Supreme Court of the United States — appointed by John Quincy Adams
District Court, D. Kentucky — appointed by James Madison
Karthaus v. Yllas Y Ferrer
Supreme Court of the United States · 1828-03-18 · cited 53×
This case involved an action of debt on an arbitration bond in the Circuit Court of Maryland, where the plaintiffs sought to enforce an award resolving commercial disputes with the defendant, Charles W. Karthaus, both individually and on behalf of his former firm. The defendant demurred to the plaintiffs' replication of the award, arguing it was invalid because the arbitrators failed to separately address the two distinct controversies submitted and directed payment by the late firm rather than the individual. The Circuit Court ruled for the plaintiffs, and on writ of error the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the submission did not require explicit differentiation between the firm and individual claims where they involved the same person, that the award was final and conclusive on the matters decided, and that no other parties existed to render the direction ineffective. The Court further found the breach properly assigned against the defendant alone, as he was the only party bound.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Ross v. Doe on the Demise of Barland
Supreme Court of the United States · 1828-03-17 · cited 72×
This case was an ejectment action originally filed in Mississippi state court over conflicting claims to a tract of land. The plaintiff claimed under a junior 1820 patent issued pursuant to an earlier 1807 certificate from a federal land commission established by the Act of Congress of March 3, 1803, while the defendant claimed under an older 1819 patent based on a public land sale purchase. The state trial and supreme courts ruled for the plaintiff, holding that the junior patent prevailed over the older one. The U.S. Supreme Court affirmed, reasoning that the commissioners had authority under the statute to decide occupancy claims as of March 30, 1798, that their certificate was final and conclusive, and that federal law placed the parties on equal footing so the certificate-supported patent took priority.
propertyfederal power
Findlay v. Hinde & Wife
Supreme Court of the United States · 1828-03-11 · cited 28×
This case involves a dispute over ownership of lot 86 in Cincinnati, where complainants claim title as heirs of Thomas Doyle, Jr., through an 1799 sale and lost deed from Abraham Garrison to the Jones brothers, followed by conveyance to Doyle, while defendants hold subsequent legal titles obtained from Garrison. The circuit court ruled for the complainants and ordered conveyance by certain defendants. The Supreme Court reversed, ruling that Garrison was a necessary party who had to be joined because any decree would require deciding the validity of his original contract to convey, which he retained the right to contest. The case was remanded to permit amendment of the bill to add proper parties and for further proceedings.
propertyprocedure
Steele's Lessee v. Spencer
Supreme Court of the United States · 1828-02-19 · cited 27×
This case was an ejectment action brought by Robert Steele's lessee to recover land in Ohio, where the plaintiff traced title through an unrecorded 1818 deed from patentee Jesse Spencer to William Steele (containing apparent erasures) and then to Robert Steele, while the defendants claimed under a 1820 state supreme court decree ordering Spencer to convey nine-tenths of the land to them after they paid the specified sums. The circuit court instructed the jury that the decree vested title equivalent to a contemporaneous deed from the patentee, that Ohio's registry act applied to it, and that material post-execution alterations in the deed would void it entirely. The Supreme Court held the first two instructions were correct because the decree operated as a conveyance and the recording statute protected bona fide purchasers without notice, but reversed on the third instruction because the materiality of any alterations was a question of law for the court to decide rather than the jury, while the fact of alteration remained for the jury. The judgment was therefore reversed and the case remanded for a new trial.
propertyprocedure
Carroll v. Peake
Supreme Court of the United States · 1828-02-18 · cited 20×
This case involved a breach of contract action brought by Joshua Peake against Daniel Carroll in the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia, alleging that Carroll failed to deliver possession of a farm in St. Mary's County as promised under a rental agreement for one year starting January 1, 1820. The lower court ruled for Peake after admitting into evidence a handwritten copy of the rental terms (prepared by Carroll) along with related letters from Carroll, over Carroll's objections. On writ of error, the Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the document qualified as admissible evidence because it was in the defendant's own handwriting and could be treated as original with respect to his obligations, forming an exception to the general rule requiring production of the original after notice. The Court also concluded that the declaration sufficiently alleged the contract and breach to support the verdict, despite surplusage and the lack of highly specific averments about the timing or location of the plaintiff's offer and request for possession.
propertyprocedure
Elliott v. Lessee of Peirsol
Supreme Court of the United States · 1828-02-16 · cited 286×
This case was an ejectment action in which the plaintiffs, as heirs of Sarah G. Elliott, sought to recover land in Kentucky from defendants who claimed title under a 1813 deed from Sarah and her husband James Elliott to Benjamin Elliott, followed by a reconveyance to James. The key dispute concerned whether the deed validly transferred Sarah's interest, given that her acknowledgment and privy examination before the county clerk were initially recorded with a defective certificate, and a later 1823 county court order purported to amend the certificate to comply with legal requirements. The Supreme Court affirmed the circuit court's judgment for the plaintiffs, holding that the deed did not convey good title from Sarah because the county court lacked authority to order amendment of the clerk's recorded certificate and the clerk had no power to alter it after recording. The Court reasoned that the clerk's role in taking and recording acknowledgments is ministerial, and once the certificate is recorded it becomes fixed and unalterable, with no statutory provision granting supervisory power to the court or allowing post-recording changes.
propertyprocedure