This case involved a 1994 tariff classification action filed by Starkey Laboratories in the Court of International Trade, which was placed on the Reserve Calendar and later dismissed in 1995 by the clerk for lack of prosecution under Rule 83(c) after remaining there for more than 18 months without being suspended or removed. In 2001, the plaintiff, represented by new counsel, moved under Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) to vacate the dismissal and reinstate the case, arguing that prior counsel had failed to suspend it under a related test case in which Starkey had prevailed. The court denied the motion, finding no basis for relief because the prior counsel's inaction did not constitute excusable neglect or any other justifying reason, the 18-month removal deadline provided clear notice under the rules, the six-year delay in seeking relief was unreasonable, and reinstatement would prejudice the government.
This case involved a tariff classification dispute in which Starkey Laboratories challenged the government's classification of imported merchandise in the Court of International Trade. The action was placed on the Reserve Calendar upon filing in 1993 but was dismissed for lack of prosecution in 1995 under CIT Rule 83(c) after it remained on the calendar for more than 18 months without being removed or suspended. Years later, after prevailing in a related test case, the plaintiff moved under CIT Rule 60(b)(1) and (6) to vacate the dismissal and reinstate the case, citing counsel's failure to file a suspension motion and lack of notice. The court denied the motion, holding that the attorney's neglect was not excusable, the six-year delay in seeking relief was unreasonable, and reinstatement would prejudice the government.
This case involved seventy-five entries of apparel imported from El Salvador between 1990 and 1993 under a continuous surety bond issued by Frontier Insurance Company. U.S. Customs liquidated the entries years later at higher appraised values and demanded additional duties, prompting Frontier to argue that the entries should be deemed liquidated at the entered values because it never received required notices extending the liquidation period. The court granted the government partial summary judgment on thirty-seven entries, holding that 19 U.S.C. §1504 did not require Customs to send extension notices to sureties before the 1993 statutory amendment. For the remaining thirty-eight entries subject to post-amendment extensions, the court denied both parties' summary judgment motions because genuine factual disputes existed over whether the notices were properly sent and received.
This case involved the tariff classification of electronic exercise monitors imported by Weslo, Inc. from 1991 to 1993 at the Port of Los Angeles. The importer entered the goods duty-free under HTSUS subheading 9029.20.40 as speedometers, but Customs liquidated them under subheading 9506.91.00 as parts of exercise equipment at a 4.64% duty rate pursuant to a September 1993 ruling. The dispute on cross-motions for partial summary judgment concerned whether Customs violated the notice-and-comment requirements of 19 U.S.C. § 1625(c) by failing to follow earlier duty-free rulings. The court held that the Mod Act provision did not apply because liquidation occurred in conformity with the 1993 ruling issued before the statute's effective date, with the relevant modification published afterward, and granted the government's cross-motion while denying the plaintiff's. The court also severed and dismissed seven unrelated entries for lack of jurisdiction.
This case concerns the U.S. Department of Commerce's Final Results of the Third Administrative Review of an antidumping duty order on cold-rolled carbon steel flat products from the Netherlands, specifically Hoogovens Staal BV's challenge to Commerce's calculations of dumping margins. On remand from a prior decision, the court reviewed Commerce's redetermination regarding levels of trade and the classification of warranty and technical service expenses. The court affirmed Commerce's treatment of the warranty and technical service expenses as direct expenses based on record evidence showing they varied directly with particular sales. The court remanded the level-of-trade determination for further agency action, after Commerce clarified that its finding rested solely on record evidence rather than facts available.
Glaxo Wellcome Inc. challenged the U.S. Customs Service's assessment of a 6.3% duty on three entries of pharmaceutical products that were entered for immediate transportation at Norfolk, Virginia, on December 28, 1994, even though they were entered for consumption at Durham, North Carolina, on January 3, 1995, after Presidential Proclamation 6763 took effect and reduced the applicable HTSUS rate to zero. The court denied Glaxo's motion for summary judgment and granted the government's cross-motion, upholding Customs' liquidation at the pre-1995 rate. It reasoned that 19 U.S.C. § 1315(a)(2) fixes the duty rate for merchandise covered by an immediate transportation entry as the rate in effect when that entry was accepted at the port of original importation, and the Proclamation's effective-date language did not specially override this statutory rule or the related Customs regulations.