Howard Boyd Turrentine

In United States v. Kemmish, the defendant moved to dismiss a superseding indictment charging him with criminal offenses, arguing that an earlier administrative forfeiture of $16,660 in seized currency and money orders violated the Double Jeopardy Clause. The district court denied the motion. The court reasoned that Kemmish had received multiple notices of the seizure and forfeiture proceedings but chose not to file a claim or cost bond, making him a non-party to the administrative action. Because double jeopardy is a personal right that attaches only when a person faces an adjudication of guilt or innocence, and Kemmish had avoided any such proceeding by not claiming the property, no former jeopardy had occurred. The court therefore held that the pending criminal prosecution did not constitute double jeopardy.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved four former employees of a construction company who resigned to start a competing business and sued the administrator of their non-contributory profit-sharing plan under ERISA, seeking a lump-sum payout of their vested benefits instead of the installment payments the administrator had approved. The U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California upheld the administrator's decision to distribute the benefits over ten annual installments, finding that the plan granted the administrator sole discretion over the form of payment and that his choice was neither arbitrary nor capricious. The court reasoned that the administrator's stated goal of protecting plan assets from funding direct competitors was consistent with fiduciary duties, that past practice showed lump sums were typically denied in competitive departures, and that any incidental benefit to the company did not invalidate the exercise of discretion. The court also denied the plaintiffs' request for attorney fees after weighing the relevant ERISA factors.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case concerned a jurisdictional dispute between California and Oregon state courts over which had authority to decide the custody and placement of minor Debra Kay Templeton under the Parental Kidnapping Prevention Act (PKPA), 28 U.S.C. § 1738A. The mother and California court sought a declaratory judgment affirming California's continuing jurisdiction after it declared the child dependent and later ordered her return from placement with relatives in Oregon, but the Oregon court had asserted jurisdiction and refused to defer. The federal court held that Oregon had jurisdiction, reasoning that California initially possessed it under its own laws and the PKPA but lost it by failing to give the out-of-state custodians proper notice and opportunity to be heard before the March 1982 hearing terminating their custody, in violation of both state and federal requirements; Oregon then validly assumed jurisdiction as the child's home state.

family lawfederal power

In this case, a non-union bus driver sued his former employer (a transit district) and the union under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that his firing for nonpayment of agency fees violated his First Amendment rights because the fees supported political activities he opposed. The defendants asserted affirmative defenses including failure to exhaust grievance or internal union remedies, statutes of limitations, choice of remedies, and laches. The court struck these defenses, holding that exhaustion of remedies is not required in § 1983 actions, that the plaintiff had no meaningful access to contractual remedies controlled by the union, and that the cited labor-law precedents were inapplicable. It also imposed Rule 11 sanctions on the union's counsel for reasserting frivolous defenses and misrepresenting vacated case authority.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

The case involved an attorney applicant who took California's Attorneys’ Examination, scored 69.4% (just below the 70% passing threshold), and was denied admission. He sued the bar examiners claiming that the Phase I grading process—which allows some applicants to pass based on partial grading and gives a statistical edge to those taking the full exam—violated his constitutional rights to equal protection, privileges and immunities, and interstate travel. The court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding no genuine issues of material fact and that the grading system had a rational basis in efficiency and accuracy without discriminating against non-residents or burdening travel rights. It also dismissed damage claims due to immunity and jurisdictional issues under the Eleventh Amendment.

civil rightsprocedure

In Bruns v. Ledbetter, 32 investors who lost money on oil and gas leases sued 14 defendants, including promoters and affiliated companies, alleging 18 counts of fraud, securities violations, breach of contract, conversion, and related state and federal claims. Several defendants moved to dismiss under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 9(b). The court held that the complaint failed to plead fraud with the particularity required by Rule 9(b) because it lumped all defendants together without specifying each one's role or acts, and it rejected plaintiffs' cited authorities as inapplicable. It also dismissed the RICO claim for lack of a distinct racketeering enterprise injury and the state-law claims for lack of pendent jurisdiction. The complaint was dismissed with leave to amend certain counts.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Milazzo v. United States, several plaintiffs filed 1982 federal income tax returns that omitted nearly all financial information, with most line items marked "object" and accompanying assertions of Fifth Amendment protections against self-incrimination; the IRS assessed $500 civil penalties against each under 26 U.S.C. § 6702 for filing frivolous returns. The plaintiffs paid 15 percent of the penalties as required and brought actions in federal district court seeking to invalidate the assessments on multiple constitutional grounds. The court granted the government's motions for summary judgment, ruling that § 6702 applied directly to the incomplete filings, that Supreme Court precedent such as United States v. Sullivan bars blanket Fifth Amendment refusals to supply tax return data, and that the remaining claims concerning bills of attainder, free speech, and separation of powers were unsupported by the statute or case law.

