Robert Emmet Tehan

The case was a federal habeas corpus petition by a state prisoner convicted of theft challenging the denial of credit against his maximum five-year sentence for 72 days spent in county jail, including preconviction detention due to inability to post bail and postconviction periods awaiting sentencing and delivery to prison. The court granted the petition and ordered credit for the full period of detention plus good time, holding that such jail time must be applied to the sentence. The core reasoning was that pretrial or postconviction detention resulting from indigency violates equal protection by imposing punishment based on financial status, and that all periods of custody constitute punishment that cannot be excluded without exceeding the statutory maximum penalty.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves a bankruptcy trustee seeking to recover $4,500 from defendant Edward Sideman, who received a $5,500 check from an insolvent partnership (Lawrence Brill Agency) four months before its bankruptcy filing. The stated purpose was to avoid garnishment of the partnership bank account, after which Sideman disbursed most of the funds to the individual partners rather than returning them to the partnership. The court upheld the Special Master's determination that Sideman is liable for the unreturned amount with interest and costs. The core reasoning is that under the Bankruptcy Act, a partnership is a distinct entity, and the transfer to a non-partner without fair consideration while insolvent was void under § 67(d)(4)(b); Sideman, as initial transferee aware of the circumstances, acted as trustee of the funds and breached that duty by the improper disbursements.

business & regulatory

In Monsour v. Gray, the petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus after being convicted on multiple state charges and sentenced to a cumulative term of up to six years, arguing that the sentencing court improperly failed to credit him with 128 days of preconviction jail time spent solely because he could not post bail, along with associated good time. He claimed this violated equal protection by discriminating against him based on poverty, as well as double jeopardy and cruel and unusual punishment protections. The court determined that the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits an absolute bar to crediting such presentence custody in determining the term of imprisonment, particularly where the judge stated he lacked authority to provide credit. Drawing on precedents such as Williams v. Illinois and Tate v. Short, the court rejected a conclusive presumption that the judge had already accounted for the time and ordered the state to either automatically credit the jail time plus good time or return the case for resentencing consideration under relevant state law. The court declined to rule on the facial constitutionality of the Wisconsin statute excluding such time from sentence computations.

criminal lawcivil rights

This case involves a petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging the validity of state court proceedings that revoked the petitioner's probation following his guilty plea to burglary charges and subsequent arrest for assaulting an officer. After an initial administrative revocation, a judicial hearing before the sentencing judge resulted in revocation of probation and execution of the original sentences. The court granted the petition, vacated the revocation order, and directed that the petitioner be restored to probation status unless a new hearing on the violations was held by December 13, 1972. The core reasoning was that the proceedings violated due process because the presiding judge had prejudged the case, failed to disqualify himself, and considered matters outside the charged violations when assessing credibility and making findings.

criminal lawprocedure

The case concerned Fort Howard Paper Company's third counterclaim against Scott Paper Company, alleging that Scott had distributed erroneous comparative product information about Fort Howard's brands in 1957, which Fort Howard characterized as unfair trade practices and unfair competition causing reputational and business harm. Scott moved for summary judgment on grounds including failure to plead special damages, lack of malice, and the two-year Wisconsin statute of limitations for libel actions. The court examined the allegations and concluded that the claim was in substance one for trade libel or product disparagement rather than a distinct unfair competition tort. Applying the two-year limitations period, the court found no specific publications alleged within that window and ordered Fort Howard to replead with particular details of timely publications or face dismissal of the counterclaim.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved returning military veterans who claimed vacation pay for the year they resumed work at Wrought Washer Mfg. Co., asserting rights under the federal statute protecting veterans' reemployment (50 U.S.C. App. § 459). The court held that the vacation pay constituted a perquisite of seniority rather than an 'other benefit,' entitling the plaintiffs to it despite their failure to meet the work requirements in the collective bargaining agreement. The reasoning followed Supreme Court decisions in Accardi v. Pennsylvania R. Co. and Eagar v. Magma Copper Co., which treat returning veterans as having been continuously employed for seniority purposes and preclude limiting such benefits by leave-of-absence rules in labor contracts.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved plaintiff Alvin Lucas, who disputed an alleged arrearage on his electric bill with Wisconsin Electric Power Company, a private utility, and challenged the termination of his service without a prior hearing under Wisconsin Administrative Code § 113.13(4) and the company's tariff. He sued the utility and state public service commissioners under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, seeking declaratory and injunctive relief on due process grounds and requesting a three-judge court. The court dismissed the action, holding that it lacked jurisdiction because the utility was a private company and its conduct did not constitute state action under color of state law, regulation, or custom. The regulation at issue limited rather than expanded the utility's common-law right to refuse credit, and no state officials participated in the challenged practice. The court further noted that the plaintiff's claim would require imposing affirmative due process obligations on private creditors, which exceeds the scope of the federal civil rights statutes.

