Rodney Scott Webb

Marvin Shape, a former Barnes County correctional officer, sued the county and its sheriff after being demoted in December 2003 and terminated in April 2004, claiming the actions stemmed from his possible ADD, complaints about billing practices, grievances over access to personnel records, and a hostile work environment. The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment in part, dismissing four of the seven counts including discrimination and certain retaliation claims, while denying it as to the remaining counts involving retaliation, free speech, and due process violations, and removed the sheriff as an individual defendant. The court reasoned that some claims failed due to lack of evidence or immunity, but the due process claim survived because the grievance hearing committee included potentially biased members and denied Shape the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses. The case centers on public employment actions and constitutional protections in the workplace grievance process.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speech

The case arose from injuries sustained by plaintiff Paul Eberts when thrown from an ATV manufactured by the defendants, leading to claims including defective warnings under state law. The defendants moved for partial summary judgment to dismiss the warnings claim, asserting that it was preempted by a federal consent decree issued under the Consumer Product Safety Act that specified warning requirements for ATVs. The court denied the motion, holding that the state claim was not preempted because the decree established only minimum standards, a statutory savings clause preserved common-law liability, and the decree did not conflict with additional state-law duties. The court further found a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff actually received the supplemental warnings mailed by the defendants, precluding summary judgment.

torts & liabilityfederal powerbusiness & regulatory

In Myers v. Richland County, a former elected state's attorney sued the county and its commissioners, claiming breach of a settlement agreement from a prior federal Title VII gender discrimination case, along with defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress, based on alleged retaliation that prevented his reelection. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, as there was no diversity or federal question jurisdiction. The court denied the motion to dismiss, ruling that supplemental jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1367 because the federal court had expressly retained jurisdiction to enforce the settlement agreement from the underlying federal action. The court granted the motion to strike the request for punitive damages, finding that North Dakota law requires a separate motion to amend the pleadings before such damages can be sought.

civil rightsprocedure

This case concerns the resentencing of Pedro Dyck, a Canadian citizen previously deported after a federal drug conviction, who was convicted of attempted reentry in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a) after traveling through the U.S. border without authorization. The district court imposed the 41-month sentence mandated by the Eighth Circuit, which had vacated an earlier downward departure under U.S.S.G. § 2L1.2 and § 5K2.0 based on the defendant's background and circumstances. The court explained that the guidelines were intended to promote uniformity but not to eliminate all judicial discretion for fact-specific individualized sentencing, yet it was bound to apply the appellate ruling requiring a sentence within the 41-51 month range.

immigrationcriminal lawprocedure

The case involved a dispute over a defective oilseed processing plant in North Dakota, where AgGrow sued Ibberson (the contractor), Anderson (the equipment supplier), and National Union (the performance bond surety) for breach of contract, warranty, negligence, and related claims after the plant failed to meet performance guarantees. Following arbitration between AgGrow and Ibberson and review by special masters under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 53, the masters found Ibberson fully liable for breach damages including corrective costs and lost profits, Anderson partially at fault with indemnity obligations to Ibberson, and National jointly and severally liable with Ibberson for corrective work costs under the bond. The court largely adopted the masters' report after reviewing objections, modifying it in three respects while confirming the core liability allocations based on contract terms, express warranties, and the scope of the performance bond. The decision centered on interpreting the parties' agreements, including indemnity provisions and bond triggers, without attributing fault to AgGrow.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a defendant convicted of aggravated sexual abuse who received a 125-month sentence that included a two-level enhancement under the Sentencing Guidelines for inflicting serious bodily injury on the victim. Following an appeals court remand for additional findings on whether the enhancement applied, the district court held evidentiary hearings with medical testimony and reimposed the original sentence. The court determined that the victim suffered serious bodily injury based on extreme physical pain during labor and delivery caused by the crime, as well as protracted mental impairments including depression and PTSD lasting over a year and physical impairments from pregnancy and related hospitalization.

