Warren Keith Urbom

This case involves plaintiff Joseph E. White's civil rights claims against law enforcement defendants arising from their investigation and prosecution of the Helen Wilson homicide, in which White alleges constitutional violations including lack of probable cause. The court addressed the defendants' motion for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds and their motion to strike various affidavits, depositions, and exhibits submitted by the plaintiff. The court denied the motion to strike the Luckeroth and Leo affidavits as moot, overruled objections to the 2010 depositions on grounds that they were not taken in violation of the discovery stay and were not subject to broad hearsay or relevance challenges, and found sufficient evidence in the record, including questions about the veracity of officer affidavits and inconsistencies in witness statements, to create genuine issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. The core reasoning focused on whether the evidence supported a finding that the defendants' conduct violated clearly established constitutional rights, without resolving factual disputes at this stage.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedure

This case originated from a 1988 complaint by Nebraska State Penitentiary inmate Richard Rayes challenging prison restrictions on incoming postage stamps under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. The parties settled in 1989 via a Settlement Agreement limiting stamp possession to 40 per inmate and treating excess as contraband, after which the court dismissed the action. In 2010, Rayes sought enforcement through motions for a temporary restraining order and discovery, while defendants moved to terminate the agreement under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court denied the defendants' motion to terminate and dismiss, holding that the 1989 agreement was a private settlement—not a judicially enforceable consent decree—because it was not entered by the court and lacked the required PLRA findings on narrow tailoring and necessity. Rayes's enforcement motions were denied without prejudice, as any remedies must be pursued through a separate breach-of-contract action, potentially in state court.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved a lawsuit by the United States against defendant John R. Koch alleging a pattern of sexual harassment against female tenants and prospective tenants in violation of the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 3601 et seq. At trial, after the plaintiff's case, the defendant moved for judgment as a matter of law, arguing that claims based on discriminatory acts occurring after tenants took possession of rental properties could not be maintained under FHA sections 3604(a-c) or 3617. The court denied the motion, holding that post-acquisition claims are actionable. It relied on Eighth Circuit precedent in Neudecker v. Boisclair Corp., which recognized hostile housing environment and retaliation claims under the FHA for conduct during tenancy, and extended that reasoning to sexual harassment while rejecting the defendant's statutory interpretation and policy arguments.

civil rightspropertyprocedure

The case concerns plaintiff Armandina Sanchez-Wentz's challenge under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to the Commissioner of Social Security's denial of her application for Title II disability insurance benefits, based on alleged impairments including a mitral valve replacement, congestive heart failure, diabetes, and other conditions that she claimed prevented full-time work since 1999. An ALJ determined that her impairments were severe but did not meet a listed impairment, that she lacked credibility on the extent of her limitations, and that she retained the residual functional capacity to perform sedentary work including her past relevant job as a social worker/administrator. The Appeals Council denied review, making the ALJ's decision final. On review of the administrative record, the district court applied the substantial-evidence standard and concluded that the Commissioner's findings were adequately supported, leading to affirmance of the denial of benefits and dismissal of the complaint.

federal powerhealthcare

The case involved a Title VII claim by a former employee against Valentino’s of Lincoln, Inc., alleging sex discrimination through a hostile work environment created by non-supervisory coworkers and constructive discharge. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the plaintiff could not prove the employer knew or should have known of the harassment and failed to remedy it, and that her resignation was unreasonable. The court denied the motion, finding genuine issues of material fact on whether the plaintiff’s complaints to supervisors provided sufficient notice and whether her quitting was a foreseeable result of the employer’s response. It also rejected extending the Ellerth/Faragher affirmative defense to non-supervisory harassment and declined to bar back/front pay claims under Ford Motor Co. v. EEOC. The motion to strike certain evidence was denied as moot.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case arose from a 2000 car-truck collision in Nebraska that injured two Colorado residents and caused one death; the plaintiffs sued the Minnesota-based trucking company and its Texas-then-Oregon driver in Texas federal court, after which the case was transferred to Nebraska. The sole disputed issue was which state's law governed the availability of punitive damages, with the plaintiffs seeking the laws of Minnesota, Texas, or Oregon and the defendants arguing for Nebraska's constitutional ban on such damages. Applying Texas choice-of-law rules under the Van Dusen doctrine because the transfer occurred under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), the court used the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws § 145 factors and determined that Minnesota law applies to the claims against the corporate defendant and Oregon law applies to the claims against the individual driver, as those states had the strongest interests in regulating punitive damages for their residents.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved an inmate who sued the IRS and its employees after the agency recalled his 1999 tax refund check of $617.15, which included an earned income credit, without prior notice or a hearing; the plaintiff alleged due process violations and regulatory delays, sought damages and return of the funds, and also moved for appointment of counsel and case consolidation. The court denied the motions for counsel and consolidation, then granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. It held that subject matter jurisdiction was lacking under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1), with an alternative basis for dismissal under 12(b)(6), because the Prison Litigation Reform Act barred damages claims for emotional injury without physical injury, the IRS's recall and processing delays did not violate due process or create a private right of action, and the plaintiff was statutorily ineligible for the credit as an inmate.