taxescivil rights

This case involved a plaintiff bringing federal claims under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act against her employer, along with related state law claims under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act and common law theories seeking compensatory and punitive damages. The defendant moved for partial summary judgment, which the court treated as a motion to reconsider its earlier denial of a motion to dismiss the state claims. The court decided to dismiss the state law claims without prejudice for lack of pendent jurisdiction. Its core reasoning was that the state claims would predominate in the case because they sought far broader relief than the equitable remedies available under Title VII, and that exercising pendent jurisdiction would be inconsistent with congressional intent to limit damages and jury trials in Title VII actions.

civil rightslabor & employmentprocedure

In Hammond Co. v. United States, plaintiffs State Savings and Loan and The Hammond Company sought to amend a prior summary judgment to add interest on funds that the IRS had wrongfully levied upon after seizing them from individuals involved in a fraud scheme. The court addressed whether interest under 26 U.S.C. § 7426(g) should run from the June 1982 levy date, when the IRS obtained constructive possession, or only from the December 1982 stipulation date when the funds were actually deposited in an interest-bearing account. The court ruled that interest begins only upon actual receipt by the Secretary, denying plaintiffs' request for interest prior to the stipulation. This conclusion rested on the statute's use of the term "receives," supporting legislative history, and the requirement of express congressional authorization for interest obligations against the United States.

taxesfederal powerprocedure

This case concerns the constitutionality of an Interim Rule adopted by the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of California to administer bankruptcy cases following the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. The bankruptcy court held that the Interim Rule is constitutional and valid. It reasoned that the district courts retain jurisdiction over bankruptcy matters under relevant statutes until at least April 1, 1984, and that the district court has inherent authority as an Article III court, as well as authority under 11 U.S.C. § 105, to adopt such a rule. The court adopted the reasoning from a similar order by Judge DeMascio in Michigan.

federal powerprocedure

In Beach v. Smith, a father sought to compel the Department of Justice to issue a federal warrant under the Fugitive Felon Act, as authorized by the Parental Kidnaping Prevention Act of 1980, after his ex-wife and her father kidnapped their child in violation of a state custody order; the DOJ had denied the request under its internal guidelines requiring evidence of abuse or neglect. The plaintiffs also challenged those guidelines and asked the court to order issuance of the warrant. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss, holding that the plaintiffs lacked standing. It reasoned that neither the denial of the warrant nor the guidelines caused a redressable injury separate from the underlying kidnapping, because the Act creates no private right to a warrant, issuance of a warrant would not directly result in the child's return, and there was no logical nexus between the plaintiffs' injury and the challenged government action.

criminal lawfamily lawfederal power

This case involved a dispute in bankruptcy proceedings over whether creditors retained a perfected security interest in two promissory notes (the Se-Vende Notes) that the bankrupt Bruce Farley Corporation had pledged to secure loans. The bankruptcy trustee argued that the interest became unperfected when the creditors returned the notes to Seacoast Escrow, a wholly owned subsidiary of the debtor acting as escrow agent and trustee, in violation of California Commercial Code section 9305's possession requirement. The court affirmed the bankruptcy judge's order directing the trustee to turn over the notes and any collected sums to the creditors, along with costs. It reasoned that the creditors had initially perfected their interest by taking possession and that transferring the notes to their fiduciary agent did not defeat perfection, as it provided sufficient notice to third parties and the subsidiary relationship was unknown to the creditors. The court further held that the trustee was estopped from contesting the continued validity of the perfected interest.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

This case under § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act involved a joint-venture construction company that signed a short-form jobsite agreement with a carpenters' union council, incorporating by reference the terms of the union's then-current Master Labor Agreement (MLA) with various employers. The company sued the union after the union called a strike and picketed the jobsite upon expiration of the 1977-80 MLA, halting work until a successor 1980-83 MLA was reached; the company claimed the strike breached the two-year term of the short-form agreement and that the union had misled it about work continuity. The court ruled for the union, holding that it had no contractual duty to supply workers once the underlying MLA ended because the short form expressly bound the employer only to the "from time to time current" MLA and recognized the union's policy of uniform terms across employers. The court found no evidence supporting the company's secondary-boycott or defamation claims. The opinion interpreted the integrated agreements to mean that obligations under the short form simply lapsed during periods when no operative MLA existed.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a claimant's request for judicial review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) of the Secretary of Health and Human Services' denial of disability insurance benefits, after an ALJ determined the claimant could no longer perform his prior work as a painter but retained the capacity for light work despite back surgery and leg numbness. The district court granted the Secretary's motion for summary judgment, rejecting a magistrate's recommendation for remand to consider post-hearing evidence because the claimant had not submitted any new evidence despite invitations to do so. The court found substantial evidence in the record supported the Secretary's conclusion of no disability and held that the Secretary could properly rely on the new medical-vocational regulations (20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1502–404.1513 and Subpart P, App. 2) to meet the burden of showing other work existed without needing testimony from a vocational expert identifying specific jobs. The court noted these regulations examine factors like age, education, and residual functional capacity and are consistent with Ninth Circuit precedent when non-exertional limitations are absent.