criminal law

In this criminal case, a jury convicted defendant Duane Huber and related farm entities on all counts in the Second Superseding Indictment and found over $5.8 million subject to forfeiture. Huber moved for judgment of acquittal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 29, raising claims including denial of a continuance, improper admission of evidence and co-conspirator statements, insufficient evidence, selective prosecution, erroneous jury instructions, and errors in the forfeiture finding. The court denied the motion, applying the Rule 29 standard that requires viewing evidence in the light most favorable to the government and determining that the evidence was sufficient to support the verdicts; it noted that many arguments were more appropriate for a Rule 33 new-trial motion and found no abuse of discretion or other reversible errors on the remaining points.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a plaintiff alleging that his former employer, Dakota Bridge Builders, violated the Davis-Bacon Act by failing to pay the prevailing carpenter wage and laying him off after he complained. The court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the complaint and denied the plaintiff's motions for default and summary judgment as moot. The court reasoned that service of process was insufficient under federal and state rules, that the Davis-Bacon Act does not create a private right of action here because administrative remedies through the Minnesota Department of Transportation were available and pursued, and that the claim was independently barred by the two- or three-year statute of limitations under 29 U.S.C. § 255.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved a dispute between KaeRen Accommodations, Inc. and K.B. Restaurants, Inc. (franchisees/licensees) and Country Hospitality Corp. (franchisor) over claims arising from a 1996 License Agreement to operate a restaurant in North Dakota that closed before its tenth anniversary. The defendant moved to dismiss for improper venue under Rule 12(b)(3), citing a forum selection clause in the Agreement requiring all litigation to be venued in Hennepin County, Minnesota. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action without prejudice, independently concluding that the clause was enforceable under the federal standard from M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., which presumes such clauses valid unless shown to be unreasonable, unjust, or invalid due to fraud or overreaching. The court rejected the plaintiffs' arguments that the clause was negated by other Agreement provisions, void under North Dakota public policy or franchise law, or unenforceable due to unequal bargaining power in a form contract.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a workplace injury claim by Jeremy Johnson against his summer employer Dave Marciniak's electrical business after Johnson fell from a catwalk and was injured. Since the employer lacked required workers' compensation insurance, Johnson sued and settled via a Miller-Shugart agreement, leading to a garnishment action against the employer's insurer Grinnell Mutual, which denied coverage under the policy's workers' compensation exclusion. The court granted summary judgment to Grinnell and denied Johnson's partial motion, holding that the exclusion applied because the claim arose from the employer's obligation under workers' compensation law even though no benefits were paid. The court reasoned that North Dakota law strictly enforces workers' compensation as the exclusive remedy and that the policy's exclusion did not conflict with other provisions regarding temporary workers.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatorytorts & liability

This case involved letter carriers at a USPS facility in North Dakota who alleged they were subjected to harassment, intimidation, and a hostile work environment by management and union stewards after they supported a female colleague in her EEO complaint regarding sexual harassment. The plaintiffs sued the USPS and their union NALC, asserting claims including retaliation, breach of the duty of fair representation, and violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986. The court granted the defendants' motions for summary judgment, dismissing all claims. It reasoned that the plaintiffs failed to produce evidence of a conspiracy or union breach sufficient to withstand summary judgment, that Title VII preempted certain claims against the USPS, and that other claims lacked merit.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case concerns a motion by LPP Mortgage Ltd., the assignee of a mortgage originally held by the Small Business Administration, for court authorization to access property via a locksmith and to conduct an appraisal against defendants William and Margo Vasicek. The court raised the issue of subject-matter jurisdiction on its own initiative and concluded it lacked authority to hear the action. Plaintiff argued that federal jurisdiction arose from an SBA regulation at 13 C.F.R. § 101.106 and that the SBA's statutory right to sue in federal court under 15 U.S.C. § 634(b) transferred upon assignment, but the court held that only Congress may confer federal jurisdiction and that neither the regulation nor the statute extends to assignees. Requests to invoke equitable jurisdiction were rejected because subject-matter jurisdiction is a non-waivable constitutional limit. The complaint was dismissed without prejudice.

procedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

This case involved cross-claims between AIG Life Insurance Company and American Travellers Life Insurance Company (Conseco) after plaintiff Haley settled her claims against both insurers. Haley had purchased long-term care insurance from AIG containing a 3-day prior institutionalization requirement; the policy was later assumed by Conseco, which sent her a letter with allegedly false statements about the policy's value. After Haley's breach-of-contract claims were dismissed, the remaining fraud claims led to AIG seeking indemnification from Conseco under their purchase and sale agreement and Conseco cross-claiming against AIG under their assumption agreement. The court granted AIG's motion for summary judgment, holding that the broad indemnification language in the purchase and sale agreement required Conseco to defend and indemnify AIG for the fraud allegations, which were intertwined with the contract claims and unsupported by facts against AIG. Conseco's cross-claim was dismissed because the policy did not violate any law.

