Zita Leeson Weinshienk

Bruce Field, a former Construction Project Manager for Denver Water, sued the Board of Water Commissioners after his 2008 termination, claiming retaliation for raising concerns about alleged fraud and irregularities in construction contracts on three projects. He asserted claims under the First Amendment, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, and Title VII. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The reasoning centered on Field's communications being made as part of his official duties overseeing projects and contracts, rendering them unprotected under Garcetti v. Ceballos for the First Amendment claim, with insufficient evidence of protected activity or causation for the remaining claims.

free speechcivil rightslabor & employment

The case involves a minor child appealing through his mother the denial of Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits by the Social Security Administration after an Administrative Law Judge found he did not qualify as disabled due to speech, cognition, and comprehension issues. The district court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review the ALJ's decision, which had been upheld by the Appeals Council. The court reversed the ALJ's denial and remanded the case for further proceedings, determining that the ALJ failed to make specific credibility findings regarding the mother's testimony and to provide an adequate narrative discussion connecting the medical and educational evidence to the conclusions on the child's functioning across the six regulatory domains.

federal powerhealthcare

The case involved a state prisoner suing an ICE agent under Bivens for allegedly violating his due process rights by lodging an immigration detainer that he claimed prevented him from bonding out or accessing community corrections during his pending criminal proceedings. The detainer was based on the plaintiff's initial statement that he was a Greek national without proper documentation and was later withdrawn after he provided proof of U.S. citizenship. The district court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment, holding that the detainer did not affect the duration or conditions of the plaintiff's detention, which was imposed solely by state authorities, and that the plaintiff had not shown any constitutional violation or complied with procedural requirements for opposing summary judgment or seeking further discovery.

immigrationcivil rightscriminal law

In Crosby v. Watkins, Petitioner David Crosby, convicted in state court of first degree sexual assault, false imprisonment, and prohibited use of a weapon and serving a 30-year sentence, filed a pro se application for a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging three aspects of his trial and appeal: the denial of his motion to suppress statements made to police, the failure to grant a mistrial due to the destruction of taped statements, and the appellate court's ruling on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. The district court, reviewing de novo the magistrate judge's recommendation, denied the application and dismissed the action with prejudice. The court reasoned that the petitioner's Miranda waiver was knowing and voluntary despite evidence of intoxication because he was coherent and responsive, that the destruction of tapes did not violate due process absent bad faith by police, and that the ineffective assistance claim was not properly presented to the state courts.

criminal lawprocedure

This case involves ongoing disputes between Laboratory Corp. of America Holdings (LabCorp) and Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. over royalty payments under a 1991 license agreement for biochemical assays, including homocysteine testing tied to a patent for detecting vitamin deficiencies. The disputes arose after a prior jury verdict in Metabolite I found that LabCorp infringed the patent and breached the license by switching to an Abbott immunoassay kit and stopping royalty payments. The court resolved cross-motions for summary judgment on post-mandate royalties and related contract claims by interpreting the agreement's terms for patent and know-how licenses, applying principles of contract enforcement that bind parties to the deal they made without relieving hardship from later events, and determining damages based on the position the non-breaching party would have occupied. The opinion also addressed evidentiary issues but ultimately enforced the royalty obligations without reviving the original agreement terms.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involved pharmacists employed by Wal-Mart who alleged violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding overtime pay. The sole remaining issue was whether Wal-Mart's policy of prospectively reducing pharmacists' base hours and salaries in response to sales declines made them the functional equivalent of hourly employees, thus requiring overtime compensation. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and granted summary judgment in favor of Wal-Mart. It reasoned that, per controlling precedent, the adjustments were not frequent enough—over 98% of plaintiffs had two or fewer changes, and the rest averaged one to two per year over several years—to invoke the "sham exception" that would deny the professional exemption. Therefore, the pharmacists remained exempt from FLSA overtime requirements.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a challenge by Colorado Wild, a nonprofit, to the U.S. Forest Service's approval of the Missionary Ridge Burned Area Timber Salvage Project in Colorado's San Juan National Forest under the National Forest Management Act (NFMA) and National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). The plaintiff sought judicial review and a preliminary injunction, arguing that the Record of Decision and Final Environmental Impact Statement were deficient because the agency failed to collect and analyze required quantitative population trend data for six management indicator species. The court granted the preliminary injunction after finding a substantial likelihood of success on the merits, determining that NFMA regulations (such as 36 C.F.R. §§ 219.19 and 219.26) obligate the Forest Service to gather actual and trend population data for these species at both the plan and project levels unless technically infeasible, and that reliance on habitat analysis alone was insufficient. The decision applied the Administrative Procedure Act's arbitrary and capricious standard, deferring to the agency only where its interpretations were reasonable and consistent with the regulations' plain meaning.

environmentprocedurefederal power

This case involves a habeas corpus petition filed by Juan Perez-Diago, a Mariel Cuban paroled into the United States in 1980 who was later convicted of attempted murder and firearms offenses, had his parole revoked, and remained in INS custody for years after Cuba refused to accept his deportation. The petitioner claimed that his ongoing detention amounted to indefinite imprisonment in violation of Fifth Amendment due process and that federal statutes and the Cuban Review Plan required his release. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation and dismissed the petition. It reasoned that excludable aliens like the petitioner are legally treated as never having entered the country, allowing indefinite detention under longstanding Supreme Court precedent, and that the Cuban Review Plan supplies the applicable procedures and annual reviews that satisfy due process requirements.

