Hiram Hamilton Ward

The case involves a former program analyst at Rack Room Shoes who alleged he was passed over for promotions in favor of younger, less experienced employees, subjected to poor evaluations and discipline after filing an EEOC age discrimination charge, and ultimately terminated, claiming violations of the ADEA, Title VII (including retaliation and later national origin), and intentional or negligent infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the motion to dismiss in part and denied it in part while allowing the plaintiff to amend the complaint. It dismissed the ADEA claims against the individual supervisors Snider and Borden because they do not qualify as employers under the statute per Fourth Circuit precedent, dismissed the emotional distress claims against all defendants for lack of sufficiently outrageous conduct or alleged severe mental distress under North Carolina law, but permitted the Title VII claims to proceed against the company.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

In Turner v. Randolph County, a former Building Codes Enforcement Officer sued the county and several supervisors, alleging that she faced a sexually hostile work environment after complaining about harassment by her supervisors, followed by retaliation including negative evaluations, warnings, and suspension after she filed an EEOC charge. She brought claims under Title VII for hostile environment and retaliation, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, conspiracy under 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3), and state-law claims for negligent and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss only the conspiracy claim, finding that the plaintiff alleged no agreement involving anyone outside the county employees themselves, and denied dismissal of the remaining claims, including after the plaintiff amended her complaint to plead waiver of governmental immunity through insurance coverage.

labor & employmentcivil rightstorts & liability

In Caldwell v. Linker, a former instructor at Randolph Community College sued college officials and the Board of Trustees after her one-year employment contract was not renewed following disputes over harassment allegations, a conditional renewal offer, and her termination, which involved being escorted off campus by law enforcement. The plaintiff raised claims including due process violations, false imprisonment, breach of contract, conversion, discrimination, and negligent oversight by the Board. The court granted defendants' motion for partial summary judgment, dismissing those six claims. It reasoned that the plaintiff lacked a protected property interest in continued employment under her fixed-term contract, that no genuine issues of material fact existed to support the tort or discrimination claims, and that the Board had no knowledge of any failure to follow grievance procedures.

labor & employmentcivil rightsproceduretorts & liability

This case involves a trademark dispute between May Apparel Group, a North Carolina children's clothing manufacturer using the marks "PEACHES 'N CREAM" (registered since 1985) and "JUST PEACHY," and Ava Import-Export, a California company marketing clothing under the mark "PEACHY KIDS" (owned by its CEO and registered in 1990). The plaintiff alleged infringement and sought to cancel the defendant's registration under 15 U.S.C. § 1119. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss Count V seeking cancellation because the mark's owner was not a party and could not be added due to lack of personal jurisdiction in North Carolina. It denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the infringement claim, finding that likelihood of confusion remained a genuine issue of material fact under the Fourth Circuit's multi-factor test, and denied the plaintiff's motion to amend and add the owner as a party on jurisdictional grounds.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case involved a federal prisoner's petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate his convictions for drug conspiracy, money laundering conspiracy, and obstruction of justice. He argued that an earlier administrative forfeiture of $4,104 in cash by the IRS barred the criminal prosecution under the Double Jeopardy Clause, citing Supreme Court decisions like United States v. Halper and Austin v. United States. The court granted the government's motion to dismiss. It reasoned that the forfeiture involved proceeds of illegal activity rather than punishment, the petitioner had defaulted and made no claim in the forfeiture proceeding, and the civil and criminal matters involved different elements so double jeopardy protections did not apply.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involved a dispute over whether L. Dan Winstead Jr. and related plaintiffs were liable for federal employment and unemployment taxes on wages paid to day laborers who assisted tenants in growing tobacco under a sharecropping arrangement on Winstead's land from 1980 to 1982. The plaintiffs sued the IRS for a refund of assessed taxes and penalties, arguing they were not the employers of the day laborers and that a statutory exemption for sharecropper arrangements applied. The court granted summary judgment to the government on the issue of liability, holding that Winstead qualified as the employer under 26 U.S.C. § 3401(d)(1) because he controlled the payment of wages to the laborers, and that the agricultural exemption in 26 U.S.C. § 3121(b)(16) did not apply since the day laborers were paid hourly rather than sharing in crop proceeds. The court denied summary judgment on the amount of damages due to factual disputes over the calculations of taxes, interest, and penalties, and it also denied the plaintiffs' motions for reconsideration and certification of an interlocutory appeal.

