This case involved a church and its pastor seeking permission to use a public high school facility for Sunday worship services during non-school hours after the Washoe County School District denied their application under a policy barring religious uses. The plaintiffs argued that the denial amounted to unconstitutional content-based discrimination against protected speech in a limited open forum created by the district's community use regulations, while the district contended that allowing the use would violate the Establishment Clause and related state laws. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, declaring the policy unconstitutional as applied and ordering that the facilities be made available to the church on the same basis as other groups. The core reasoning was that religious worship and discussion constitute protected speech, and once a school district opens its facilities to community expressive activities, it cannot selectively exclude religious content without satisfying strict scrutiny, which was not met here.
The case involved a dispute between U.S. plaintiffs who operated a sole proprietorship distributing astronomical materials and a foreign defendant corporation over an alleged breach of a distribution agreement through sales to third parties, along with related claims of fraud, breach of implied covenant, and unjust enrichment. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and improper venue under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(3). The decision rested on a forum selection clause in the agreement stating that it was subject to English law and that English courts had competent jurisdiction, which was reaffirmed in a later extension letter signed by the plaintiffs. Drawing on Supreme Court precedent for international commercial contracts, the court enforced the clause as the parties had freely negotiated it without evidence of fraud, overreaching, or other factors rendering enforcement unreasonable.
This case arose from a 1989 collision between a Southern Pacific train and a Maga Trucking tractor-trailer stranded at a Nevada railroad crossing, with each side suing the other for negligence-related damages to equipment and freight. Southern Pacific moved for summary judgment, contending that the Federal Railroad Safety Act and Federal Aid Highway Act preempted any state common-law negligence claims concerning railroad crossing maintenance. The court denied the motion, reasoning that federal preemption is limited to displacing specific state statutes or regulations in areas covered by federal rules and does not bar traditional negligence actions, leaving factual questions about the crossing's condition and causation for trial.
The case involved plaintiffs suing moving companies O’Brien’s Moving and Storage Inc. and Bekins Van Lines Company for damage to a 1931 Estey Baby Grand piano that occurred while in their custody during transport from California to Nevada. The court decided that the defendants were liable for the full value of the piano, awarding $6,419.87 to the plaintiffs, and additionally imposed $10,000 in punitive damages against Bekins for bad faith in handling the claim. The reasoning was that under the Carmack Amendment governing interstate carriers, the defendants as bailees were responsible for any damage during the period of custody without need to prove a specific incident, as the piano was delivered in worse condition than received, and federal common law permitted punitive damages for intentional bad faith refusal to settle a valid claim.
business & regulatorytorts & liabilityfederal power
The case involved a dispute between Crystal Bay General Improvement District and its insurer Aetna Casualty over coverage under a comprehensive general liability policy for third-party claims of nuisance, trespass, and emotional distress arising from septic odors from a pump station. CBGID sued Aetna alleging bad faith, unfair insurance practices, breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, breach of fiduciary duty, and seeking declaratory relief that the policy covered the losses and barred Aetna from recovering the $96,000 it paid to settle the underlying suit; Aetna counterclaimed for reimbursement. The court denied all motions and cross-motions for summary judgment, determining that material factual and legal issues remained unresolved concerning policy interpretation, the pollution exclusion, the duty to defend and settle, and whether Aetna gave equal consideration to CBGID's interests in the absence of policy limits.
The case involved a plaintiff's claim of employment discrimination based on pregnancy under Title VII against her former employer. The plaintiff partially prevailed at trial, obtaining back pay for two specific discriminatory acts but failing on broader claims and other causes of action. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for attorneys' fees under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) but awarded only $24,800 rather than the requested amount exceeding $200,000 with enhancement. The reasoning focused on calculating a lodestar amount based on reasonable hours and rates for the degree of success achieved, without applying a contingency enhancement multiplier because the plaintiff did not demonstrate that such an enhancement was necessary to attract competent counsel in the relevant market.