This case involved a Korean national challenging the INS's denial of his request to extend nonimmigrant treaty investor status tied to his motel investment in the U.S. The court reviewed the denial under the arbitrary, capricious, or abuse of discretion standard and determined that the INS had abused its discretion by not considering evidence of the plaintiff's other assets, such as bank accounts, real estate, and a pension, when assessing whether the motel qualified as a marginal enterprise solely for earning a living. The court remanded the matter to the INS to evaluate the full record, including those assets, and issue a decision that accounts for all relevant factors in line with agency precedents.
This case concerned the Suquamish Indian Tribe's asserted rights under the Treaty of Point Elliott and the creation and expansion of the Port Madison Indian Reservation in Washington. Plaintiffs sought declarations that the Tribe was a party to the treaty entitled to assert rights on behalf of its members, that the reservation was established by the treaty, and that its boundaries were enlarged by a Secretarial Order of October 21, 1864. Defendants cross-moved for findings that the treaty and order did not affirmatively grant land rights to the Tribe and that certain lands including tidelands were not included. The court granted plaintiffs' motion in part and denied defendants' motion, ruling that the Tribe was recognized by the federal government as a party to the treaty, the reservation was established by the treaty, and the order enlarged the reservation. The court reached these conclusions by deferring to the executive branch's political determination of tribal status and by interpreting the treaty and order in light of accompanying historical correspondence, while declining to address tideland issues as outside the permitted scope or subject to factual disputes.
In Hirabayashi v. United States, the petitioner sought a writ of error coram nobis to vacate his 1942 misdemeanor convictions for failing to report to a Civil Control Station under Civilian Exclusion Order No. 57 and for violating a curfew under Public Proclamation No. 3, both targeting persons of Japanese ancestry during World War II, on the ground that the government had suppressed evidence about the military necessity for the orders. The court granted the petition as to the failure-to-report conviction, finding that the nondisclosure was an error of the most fundamental character that prejudiced the petitioner's Supreme Court appeal, but denied it as to the curfew conviction. The court reasoned that the curfew was a milder and temporary restriction that the Supreme Court would have upheld even with the suppressed evidence, while the exclusion order's basis directly undermined the reporting requirement.
This case arose after Queen City Savings and Loan made a $2 million loan to Wayne Rembold that later went into default; FSLIC was appointed receiver for Queen City and transferred the loan to Gibraltar, which then asserted cross-claims against Westside Federal based on a standby commitment. FSLIC moved to dismiss those cross-claims, arguing that federal statutes require claims against it in its capacity as receiver to be presented first to the receiver and the Federal Home Loan Bank Board for administrative resolution before any court action. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that 12 U.S.C. §§ 1464(d)(6)(C) and 1729(d) mandate exhaustion of the administrative process and that allowing immediate judicial review under 12 U.S.C. § 1730(k)(1) would create an irreconcilable conflict with those provisions. It adopted the reasoning of the Fifth Circuit in Hudspeth, found that the statutes should be read to preserve the administrative scheme Congress created for liquidating troubled thrifts, and rejected Gibraltar's arguments that the process was unconstitutional or that discovery was needed before deciding the purely legal issue.
This case involved a seaman employed by the State of Alaska who was injured aboard a state ferry and sought traditional maritime remedies including damages under the Jones Act for negligence, a claim for unseaworthiness, and maintenance and cure. The defendant moved for summary judgment based on a provision in the collective bargaining agreement between the plaintiff's union and the state that substituted Alaska workers' compensation benefits for those traditional seamen's remedies. The court granted the defendant's motion and dismissed the claims with prejudice, finding that the agreement was the product of equal bargaining, provided an adequate quid pro quo through advantages such as the inapplicability of comparative negligence, a presumption of coverage, and more certain and speedy benefits, and therefore controlled over the historical maritime remedies.
This case involved the EEOC's enforcement action against Cudahy Foods under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, where the defendants moved to dismiss the suit or strike the EEOC's jury demand on grounds including lack of authority to enforce the ADEA and improper conciliation efforts. The court held that the defendants had standing to challenge the EEOC's authority but ruled that the agency retained enforcement power, as the 1979 transfer from the Department of Labor via Executive Order 12144 remained valid despite the Supreme Court's Chadha decision on legislative vetoes. The court further found that the EEOC had fulfilled its conciliation duties and was entitled to a jury trial under applicable precedent. Accordingly, the motion to dismiss or strike the jury demand was denied.