In this case, female employees of Virginia Tech sued the university alleging gender-based pay discrimination under the Equal Pay Act and Title VII, as well as retaliation under the EPA. The university moved for summary judgment, arguing that the claims lacked merit or were time-barred. The court denied the motion, finding genuine disputes of material fact regarding whether the plaintiffs performed equal work for less pay than male counterparts, whether any violations were willful (which would extend the statute of limitations for some claims), and whether the university engaged in retaliatory conduct. These factual issues must be resolved by a jury rather than decided as a matter of law.
In Bruce v. Ebert, the petitioner filed a § 2241 habeas petition challenging his 1994 conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1) for using a firearm during a drug trafficking crime, arguing actual innocence after the Supreme Court's decision in Watson v. United States. The case arose from a videotaped negotiation where the petitioner briefly handled but did not complete a transaction involving an M-16 machine gun in exchange for drugs and money. After the petition was transferred to the Western District of Virginia, the court construed the request as seeking a writ of error coram nobis under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) and vacated the conviction. The court reasoned that the facts did not establish the active employment of the firearm required by Watson and that the indictment specified only the M-16, not another weapon mentioned in testimony.
The case involved Angela VanBuren's claims against her former employer Virginia Highlands Orthopaedic Spine Center and her supervisor Dr. Grubb for sexual harassment, hostile work environment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as well as a Virginia common law claim for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss in part by dismissing the wrongful discharge claim against Dr. Grubb individually while denying dismissal of the claims against the company, and it denied the plaintiff's motion to strike an affirmative defense. The court reasoned that Virginia precedent limits wrongful discharge liability to employers and does not extend it to individual supervisors, consistent with the status of the parties as established in the complaint.
In Couch v. Jabe, a Virginia prison inmate sued under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that VDOC Operating Policy 803.2 violated his First and Fourteenth Amendment rights by removing Ulysses and Lady Chatterley's Lover from the prison library and barring him from ordering them, because the policy disapproved publications containing explicit or graphic depictions of sexual acts. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on an undisputed factual record. It held that the policy was facially unconstitutional and issued an injunction against its enforcement, while denying the defendants' motion and granting the plaintiff's. The core reasoning was that the regulation was overbroad and not rationally related to legitimate penological interests under applicable First Amendment standards for prison restrictions.
In Crews v. Johnson, an inmate at Wallens Ridge State Prison filed a pro se petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to vacate his 2004 Virginia convictions for rape and related offenses, claiming violations of his Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. The claims centered on the destruction of biological evidence before retesting, the prosecution's alleged failure to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt through DNA analysis, and ineffective assistance of counsel for not challenging evidence sufficiency or certain appellate rulings. After reviewing the record and parties' arguments on the respondent's motion to dismiss, the court granted the motion to dismiss the habeas petition. However, recognizing the complexity and importance of the constitutional issues raised, the court also granted a certificate of appealability.
The case involved plaintiff Charles King's motion to remand a diversity action back to Virginia state court after defendant Flinn & Dreffein removed it to federal court. King filed the complaint in state court in September 2008 but did not serve it until exactly one year later; Flinn removed within thirty days of service, citing diversity jurisdiction. King argued that 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) bars removal of any diversity case more than one year after the action commences, while Flinn contended the one-year limit applies only to cases that were not removable when first filed. The court denied the motion to remand, holding that the statutory language and policy considerations limit the one-year bar to cases that become removable later, and granted a certificate for interlocutory appeal because the Fourth Circuit has not resolved the issue.
