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Decision levers
AI-measured from their own opinions — each lever cites its cases
Willing to revisit precedentStrong stare decisis
In State v. Holden the court overruled its own recent decision in State v. Lewis and shifted the burden of proof in collateral attacks on out-of-state guilty pleas. State v. Holden ↗
Deference to government powerSkepticism of government power
In State v. Washington the court reversed a conviction after finding the prosecutor had systematically used peremptory challenges to exclude black jurors over many years. State v. Washington ↗
PurposivismTextualism
In Slagle-Johnson Lumber the court adhered strictly to the statutory text and prior precedent limiting lien coverage to materials directly incorporated or consumed in public works. Slagle-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Lan… ↗
Judicial activismJudicial restraint
In State v. Touchet the court vacated a sentence for failure to comply with the statutory sentencing guidelines and remanded for an individualized statement of reasons. State v. Touchet ↗
Affiliations
Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit — appointed by Jimmy Carter
AT
Albert Tate jr
Born 1920 · Opelousas, LA
Party: Democratic →B.A., George Washington UniversityLL.B., Yale UniversityBA, George Washington UniversityJD, Yale UniversityJD, Yale University
The case involved a lumber supplier suing a general contractor and its surety to recover payment for lumber and nails sold to a defaulting subcontractor, which were used to build temporary wooden forms for pouring concrete in a public university stadium project. The lower courts dismissed the claim, holding that the statutory lien under Louisiana's Public Works Act did not cover these materials because they were not physically incorporated into the completed structure. On review, the Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal, adhering to its prior precedent that excluded items used temporarily and then removed, even if consumed or damaged during construction, and distinguished such materials from those directly consumed like dynamite. The court reasoned that the statute's lien protection applies to materials furnished for the work but requires direct incorporation or consumption into the final public work, and amendments to the act did not alter this limitation.
The case concerned Frank D. Mathews's conviction for obtaining hotel accommodations by fraud under La.R.S. 21:21(1) (1968), which criminalized obtaining accommodations without paying with intent to defraud except when credit is given by express agreement; he received a suspended one-year sentence and probation requiring restitution. The defendant was charged solely under subsection (1) but argued in a motion for directed verdict that the state's evidence showed credit had been extended or other conduct not covered by that subsection, and he was not charged with alternative methods of the offense under subsections (2) or (4). The court reviewed the denial of the motion under Louisiana's standard requiring no evidence at all of the crime or its elements, while also referencing federal due-process requirements from Jackson v. Virginia that convictions cannot rest on patently deficient evidence, and noted that proof of an uncharged offense does not support conviction.
In State v. Washington, the defendant was convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to 35 years in prison. He appealed on the ground that the prosecutor had denied him a fair trial by systematically using peremptory challenges to exclude black prospective jurors from service, particularly in cases involving black defendants and white victims. The Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction and ordered a new trial. The court based its decision on testimony from multiple attorneys about the prosecutor's consistent practice over years, combined with the prosecutor's own statements admitting he challenged black jurors based on assumptions about their attitudes, intelligence, and voting tendencies without individual questioning. This evidence established a prima facie case of racial discrimination that the state failed to rebut.
This case involved a negligent homicide charge against a driver following a fatal car accident, where the state sought to use results from a photo-electric intoximeter (PEI) test showing a blood alcohol level above the legal limit. The defendant argued that due process required warning him before the test that the results could create a presumption of criminal negligence, and moved to suppress the evidence. The Louisiana Supreme Court held that no such warning is constitutionally required because the privilege against self-incrimination does not apply to physical evidence like blood tests, and the statutory warnings about license suspension suffice. However, the court ruled that any presumption arising from the PEI test results may not be used at trial for negligent homicide to avoid relieving the state of its burden to prove negligence beyond a reasonable doubt.
In State v. Valasquez, a licensed pharmacist was convicted of felony distribution of a controlled dangerous substance after selling pills to an informant pursuant to a forged prescription that the pharmacist knew was invalid. The defendant argued that as a licensee he could only face misdemeanor charges under the regulatory provisions for improper dispensation rather than felony prosecution under the general distribution statutes. The Louisiana Supreme Court affirmed the conviction, holding that the controlled substances law creates two distinct offenses—one applicable to any person for illegal distribution and another for licensed dispensers—and expressly allows independent proceedings under either. The court reasoned that the district attorney has discretion to elect which violation to prosecute when conduct violates multiple provisions, and prior precedent on penalty disparities did not bar felony charges against licensees. The entrapment claim was rejected because no forgery by state agents was proven.
The case involved defendant James Williams, who was convicted of armed robbery in Louisiana and raised a defense of not guilty by reason of insanity based on mental defect and intoxication from alcohol and marijuana. On appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court reversed the conviction due to the trial judge's extensive cross-examination of a defense psychiatrist before the jury regarding the amount of substances the defendant had consumed. The court held that this questioning violated La.C.Cr.P. art. 772, which prohibits judges from commenting on the facts or evidence in the jury's presence, as it implied an opinion on a material issue and undermined the jury's role as sole fact-finder. The decision emphasized that judges must act as impartial umpires rather than actively participating in witness interrogation in criminal jury trials.