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a group of farmers challenging the USDA and Risk Management Agency's decision that a base price for durum wheat could not be established under their 2001 crop revenue coverage insurance policies without an illegal amendment, which led to cancellation of the policies; the farmers also raised a due process claim. The court first denied the government's motions to dismiss on grounds of failure to exhaust National Appeals Division remedies and the FCIC's anti-injunction provision. On the merits, after reviewing the policy language and formula for the base price, the court concluded that the agency's interpretation aligned with the plain terms of the policy and was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court granted summary judgment to the government defendants.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involves multiple employment discrimination lawsuits filed by plaintiff Anderson against his employer, the Western Area Power Administration (WAPA), based on EEO complaints from 1996 and 1997 alleging disability discrimination, retaliation, workplace harassment, and constitutional violations. The court granted the government's motions for summary judgment in Anderson II and Anderson III, dismissing both cases. The core reasoning was that res judicata applied because the prior Anderson I case had reached a final judgment on the merits by a court of competent jurisdiction, the parties were identical, and the claims in the later suits arose from the same facts, were ripe at the time of the first suit, and thus could and should have been raised earlier.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved an appeal from a bankruptcy court ruling regarding the rights of two creditors, Ag Acceptance Corporation and FarmPro Services, Inc., to $80,000 in crop disaster relief payments owed to debtors William and Gayle Brown under Chapter 12 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy court had determined that both creditors held valid security interests in the payments based on their loan agreements, which explicitly covered government agricultural program payments, and that Ag Acceptance held first priority because it perfected its interest earlier. On appeal, the district court affirmed, holding that the payments were property of the estate under 11 U.S.C. § 541 and subject to the security interests despite the post-petition origin of the rights. The court reasoned that North Dakota UCC provisions on crops and proceeds did not apply to exclude or subordinate Ag Acceptance's interest, as the payments were not crops or UCC-defined proceeds, and no purchase-money security interest exception favored FarmPro. The decision upheld the first-to-perfect rule for priority among the creditors.

business & regulatorypropertyprocedure

In Fish v. Ristvedt, a pro se plaintiff who had worked as a truck driver sued his former employer H & R Transfer, Inc. and two individuals for disability discrimination under the ADA, Title VII, the FLSA, the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and later the North Dakota Human Rights Act, alleging he was terminated because of a disability. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing the company employed fewer than 15 people (so it was not covered by the ADA), the individual defendants could not be liable, and the other federal statutes did not apply to the facts alleged. The court granted the defendants' motion and denied the plaintiff's cross-motion, dismissing all federal claims because the employer fell outside the ADA's coverage, individuals are not liable under the ADA, Title VII and other cited statutes address race, sex, or national-origin discrimination rather than disability, and the FLSA claims were not supported. The North Dakota Human Rights Act claim was allowed to proceed after amendment.

civil rightslabor & employment

The case involves a dispute between RDO Foods Co., a North Dakota corporation operating a potato flake plant, and defendants UBI, James Osgood, and Matthew Osgood over a 1990 management agreement and sales agency agreement, including claims of unpaid fees, trade secret disclosures, tortious interference with business relationships, and related counterclaims for breach of contract and various torts. The court denied Matthew Osgood's motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction, finding that his contacts with North Dakota were sufficient to satisfy due process under the state's long-arm statute. It granted in part and denied in part RDO's motion to dismiss or for summary judgment on the counterclaims, dismissing those alleging interference with prospective business advantage, fraud, and civil conspiracy, while allowing others such as breach of contract to proceed where they were not barred by the statute of limitations. The rulings rested on evaluations of minimum contacts for jurisdiction and application of North Dakota law to the timeliness and sufficiency of the claims.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

The case involved a registered nurse at a Veterans Administration hospital who suffered a back injury on the job, was reassigned to various positions including quality management and intensive care, faced medical evaluations regarding her fitness for duty due to physical and anxiety-related limitations, and ultimately took disability retirement after a Physical Standards Board determined she could not perform her nursing duties. She sued the Department of Veterans Affairs under the Rehabilitation Act alleging disability discrimination and retaliation. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, concluding that the plaintiff had not made out a prima facie case on either claim because she failed to show she could perform available positions with or without reasonable accommodation and presented no evidence establishing the required elements of retaliation.

civil rightslabor & employment

In Anderson v. Richardson, the plaintiff employee sued his employer alleging unlawful discrimination and retaliation under federal statutes including the Rehabilitation Act, claiming adverse actions by supervisors including a 10-day suspension. After a jury found that the defendant had discriminated and retaliated against the plaintiff but awarded no damages, the defendant renewed a motion for judgment as a matter of law arguing insufficient evidence and improper jury consideration of supervisor actions. The court denied the motion, holding that the verdict was supported by probative evidence and that speculation about the jury's internal deliberations or question during deliberations was improper under Rule 50 and Federal Rule of Evidence 606(b). The court granted in part the plaintiff's request for equitable relief by awarding backpay plus interest for the suspension period, reasoning that the jury's no-damages finding addressed only compensatory damages it was permitted to consider and did not preclude equitable remedies.

labor & employmentcivil rights