District Court, S.D. Ohio — appointed by Dwight Eisenhower

Riggs v. ISLAND CREEK COAL COMPANY
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1974-10-05 · cited 2×
This case involved a lawsuit by plaintiff Riggs against defendant Island Creek Coal Company that was removed from state court to federal court based on diversity of citizenship. After a trial on liability, the defendant moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that its principal place of business was in Ohio (the same state as the plaintiff), which would destroy diversity and make removal improper under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c). The court overruled the motion, holding that diversity jurisdiction was proper because a mining corporation's principal place of business is determined by the location of its mining operations, land, employees, and equipment rather than its executive offices, and the evidence showed those operations were not in Ohio. The court further reasoned that jurisdictional facts could be developed through trial evidence and that, even under alternative analyses, diversity existed at the time of the ruling.
procedure
SCHLEGEL MANUFACTURING CO. v. King Aluminum Corp.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1974-09-04 · cited 3×
This case involves a motion by Schlegel Manufacturing Company to hold USM Corporation in civil contempt for violating a prior court injunction in a patent infringement lawsuit concerning pile weatherstripping with a flexible barrier. The court found USM in willful contempt because its new "Twin-Fin" product was equivalent to the previously enjoined infringing product, differing only slightly in the attachment of the barrier strip, and thus continued to infringe the valid Horton patent. The court reaffirmed the permanent injunction, ordered USM to account for profits from the sales, and invalidated USM's asserted patent as part of the proceedings, while limiting the issues to infringement rather than allowing collateral attacks on the original patent's validity.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Schlegel Manufacturing Co. v. King Aluminum Corp.
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1973-12-11 · cited 6×
This case involved a motion for contempt against defendants for allegedly violating a 1972 consent decree that settled a patent infringement suit in favor of the plaintiff regarding weatherstripping technology. The defendants had filed a declaratory judgment action in South Carolina seeking to relitigate issues of patent validity and infringement, prompting cross-motions over the proper forum and procedure. The court denied the defendants' motion to stay proceedings, ruled that this court was the appropriate forum, and set an evidentiary hearing on the contempt motion for February 12, 1974. It held that the consent decree was res judicata, estopping the defendants from challenging the validity of the plaintiff's patent, though they could raise issues regarding their own modified product or its validity if needed to resolve the contempt claim. The reasoning emphasized that a consent decree is a binding judicial act that parties may not reopen at will, distinguishing it from licensing agreements under Lear v. Adkins where public policy against monopolies applies differently.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Ziskin v. Weinberger
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1973-12-07 · cited 12×
This case involved a claim for child's insurance benefits under the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 402(d), by a plaintiff who alleged she became disabled before age 18 due to polio and thus qualified as a disabled child on her deceased father's account. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare denied the benefits, concluding that the plaintiff's college degree and teaching work showed she was not disabled prior to turning 18. On review under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), the court examined the administrative record under the substantial evidence standard and granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment while denying the Secretary's. The core reasoning was that the plaintiff's post-18 work attempts were unsuccessful and temporary because of her impairment, which does not qualify as substantial gainful activity under the Act and regulations, and the Secretary failed to properly apply the relevant standards to the full record.
healthcarefederal power
Samuels v. Weinberger
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1973-10-04 · cited 11×
This case involved a challenge under the Social Security Act to the denial of Medicare Part A hospital insurance benefits for inpatient services provided to the plaintiff at Greene Memorial Hospital from September 17 to October 16, 1970. The Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare had determined that the care was custodial in nature and thus excluded from coverage under 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(a)(9), after initial approval for an earlier portion of the stay related to treatment of a fractured arm. The district court reviewed the administrative record under the substantial evidence standard of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) and granted summary judgment to the plaintiff. It reversed the Secretary's decision on the grounds that the treating physician's opinion established a medical need for continued hospitalization and that the custodial care exclusion did not apply to such skilled services for an elderly patient under the statute's remedial purpose.
healthcarefederal power
Keller v. STANDARD SAND AND GRAVEL COMPANY
District Court, S.D. Ohio · 1973-03-27 · cited 1×
This case was a personal injury action in admiralty for a maritime tort stemming from a 1968 collision on the Ohio River between a pleasure boat carrying the plaintiff and the defendant's moored vessel. The suit was filed in 1971, nearly three years after the incident, and the defendant moved for summary judgment asserting that the claim was barred by laches due to inexcusable delay and resulting prejudice. The court held that the most analogous limitations period for guidance was the two-year state statute for personal injuries rather than the three-year Jones Act period, as the plaintiff was not a seaman or employee injured while working aboard a vessel. Finding the delay inexcusable and the evidence of prejudice (including unavailable witnesses and inability to reconstruct vessel alignment) undisputed, the court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action.
torts & liabilityprocedure