civil rightsbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a challenge by the United States under Section 7 of the Clayton Act to Pabst Brewing Company's 1958 acquisition of Blatz Brewing Company from Schenley Industries. The complaint alleged that the merger's effects might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the production and sale of beer in the continental United States, the State of Wisconsin, and the three-state area of Wisconsin, Illinois, and Michigan. After trial, the court found that the relevant product market was beer and that the United States and Wisconsin were relevant geographic markets; it rejected Pabst's failing-firm defense after determining that, although Pabst faced financial difficulties, reasonable alternatives to the merger existed. The court concluded that the acquisition violated Section 7 because it increased concentration in an already consolidating industry, eliminated substantial competition between the merging firms, and raised the probability of anticompetitive effects.

business & regulatory

The case was a class action filed by James E. Otey, a Black resident of Milwaukee, against the city's Common Council, Board of Election Commissioners, and City Clerk, seeking a declaration that a proposed resolution was unconstitutional and an injunction against its placement on the ballot. The resolution, initiated by petition under Wis. Stat. § 9.20, stated that the Common Council shall not enact any ordinance restricting property owners' rights to sell, lease, or rent private real estate; Otey alleged it would deny equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by maintaining segregated housing conditions. The defendants largely took no position on the merits, asserting no justiciable controversy existed because their duties under the statute were mandatory. The court examined whether the matter presented a live case or controversy, noting that the resolution's command of perpetual council inaction could evade later judicial review and that a legislative body cannot irrevocably bind its successors on a subject through referendum.

civil rightselectionsproperty

This case concerns a mother's application under the Social Security Act for pre-1965 survivor's insurance benefits on behalf of her four children, who were born out of wedlock to a deceased father domiciled in New York. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare denied the claim on the grounds that the children did not qualify as dependent because they were not legitimate under applicable law, though partial benefits were later granted under 1965 amendments. The court reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment and examined whether formal acknowledgments of paternity under Puerto Rican and Wisconsin law, combined with Puerto Rico's post-1952 jurisprudence treating all filiated children equally regardless of birth circumstances, satisfied the Act's dependency and legitimacy requirements in sections 202(d) and 216(h). The core reasoning focused on the federal statute's directive to apply the law of the father's domicile to determine child status and whether such acknowledgments conferred rights equivalent to those of legitimate children.

family lawfederal power

The case involves a Wisconsin state prisoner, John Allen Seybold, who filed a civil action in forma pauperis alleging copyright infringement by the defendants and seeking an injunction and damages. The plaintiff, appearing pro se, petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus ad testificandum to be transported to court for hearings on pending motions, citing his incarceration as preventing personal appearance. The court denied the petition, holding that while prisoners retain the right to bring civil actions, incarceration necessarily limits many privileges and rights, making effective prosecution of unrelated civil claims impractical without undue expense, public risk, and interference with state prison officials. The court placed further proceedings in abeyance until the plaintiff's release from prison, at which point he must reactivate the case within thirty days or face dismissal, noting that the statute of limitations had already been tolled by the filing.

civil rightsprocedure

This case was a tax refund suit brought by Irvin and Cecile Lozoff seeking recovery of $21,516.08 in federal income taxes paid for 1957. The taxpayers had received payments under agreements with Curtiss Candy Company for purchasing merchandise and claimed the amounts qualified for capital gains treatment after a 1956 agreement with Robert Schnering. The court held that the income was ordinary income, not eligible for capital gains, because it represented settlement of past commissions and compensation for cancellation of the agency contract rather than a sale or exchange of a capital asset, and dismissed the action. The court also rejected claims of estoppel from the IRS's acceptance of installment-basis reporting in a prior year.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

This case was a lawsuit by T. P. Laboratories against former employee Huge for infringement of two patents on orthodontic tooth positioning appliances (a resilient rubber device with preselected tooth impressions for final positioning after wire treatment) and for unfair competition based on alleged misuse of manufacturing techniques. The court held both patents invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as obvious and dismissed the infringement claim, while also dismissing the unfair competition claim for failure to prove misappropriation of protectable trade secrets. The reasoning centered on the patents' claims being obvious from existing dental practices and models, with the alleged secrets either disclosed by the patents themselves, readily ascertainable, well-known in the trade, or obtainable on the open market.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a civil antitrust action by the United States against several paper companies, including Badger Paper Mills, alleging a conspiracy in restraint of trade in pulpwood in violation of the Sherman Act. The defendants moved for production of transcripts of grand jury testimony given by six witnesses who would be called at trial, after the grand jury investigation had concluded without indictment in this district. The court granted the motion for limited disclosure to the witnesses, their counsel, and defense counsel, reasoning that the witnesses had consented to disclosure, the plaintiff had already used the transcripts for trial preparation creating an imbalance, and the traditional reasons for maintaining grand jury secrecy no longer applied given the closure of proceedings and lack of any ongoing need for protection.

business & regulatoryprocedurecriminal law

This case involved Solo Cup Company suing Paper Machinery Corporation and related defendants for patent infringement of U.S. Patent No. 2,321,407 on a conical paper cup-making machine and for unfair competition based on the alleged improper use of Solo Cup's confidential machine drawings. The court held the patent invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) due to the inventor's public use of the machine more than one year before the August 30, 1940 filing date, as shown by evidence of operation and production of sample cups in 1938 and 1939. On the unfair competition count, the court found liability under Wisconsin common law and Restatement of Torts § 757 because defendants obtained and used the drawings through a former Solo Cup employee and corporate officers, leading to an award of damages and an injunction against manufacturing machines derived from those drawings.

business & regulatorypropertytorts & liability

The case involved the United States suing Pabst Brewing Company under Section 7 of the Clayton Act to challenge its 1958 acquisition of Blatz Brewing Company, alleging that the merger might substantially lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly in the production and sale of beer in the continental United States, Wisconsin, and the Wisconsin-Illinois-Michigan area. The court determined that the relevant geographic market was the entire United States and that Wisconsin and the three-state area were not appropriate sections of the country for assessing competitive effects. It concluded that the government failed to prove a substantial lessening of competition or a tendency toward monopoly, citing the absence of a trend toward concentration in the industry, the lack of evidence that production locations limited sales areas, and insufficient proof that the acquisition enhanced Pabst's market power in ways that harmed competition. The court therefore held that the acquisition did not violate the Clayton Act and denied the requested relief of divestiture.

business & regulatory

This case involved a patent infringement suit brought by Graham-White Sales Corp. against Prime Manufacturing Co. over two patents assigned to plaintiff: the '794 patent for a control valve in a diesel locomotive sanding system and the '570 patent for a bell ringer on diesel locomotives. Plaintiff sought an injunction and accounting after defendant allegedly infringed both patents. The court dismissed the complaint and denied any injunction, finding that plaintiff's prior business relationship and agreement with defendant created an estoppel barring the suit on the control valve patent and that the bell ringer patent was subject to similar estoppel based on the parties' dealings and inventive contributions. The court also analyzed validity and infringement issues but ultimately entered judgment for the defendant based on these defenses.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a breach of warranty claim by a Wisconsin corporation against a Minnesota valve manufacturer for allegedly defective products shipped to Wisconsin, with jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship. The defendant moved to quash service and dismiss, arguing that federal rules barred out-of-state service, that the Wisconsin long-arm statute did not apply, and that venue was improper. The court held that Rule 4(d)(7) permits service according to Wisconsin law, that Wis. Stat. § 262.05(5) validly conferred personal jurisdiction because the action arose from a promise to ship goods into the state, and that this application did not violate due process given the defendant's contacts via orders and deliveries. It also found venue proper under 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) since the plaintiff resided in the district. The court therefore denied the motion to dismiss.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a bankruptcy trustee suing the District Director of Internal Revenue to avoid and recover an assignment of accounts receivable and a chattel mortgage made by the bankrupt company shortly before filing for bankruptcy, claiming it was a preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy Act to satisfy antecedent tax debts. The defendant moved to dismiss on grounds that the complaint failed to state a claim and that the suit was effectively against the United States without consent. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the assignment was valid security for statutory tax liens and did not deplete the estate in a way that created a preference under § 60, as the bankrupt had already relinquished ownership prior to bankruptcy. The court found the plaintiff's positions inconsistent and that § 67(c) provisions on statutory liens did not apply here.

federal powertaxesprocedure

This case involves a patent infringement lawsuit brought by Paper Converting Machine Co. against FMC Corporation, in which the plaintiff moved to compel production of various documents and the defendant opposed production of some on grounds of attorney-client privilege. The court applied the standard four-part test for attorney-client privilege to pre-patent-issuance documents involving the defendant's patent counsel, determining that the privilege applies only when communications seek legal advice or services rather than non-legal tasks like patent searches or initial patentability assessments. Documents such as inter-office correspondence seeking advice on trade statements about copying or infringement were held privileged, while others relaying facts without a primary legal purpose, copies sent to counsel, or correspondence with the Patent Office were ordered produced. The court emphasized that the privilege is strictly construed and does not extend to a corporate patent counsel's preparatory or investigatory activities.

procedure