taxescivil rightsprocedurecriminal law

The case involves a motion by the City of Lincoln to strike portions of affidavits and depositions submitted by plaintiff John Ways in opposition to the city's summary judgment motion in a challenge to Ordinance 9.16.240. The court granted the motion in part, striking paragraphs 5-9 and 12-17 of Ways' affidavit as speculative, lacking personal knowledge, and containing improper legal argument rather than admissible facts. It allowed limited expert testimony from Shirley Carr Mason defining terms of art in her field but excluded any statements purporting to interpret the legal meaning of the ordinance or apply it to specific conduct. The ruling is based on Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(e) requiring affidavits to contain admissible evidence based on personal knowledge, and Federal Rules of Evidence 701-704 distinguishing between permissible expert opinions and impermissible legal conclusions.

procedurefree speechcivil rights

This case involves a defendant in a federal drug investigation who moved to suppress evidence seized from his residence pursuant to a search warrant, claiming the supporting affidavit deliberately omitted material facts about a confidential DEA source who had provided false information during debriefing, and seeking a hearing under Franks v. Delaware. The magistrate judge recommended denying the motions, and the district court conducted a de novo review of the challenged findings. The court adopted the recommendation and denied both the motion to suppress physical evidence and the motion to suppress statements. It held that the defendant had not made the required substantial preliminary showing that the omission was intentional or reckless, and that supplementing the affidavit with the omitted facts would still support a finding of probable cause.

criminal lawprocedure

Dr. LeRoy Carhart, a physician who performs abortions and supplied fetal tissue for research at the University of Nebraska Medical Center, held a volunteer faculty position in the Department of Pathology and Microbiology. After successfully challenging Nebraska's partial-birth abortion law and amid growing publicity linking him to the university's fetal tissue research, regents and administrators urged him to resign to shield the program from controversy tied to a regent's re-election bid; he refused and sued to regain the position. The court denied his motion for a preliminary injunction. Although Carhart demonstrated a likelihood of success on at least one claim, the court found no threat of irreparable injury, which is a prerequisite for such relief, and concluded that the balance of equities did not support granting the injunction before trial.

abortionlabor & employmentprocedure

The case involves a physician who was terminated from his volunteer faculty position at the University of Nebraska Medical Center and sued various defendants under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, alleging violations of his free speech and privacy rights, conspiracy, and emotional distress, all stemming from his prior lawsuit challenging Nebraska's partial birth abortion statute. The defendants moved to dismiss most claims for failure to state a claim and alternatively sought a more definite statement. The court granted the motion in part, dismissing the negligence-based portions of the free speech and privacy claims under § 1983, dismissing the conspiracy claims under §§ 1985(2) and 1986 for lack of alleged facts showing a meeting of the minds, and ordering a more definite statement on the emotional distress claim to clarify its basis and elements, while denying the motion as to the remaining aspects of the § 1983 claims. The court reasoned that the complaint failed to adequately plead required elements under governing standards for those dismissed claims and that additional clarity was needed for the defendants to respond to the tort claim, though federal pleading rules are liberal overall.

free speechcivil rightsabortionhealthcare

The case involves a former used car salesman suing his employer for unlawful employment discrimination under Title VII and Section 1981, alleging a hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation based on his Italian national origin, including repeated use of ethnic slurs and exposure to racist comments. The court considered the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which seeks to dismiss the claims without a trial. After reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, the court granted the motion in part, dismissing some claims, but denied it in other respects, allowing the remaining claims to proceed to trial because genuine issues of material fact exist that require a full hearing of evidence.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The plaintiffs, anti-abortion protesters, sued Lincoln city officials for declaratory and injunctive relief, claiming that Lincoln Municipal Code § 9.40.090 unconstitutionally restricted their ability to engage in focused picketing near the home of a doctor who performs abortions. The ordinance prohibits focused picketing in the street directly in front of or within 50 feet of a targeted residence but exempts general marches, door-to-door activities, and picketing near commercial establishments. The court treated the parties' motions as cross-motions for summary judgment and granted judgment to the defendants, finding that the ordinance was a valid, content-neutral time, place, and manner restriction that served the significant government interest in residential privacy without burdening substantially more speech than necessary. The court also rejected claims that the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, noting that enforcement turns on objective circumstances indicating focused intent rather than general protest activity.

free speechabortion

The case involved a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging a state conviction, where a magistrate judge recommended denying the petition in full. The court addressed whether the petitioner's objection to that recommendation was timely filed within the required ten-day period after service by mail. It decided that the objection was timely and that Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 6 governs the computation of time limits in such cases. The core reasoning was that Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases permits application of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure when not inconsistent and when appropriate, and Rule 6's provisions for excluding weekends, holidays, and adding three days for mail service fill a gap without conflicting with habeas-specific rules; the court also referenced AEDPA standards for reviewing the underlying state court decisions on issues like identification evidence.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved an incarcerated plaintiff who worked in a prison data entry job and alleged that fellow inmates sexually harassed her, that her supervisor knew but failed to stop it, and that she was eventually fired at the harassers' request. She sued the Nebraska Department of Correctional Services, Cornhusker State Industries, and two employees under Section 1983 and Title VII. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) after finding defects in service of process on the individual defendants and concluding that the plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The opinion noted that even if service issues were cured, no viable cause of action existed.

criminal lawlabor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a probationer suing his probation officer for conducting a warrantless search of his home, which the plaintiff claimed violated his Fourth Amendment rights. The defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing he was entitled to absolute or qualified immunity and that collateral estoppel barred the claim. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant on the basis of qualified immunity. It reasoned that the plaintiff's status as a probationer with diminished privacy expectations, combined with the probation order's search conditions and a facially valid court order, meant a reasonable officer in the defendant's position would not have known the search violated the plaintiff's constitutional rights.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

This case is an appeal by the Chapter 12 standing trustee from a bankruptcy court order confirming a reorganization plan for family farmer debtors. The trustee challenged the debtors' ability to make direct payments to secured creditors holding impaired claims, which would bypass the trustee and avoid statutory fees under 28 U.S.C. § 586. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling permitting such direct payments. The decision rested on the plain language of 11 U.S.C. §§ 1222(a)(1), 1226, 1225(a)(5)(B)(ii), and 1222(b)(9), which contemplate or permit debtor payments outside the trustee in some circumstances, along with binding Eighth Circuit precedent in Wagner v. Armstrong allowing direct payments to impaired secured creditors in Chapter 12 cases.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved an inmate at the Nebraska State Penitentiary who was disciplined for failing to produce a urine sample after being randomly selected for drug testing, resulting in a finding of guilt, seven days in segregation, and lost wages; after a state court reversed the disciplinary decision, the inmate sued prison officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging due process violations for not allowing certain witnesses at his hearing. The defendants moved for summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. The court granted the motion as to defendants Johnsen and Heckman, concluding that even assuming a protected liberty interest existed, the inmate's right to call witnesses was not clearly established under Sandin v. Conner such that the officials should have known their conduct violated it.

civil rightsprocedurecriminal law

In this case, plaintiff Debra Carlson sued her former employer InaCom Corporation under the Americans with Disabilities Act, alleging that her termination and the employer's failure to provide reasonable accommodation for her migraine headaches constituted disability discrimination. After a three-day bench trial, the court issued findings of fact detailing Carlson's employment as an executive secretary, her satisfactory performance, her history of unscheduled absences averaging nine per year (many due to migraines), the company's lack of a formal absenteeism policy, and her supervisor's discussions with her about attendance issues without any mention of migraines as the cause. The court analyzed these facts, including that absences were not documented as migraine-related and that the employer was unaware of the disability connection, to determine whether the termination violated the ADA.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Moore v. United States, a federal pretrial detainee filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, alleging that his detention was based on a defective indictment stemming from unlawful wiretap evidence that he had no opportunity to challenge before the indictment issued. The petitioner had not appealed the magistrate judge's detention order, which had been affirmed by the district judge. The court held that § 2241 relief was unavailable to federal pretrial detainees in this context, as the proper remedy was to appeal the detention order to the Eighth Circuit or to raise the claim at trial and on direct appeal. The magistrate judge recommended dismissal without prejudice, and the district judge adopted that recommendation, denying the objection to the magistrate's order.

criminal lawprocedure