healthcareprocedure

The case concerned whether the federal district court could issue a preliminary injunction barring Imperial County from enforcing a state court judgment that restricted the sale of well water for use outside the county, where the plaintiffs alleged the restriction violated the Commerce Clause. The central question was whether the Anti-Injunction Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2283, applied to bar the federal injunction because the plaintiffs were not parties to the earlier state litigation against the water seller. The court held that the plaintiffs qualified as “strangers” to the state proceeding and therefore the Act did not preclude federal relief. It reasoned that the plaintiffs were neither named parties nor privies, noting that amicus participation does not create party status and that the plaintiffs held no property interest in the seller’s land or conditional use permit that would establish privity.

procedurefederal powerproperty

This case involves four U.S. Border Patrol agents charged under 18 U.S.C. § 242 with depriving illegal aliens of their civil rights by mistreating and assaulting them after apprehension near the U.S.-Mexico border in 1979. The defendants argued that the victims were not "inhabitants of any State, Territory or District" under the statute. The court held that the victims qualified as inhabitants because the term, in the context of Reconstruction-era civil rights legislation, extends to any person within U.S. jurisdiction. This conclusion drew from the statute's legislative history showing imprecise drafting and intent for broad protection, supporting treaties requiring equal treatment of aliens, and comparisons to the broader language in 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

criminal lawcivil rightsimmigration

The case concerned whether California could enforce its fish and game regulations against non-Indians who hunt and fish on the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation pursuant to tribal permits, and whether state game wardens could enter the reservation to do so. The California Department of Fish and Game sued the Quechan Tribe for declaratory relief after the Tribe changed its ordinances to no longer require state licenses and asserted exclusive control. The court analyzed Public Law 280, which extends state civil and criminal jurisdiction to Indian country but expressly withholds it over hunting and fishing, and concluded that tribal ordinances and federal law preempt state regulation of these activities on the reservation. It held that the Tribe's authority to control entry and regulate non-member hunting and fishing prevails, barring state enforcement absent specific congressional authorization.

federal powercriminal lawenvironment

The case Milligan v. Stone involved a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by a prisoner who had pleaded guilty to first-degree robbery after a suppression hearing. Petitioner alleged violations of his Fourteenth Amendment right to a fair hearing due to alleged judicial bias, his Fourth Amendment right against unreasonable searches and seizures based on an allegedly unlawful initial detention, and his Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel during the suppression hearing, plea, and sentencing. The district court dismissed the petition in full, finding that the trial judge's comments did not demonstrate bias (and the guilty plea limited review of that claim without a certificate of probable cause), that the officer had founded suspicion for the stop given the late hour, high-crime area, and suspicious positioning of the vehicle, and that counsel's strategic decisions reflected competent representation. The court concluded that none of petitioner's constitutional rights were violated.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a civil contempt proceeding against Mr. Weir under 28 U.S.C. § 1826(a) after he refused to answer questions before a federal grand jury investigating possible violations of U.S. narcotics laws. The court granted him use and derivative use immunity pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §§ 6002 and 6003, but Weir continued to refuse to testify, raising objections including that the immunity was insufficient to protect against Fifth Amendment violations, potential Mexican prosecution, coerced statements made to Mexican officials, and illegal electronic surveillance. The court rejected these arguments as well as claims that the contempt sanction was unnecessary or punitive, finding that the government had adequately denied surveillance allegations, that the immunity adequately safeguarded his rights, and that the U.S. Attorney's determination of necessity for the testimony could not be second-guessed. Accordingly, the court adjudged Weir in civil contempt and ordered him committed until he complied by testifying.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involves challenges to various Border Patrol checkpoints in California's Southern District following the Supreme Court's Almeida-Sanchez ruling that roving vehicle searches without warrants or probable cause violate the Fourth Amendment. After consolidating cases and holding evidentiary hearings on the checkpoints' operations, the court evaluated whether specific fixed and temporary sites qualified as the functional equivalent of the border. The court determined that multiple checkpoints—such as those on Interstate 5 near San Clemente, Route 86, and several others close to the border in desert areas—met this standard due to their proximity to the border, terrain, limited alternative routes, and focus on immigration enforcement. As a result, stops and searches at these locations were upheld as constitutional border equivalents, without needing probable cause or warrants.

immigrationcriminal lawcivil rights