taxeslabor & employment

The case concerns plaintiffs who purchased or sold dairy products and participated in 'Pine State Customers Financial Security Plans' marketed by Pine State Creamery through defendant DiCresce, an agent for MONY; after Pine State’s 1993 bankruptcy, the plans defaulted, prompting claims of federal and state securities violations, RICO, fraud, and misrepresentation against DiCresce, MONY, Kilgore, and Wachovia as estate representative. The court addressed multiple motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a motion to intervene, and a motion to stay discovery. It partially granted and partially denied the motions to dismiss—dismissing Section 17(a) securities claims for lack of a private right of action and claims against the estate, while allowing other claims to proceed and permitting amendment for statute-of-limitations compliance—granted intervention except on the dismissed claims, and denied the stay, reasoning that notice pleading and discovery are appropriate before substantive dismissal at this early stage.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a diversity product liability action in which plaintiffs Crown Automobile and Carmelo Cambareri sued Chrysler Corporation and Enterprise Industries after a mobile food service vehicle leased to Cambareri was destroyed by fire allegedly caused by defective propane fuel lines. The court granted Enterprise Industries' motion for summary judgment on all claims, holding that it was a mere seller that had no reasonable opportunity to inspect the vehicle under N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(a). It partially granted Chrysler's motion for summary judgment by dismissing claims for negligent design or manufacture of the vehicle and all strict liability claims, but denied summary judgment on the product liability claim related to the propane lines supplied by Chrysler because a genuine factual dispute existed regarding defect causation and privity was not required under N.C.G.S. § 99B-2(b). The rulings rested on application of North Carolina's product liability statutes to the roles of seller and component-part manufacturer.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case concerned a former employee who left his job due to health issues and alleged that his ex-employer Tultex misled him about the requirements for long-term disability benefits under a policy issued by Hartford, causing him to forgo a claim that was later denied on coverage grounds; he sued both defendants for breach of fiduciary duty and related claims under ERISA and state law. The court ruled on numerous procedural motions by granting the plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, denying Tultex's motion to dismiss the complaint, granting the defendants' motion to sever cross-claims, denying the plaintiff's motion to strike, and staying Hartford's motion to amend its cross-claim along with Tultex's motion to dismiss the cross-claims. Core reasoning for denying dismissal included that the statute of limitations did not bar the suit, as factual questions remained on claim accrual and equitable tolling could apply due to Tultex's alleged misleading advice about policy definitions.

labor & employmenthealthcareprocedure

In Pippen v. Scales, pro se plaintiff Michael J. Pippen sued the North Carolina State Board of Examiners of Plumbing, Heating, and Fire Sprinkler Contractors along with individual board members, investigators, attorneys, and customers, alleging RICO violations and civil rights claims under the Constitution and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, and 1985 stemming from the one-year suspension of his H-3 contractor license after complaints about his work. The court granted the plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint but then granted all defendants' motions to dismiss the action in full. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff failed to allege a pattern of racketeering activity or predicate acts sufficient for a RICO claim, lacked any showing of racial or class-based animus for the §§ 1981 and 1985 claims, and received adequate due process through notice, an evidentiary hearing, and the opportunity for state court review before the license suspension.

civil rightsprocedurebusiness & regulatory

This case involved a claim by plaintiff Brenda Patterson, a Black female employee at McLean Credit Union, that the employer violated 42 U.S.C. § 1981 by failing to promote her to Account Intermediate, a position given to a white colleague, which she argued would have created a new contractual relationship. After multiple appeals reaching the Supreme Court and further discovery, the district court considered the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the refusal-to-promote claim. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, holding that the change in position did not meet the standard for a new and distinct employment contract under Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164 (1989), because the added duties were routine extensions of existing work, pay differences were modest, and the overall relationship between employee and employer remained unchanged. The decision relied on comparisons of job responsibilities, pay scales, and precedents finding similar internal promotions insufficient to trigger § 1981 liability.

civil rightslabor & employment

In this case, plaintiff Brenda Patterson alleged that her employer, McLean Credit Union, denied her a promotion from file coordinator to Accounting Clerk Intermediate on the basis of race, in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1981. Following remand from the Supreme Court and Fourth Circuit, the district court dismissed the promotion-denial claim. The court applied the Supreme Court's holding in Patterson that a § 1981 promotion claim requires the opportunity for a new and distinct contractual relation between employee and employer, concluding that the move between two hourly-wage positions at the same location and under the same conditions did not satisfy this standard, unlike a shift to a salaried position. The opinion noted that Title VII offers a separate administrative process for addressing workplace discrimination claims.

civil rightslabor & employment

This case involves an appeal by the U.S. Air Force from a bankruptcy court order denying relief from the automatic stay in the Chapter 11 reorganization of Carolina Parachute Corporation, a defense contractor with government contracts. The Air Force sought to terminate its contracts due to the debtor's delivery delays after the bankruptcy court confirmed a reorganization plan allowing the debtor in possession to assume the executory contracts. The district court reversed the bankruptcy court's denial of the motion to lift the stay. It held that under 11 U.S.C. § 365(c)(1) and the Federal Nonassignment Act (41 U.S.C. § 15), the government contracts could not be assumed without the government's consent because the debtor in possession is treated as a distinct entity from the original contractor, following the reasoning in Matter of West Electronics, Inc.

business & regulatoryfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a dispute between two insurers, St. Paul Fire & Marine Insurance Company and Vigilant Insurance Company, over their respective duties to defend and indemnify a psychiatrist, Dr. James E. Collins, against two medical malpractice lawsuits alleging improper sexual conduct during treatment that began in 1976 and continued into 1977. St. Paul, which issued a claims-made policy covering the later period, defended the suits and settled one for $425,000, then sought contribution from Vigilant, whose occurrence policy covered the earlier period; Vigilant initially refused to defend or contribute after reviewing the complaints. The court granted summary judgment to St. Paul, holding that Vigilant breached its duty to defend because the alleged malpractice occurred in part during its policy period and constituted professional negligence under North Carolina law. The decision rested on the principle that an insurer must defend when facts known or alleged potentially trigger coverage, and that refusal estops the insurer from later denying coverage for a reasonable settlement. The court also addressed related issues of waiver and allocation of defense costs between the policies.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

In this bankruptcy case, debtor Asinelli, Inc. filed for Chapter 7 relief, owing defendant Dole Fresh Fruit Company for produce; defendant invoked the trust provisions of the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA) to protect its claim and filed a counterclaim in an adversary proceeding brought by plaintiffs against a bank holding the debtor's assets. Defendant moved under 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) to withdraw the reference of the proceeding from the bankruptcy court to the district court, arguing that resolution required substantial consideration of both the Bankruptcy Code and PACA. The court denied the motion, holding that a properly perfected PACA trust interest is not part of the debtor's estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541, so the matter would involve only a straightforward determination of perfection under PACA without needing material and substantial analysis of both Title 11 and non-bankruptcy federal law. The decision relied on the statutory structure of PACA trusts and precedents distinguishing routine applications of other federal statutes from cases warranting mandatory withdrawal.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved a dispute between private utility companies (Pinehurst Enterprises and subsidiaries) and the Town of Southern Pines over which party had the right to provide water and sewer services to a new development in Moore County, North Carolina. The plaintiffs alleged federal antitrust violations and other claims arising from the town's actions in connection with a regional wastewater plan funded partly by federal grants, while the town asserted authority based on state law, annexation, and prior agreements. The court granted summary judgment to the defendants on the antitrust claims, finding they were protected by the state action immunity doctrine because the town acted pursuant to state-authorized powers in regulating utilities. It also dismissed a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for failure to state a valid cause of action. Finally, the court declined to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, citing North Carolina's strong interest in resolving questions about interlocal agreements and local government authority.

business & regulatoryenvironmentfederal power

This case involved the Small Business Administration (SBA) suing Vanguard Investment Company, a licensed small business investment company (SBIC), for alleged violations of the Small Business Investment Act and related regulations. The SBA sought forfeiture of Vanguard's license, dissolution of the company, a permanent injunction and receivership, and a money judgment on outstanding debentures. Vanguard cross-moved for permission to file for Chapter 11 bankruptcy protection. The court granted the SBA's motion for summary judgment and denied Vanguard's motions, finding that the record indisputably established regulatory violations such as capital impairment. It ordered license forfeiture, appointed a receiver for liquidation, entered judgment for over $1 million on the debentures, and held that the prior purported bankruptcy filing was void and that Vanguard had no right to file for bankruptcy.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In this case, defendant Michael L. Brant, who had pled guilty to interstate transportation of counterfeit securities, moved for return of personal property (an attache case and items from his car) seized at arrest or alternatively for damages after the government destroyed the items without any forfeiture proceedings. The court explained that seized non-contraband property must generally be returned once criminal proceedings end and that the government's destruction without statutory process violated due process. However, because the record was insufficient to determine whether ancillary jurisdiction existed over the motion, the court reserved ruling and allowed the parties to supplement the record on jurisdiction.

criminal lawpropertyprocedure

This case concerned a Medicare provider's challenge to the Secretary of Health and Human Services' decision to reduce its reimbursement by offsetting investment income earned by a related nonprofit foundation against the provider's claimed interest expenses. The plaintiff hospital had donated property to the foundation, which sold it and invested the proceeds, generating income that the Secretary used to offset allowable costs under Medicare regulations. The court granted summary judgment to the Secretary, finding that both the offset rule and the related organizations doctrine permitted imputing the foundation's investment income to the provider because the entities were related through shared control and the offset ensured reimbursement only for reasonable and necessary costs actually incurred, consistent with the Medicare statute's requirement of fair compensation.

healthcarebusiness & regulatoryfederal power

This case is a declaratory judgment action by an insurer against Duke University and its employees regarding coverage under a liability policy for damages awarded in a prior state-court suit. The underlying suit involved claims of malicious prosecution, libel and slander, and conversion arising from a dispute over a medical research machine, resulting in awards of both compensatory and punitive damages. The court found that the policy language would cover punitive damages but held that North Carolina public policy bars insurance coverage for punitive damages stemming from intentional torts. The court also ruled that the policy does not cover claims by one employee against fellow employees. Summary judgment was therefore granted to the insurer.

torts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory