District Court, C.D. California — appointed by Gerald Ford
United States v. Blanton
District Court, C.D. California · 2005-03-23 · cited 4×
The case involved a defendant convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), with the government seeking a 15-year mandatory minimum sentence enhancement under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(1), based on one adult conviction and three prior juvenile adjudications for violent felonies. The defendant moved for acquittal on the enhancement under Rule 29, arguing that United States v. Tighe barred the use of juvenile adjudications as predicate offenses. The court granted the motion, holding that the juvenile adjudications could not serve as ACCA predicates because the defendant was not afforded the right to a jury trial in those proceedings, consistent with Tighe's analysis of Apprendi's prior conviction exception and further considerations under Blakely v. Washington. The core reasoning emphasized constitutional differences between adult convictions and juvenile adjudications, which lack equivalent procedural safeguards, precluding their use to enhance the sentence beyond the statutory maximum without jury findings.
criminal lawprocedure
Hart v. Gaioni
District Court, C.D. California · 2005-01-05
In Hart v. Gaioni, plaintiffs sued federal prosecutors and agents under Bivens, alleging violations of their First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendment rights based on claims that defendants leaked grand jury information about plaintiffs' attorney to the press and used it to seek his disqualification in separate underlying civil rights cases, thereby interfering with plaintiffs' access to the courts. The court granted in part and denied in part defendants' motion to dismiss the first amended complaint. It held that the USAO defendants were entitled to absolute immunity from claims arising out of their filing of judicial inquiry notices regarding potential conflicts of interest, because such actions are intimately associated with the judicial process. The court denied as moot the motions to stay discovery and for Chuman certification.
civil rightsfederal powerprocedure
United States v. Plaza Mobile Estates
District Court, C.D. California · 2003-07-01 · cited 4×
This case involves claims by the United States and plaintiff-intervenors against mobile home park owners and managers for maintaining rules that restricted children's access to facilities like pools, clubhouses, and streets based on age. The court considered a motion for partial summary judgment seeking a declaration that these rules at several parks violated the Fair Housing Act's prohibitions on familial status discrimination and an injunction against their enforcement at the current parks. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine issues of material fact and holding that the age-based restrictions were discriminatory, lacked justification as the least restrictive means for health or safety, and amounted to illegal steering. It reasoned that explicit rules limiting minors' use of recreational areas without adult supervision or at specific times directly conflicted with the Act's protections.
civil rightsproperty
United States v. Rahmani
District Court, C.D. California · 2002-06-21 · cited 12×
In United States v. Rahmani, the defendants were indicted on charges of conspiring and providing material support to the Mujahedin-e Khalq (MEK), a group designated as a foreign terrorist organization by the Secretary of State under 8 U.S.C. § 1189 and 18 U.S.C. § 2339B. The defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, relying on the D.C. Circuit's decision in National Council of Resistance of Iran v. Department of State, which held that the designation process denies due process by failing to provide the designated organization with notice or a meaningful opportunity to be heard. The district court granted the motion, ruling that the unconstitutional designation procedure under Section 1189 could not serve as a valid predicate for the criminal charges, even though the D.C. Circuit had not set aside the specific MEK designation. The court reasoned that the statute's lack of procedural protections for entities with constitutional rights rendered it invalid as applied, precluding its use in prosecutions regardless of when the conduct occurred.
criminal lawcivil rightsfederal power
Klvana v. State of Cal.
District Court, C.D. California · 1995-12-15 · cited 1×
The case involves a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Milos Klvana, a state prisoner convicted by a jury in 1989 of nine counts of second-degree murder and numerous other charges, including practicing medicine without a license, insurance fraud, and perjury. The convictions stemmed from Klvana's actions as a physician performing deliveries in clinics and homes, where nine infants died due to what the prosecution argued was implied malice from extreme departures from the standard of care, such as failing to monitor high-risk patients or respond to signs of distress. After state courts affirmed the convictions on direct appeal, Klvana sought federal relief claiming insufficient evidence and other errors. The U.S. District Court, adopting the magistrate judge's report and recommendation after de novo review, denied the petition and dismissed the action with prejudice, finding no basis to overturn the state court's determinations on the sufficiency of evidence for implied malice or other claims.
criminal lawhealthcareprocedure
Dep Corp. v. Opti-Ray, Inc.
District Court, C.D. California · 1991-05-09 · cited 5×
Dep Corporation, which owns the registered trademark "L.A. LOOKS" for hair care products and had begun expanding the mark to other mass-market goods including sunglasses, sued Opti-Ray, Inc. for federal and common-law trademark infringement, unfair competition, and related state claims after Opti-Ray began selling sunglasses bearing the similar mark "LA LOOK." The district court granted Dep's motion for a preliminary injunction. It found that Dep had shown a likelihood of success on the merits because it owned a valid mark, Opti-Ray used a confusingly similar mark without consent, and such use was likely to cause consumer confusion as to source or sponsorship. The court also held that irreparable injury was presumed once infringement was shown and that the balance of hardships favored Dep, satisfying the standard for preliminary relief under Ninth Circuit precedent.
business & regulatoryprocedure