In Mitchell v. Los Angeles Unified School District, non-union public school teachers challenged the agency fee notices provided by their union, United Teachers-Los Angeles (UTLA), claiming they failed to include independent audit verification of the allocation between chargeable and non-chargeable expenditures as required by Supreme Court precedent. The court certified the case as a class action on behalf of over 8,000 non-union employees and granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, issuing a permanent injunction against the collection of fees without proper disclosures. The core reasoning was that the union's notice violated First Amendment protections by not ensuring an auditor-verified breakdown of expenses, which is necessary for non-members to make informed decisions about objecting to the fees, consistent with Chicago Teachers Union v. Hudson.
This case involves non-union employees of the Los Angeles Unified School District challenging the procedures for collecting agency fees by the United Teachers-Los Angeles union, claiming they violate First Amendment rights under the Supreme Court's Hudson decision. The plaintiffs argue that the union did not provide adequately verified financial information on chargeable versus non-chargeable expenditures before deducting fees from paychecks. The court denied the union's motion for summary judgment and the school district's motion to dismiss, finding that the union's financial disclosures lacked proper independent auditor verification for the allocation of expenses. The reasoning centers on the requirement that agency fee procedures must ensure non-union members are not compelled to support ideological activities without proper safeguards and disclosures.
This case involved plaintiff Hadady Corp., publisher of the 'Bullish Consensus' commodities newsletter, suing defendant Dean Witter Reynolds for copyright infringement and breach of a 1985 settlement agreement that prohibited unauthorized retransmission of the copyrighted material. The court granted summary judgment to Dean Witter on the copyright infringement claim for the period from July to September 1987, finding that Hadady had abandoned its copyright by including a notice allowing free use after two days and was estopped from asserting infringement due to its conduct. For the period after September 22, 1987, when the limiting notice was removed, the court denied summary judgment on the breach of contract claim because the settlement agreement required prior written consent, which was not shown. The decision relied on undisputed facts from declarations, depositions, and the pretrial order regarding the form of copyright notices, the parties' prior interactions, and Dean Witter's retransmission via its internal network.
The case involved a real estate developer, Arroyo Vista Partners, suing Santa Barbara County after the Board of Supervisors denied permits for a 146-unit residential project, alleging that the denial stemmed from political retaliation by one supervisor and an informal 'ward courtesy' policy among board members, in violation of federal constitutional rights under the Due Process, Equal Protection, and First Amendment clauses via 42 U.S.C. § 1983, along with related mandamus claims and a state constitutional takings claim. The court granted the County's motion to dismiss under Rules 12(b)(6) and 12(b)(1), finding the federal claims either unripe or insufficient to state a constitutional violation. The core reasoning emphasized that federal courts should not intervene in local land-use decisions absent clear allegations of constitutional error, that procedural due process claims were barred under precedents like Parratt, and that state procedures for compensation or review had not been exhausted where required.
The case involved Mari Bloom, a hairstylist terminated from her position as assistant head hair stylist on a television series produced by Universal City Studios. Bloom filed suit in state court alleging breach of contract, breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing, tortious interference with economic advantage, misrepresentation, and unfair business practices. The defendants removed the case to federal court on the basis of Section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, arguing that the claims were preempted by a collective bargaining agreement between the studio and Bloom's union that covered her position and required arbitration of disputes over employment terms. The court denied Bloom's motion to remand, granted summary judgment to the defendants, and dismissed the complaint, reasoning that resolution of all claims required interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement, that the claims were therefore preempted by federal law, and that Bloom had failed to exhaust the agreement's grievance and arbitration procedures.
This case involved a defendant who pleaded guilty to four counts of unarmed bank robbery committed in 1989. The court addressed whether the Sentencing Reform Act's requirement to apply the sentencing guidelines in effect at the time of sentencing violated the Ex Post Facto Clause when those guidelines prescribed a longer prison term than those in effect at the time of the offenses. The court decided that applying the amended guidelines would violate the Constitution and therefore sentenced the defendant using the guidelines from the time the crimes were committed. It reasoned that, similar to Miller v. Florida, the change was retrospective and disadvantaged the defendant by increasing the presumptive sentencing range from 37-46 months to 87-108 months, with limited ability to depart or appeal.
