This case involved an ejectment action in which the plaintiffs, judgment creditors of Richard D. Fenby, sought to recover land in Maryland by levying on it after a 1858 sheriff's sale. The plaintiffs traced title through a 1857 deed from Robert D. Brown conveying the property to Fenby as trustee for the sole benefit of Fenby's wife and children, which the plaintiffs claimed was fraudulent. The Circuit Court instructed the jury that the deed conveyed only a naked legal title to Fenby with no leviable beneficial interest, and the Supreme Court affirmed. The Court reasoned that Maryland law maintains a strict separation between legal and equitable titles, ejectment requires proof of legal title in the plaintiff, and any challenge to the trust or claim of fraud must be pursued in equity rather than at common law.
This case concerned whether the U.S. Supreme Court could issue a writ of mandamus compelling the Governor of Ohio to extradite a fugitive from justice to Kentucky under the Constitution's fugitive clause and the federal Act of 1793. The Court reviewed its original jurisdiction in suits against states, the proper form of process against governors, and precedents such as Chisholm v. Georgia and New Jersey v. New York, confirming that the Court may exercise such jurisdiction and regulate process without additional congressional authorization. It determined that the constitutional provision and statute create an obligation on state executives to deliver fugitives, but this duty depends on voluntary compliance by the states rather than federal enforcement authority. The Court therefore held that no coercive power exists in the federal government, including through mandamus, to compel the governor's performance and overruled the motion.
The case involved a Maryland landowner who filed suit in state court seeking to enjoin federal agents from building an aqueduct across his property to supply water to Washington and Georgetown, alleging the project lacked congressional approval, violated state and federal constitutions, and did not serve a public purpose. The trial court and Maryland Court of Appeals refused the injunction. The U.S. Supreme Court dismissed the writ of error for lack of jurisdiction, ruling that the lower court's affirmance was not a final decree and that the plaintiff asserted no federal right but instead challenged actions taken under federal authority.
The case involves a writ of error seeking review by the U.S. Supreme Court of a judgment from the Minnesota Supreme Court. That state court judgment reversed a lower court decision and awarded a new trial. The U.S. Supreme Court determined that it lacked jurisdiction because the state court ruling was not a final judgment. As a result, the writ was dismissed.
This case involved a claim by Jose Castro and others to eleven leagues of land in California based on a purported 1846 grant from Mexican Governor Pio Pico. The Supreme Court reversed the Circuit Court's confirmation of the grant and directed dismissal of the petition. The court reasoned that the document lacked any supporting petition, informe, decree, or record in Mexican archives, was deposited years later by a third party under suspicious circumstances with no chain of custody, and was backed only by inconsistent oral testimony about possession that contradicted Mexican legal requirements. It held that such privately held papers could not satisfy the evidentiary standards needed to confirm title after U.S. cession of the territory, distinguishing the case from precedents like Fremont v. United States where authentic archived records existed.
The case Almy v. California concerned a California law that required a stamp tax on bills of lading for shipping gold, silver, or gold dust out of the state, with penalties for non-compliance. Almy, a ship master, was convicted for using an unstamped bill of lading when transporting gold dust from San Francisco to New York. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the conviction, holding that the state law was unconstitutional. The Court reasoned that the tax on bills of lading was effectively a duty on exports, which states are prohibited from imposing under the U.S. Constitution without congressional consent, drawing on the precedent from Brown v. Maryland where a similar licensing tax on importers was invalidated as a tax on imports.