the statutory requirements for avoidance even though the lien does not attach under state law.