immigrationcivil rightsprocedure

This case involved a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 filed by an individual subject to a final order of removal who had been detained by immigration authorities; the petition sought release from custody and review of an immigration judge's denial of a motion to reopen removal proceedings. After the petitioner was released on a $2,500 bond, the respondents moved to dismiss the case as moot, while the petitioner cross-moved for default judgment. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the petition no longer presented a live Article III case or controversy because the primary injury of unlawful detention had ended and any remaining restrictions or risks of future removal stemmed from the removal order itself rather than the detention. The court further ruled it lacked jurisdiction over the challenge to the motion to reopen because the petitioner had not exhausted administrative remedies by appealing to the Board of Immigration Appeals.

immigrationprocedure

This case involved a patent infringement suit by Golight, Inc. against Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. concerning Claim 11 of U.S. Patent No. 5,673,989, which covers a portable searchlight with wireless remote control. After a bench trial, the court held that the claim was not invalid for obviousness despite prior art and prosecution history, that Wal-Mart's accused product literally infringed the claim by selling 14,600 units, and that the infringement was willful. The court awarded Golight $464,280 in damages based on a $31.80 per-unit royalty, prejudgment interest at the Treasury Bill rate, attorney fees under 35 U.S.C. § 285, and post-judgment interest, while declining exemplary damages.

business & regulatory

This case involved determining the damages owed by Lextron, Inc. to Micro Chemical, Inc. for infringing certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 4,733,971 related to weigh/mix machines used in agriculture. After finding that noninfringing substitute machines were available and there was no proven demand for the patented features, the court ruled that Micro was not entitled to lost profits damages. Instead, the court awarded Micro a reasonable royalty of $862,239 plus prejudgment interest of $297,243, for a total of $1,159,482, based on evidence presented at trial regarding royalty rates and the appropriate base for calculation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a Bivens action brought by a federal prisoner against prison officials and the Bureau of Prisons, alleging retaliation for his testimony against guards and inmates, along with violations of his First, Fifth, and Eighth Amendment rights through excessive force, failure to protect, sleep deprivation, inadequate shelter, interference with religious exercise, and related conspiracy claims under §§ 1985 and 1986, plus FTCA claims. The court addressed multiple motions to dismiss or for summary judgment, liberally construing the pro se complaint and treating sworn filings as affidavits, while applying standards from Rule 12(b)(6) and Rule 56. It dismissed numerous claims and defendants but denied dismissal or summary judgment on many others, allowing claims such as Eighth Amendment deprivations of sleep and warm clothes, excessive force, failure to protect, First Amendment religious interference, retaliation, and equal protection to proceed against specific defendants when allegations viewed as a whole could support relief. The core reasoning emphasized that pro se complaints should not be parsed into isolated paragraphs and that qualified immunity does not impose heightened pleading requirements.

civil rightscriminal lawprocedurefederal power

The case involved Alex's Transportation, Inc., an Arizona company, challenging the Colorado Public Utilities Commission's denial of its application to operate seven-passenger vehicles for intrastate charter bus service. The court decided in favor of the defendants, denying the preliminary injunction and entering judgment against the plaintiff. The core reasoning was that 49 U.S.C. § 14501(a) preempts state authority over intrastate charter bus transportation but lacks a clear federal definition of "bus" or "charter bus," so states may supply their own definitions, and Colorado's requirement of a minimum thirty-two passenger capacity meant its regulations applied to the plaintiff's smaller vehicles.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves claims by employees against Wal-Mart under the Fair Labor Standards Act for failure to pay overtime wages for hours worked over 40 per week. The court addressed several motions, including a motion to dismiss, approval of a collective action under 29 U.S.C. § 216(b), and summary judgment based on the statute of limitations. The court adopted the magistrate judge's recommendation in full, denying the motion to dismiss, granting approval for the collective action even though a similar action was already pending, partially granting summary judgment to dismiss many plaintiffs' claims as time-barred, and dismissing one plaintiff's claims without prejudice. The core reasoning was that the FLSA's opt-in structure does not bar non-participants from filing separate suits, so judicial efficiency supports allowing consolidation into a second collective action rather than numerous individual cases.

labor & employmentprocedure

This case involved full-time pharmacists employed by Wal-Mart who sued for overtime compensation under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for hours worked beyond 40 per week. Wal-Mart contended the pharmacists fell under the professional exemption and thus were ineligible for overtime. The court granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment on liability, holding that the employees were not paid on a salary basis because their compensation was subject to reductions tied to variations in hours worked or store business needs, violating the regulatory definition of a predetermined salary amount. The court also dismissed claims by thirty opt-in plaintiffs as barred by the FLSA's three-year statute of limitations. Core reasoning focused on construing the FLSA narrowly to protect employees while balancing business needs, finding Wal-Mart's prospective pay adjustments for convenience demonstrated hourly rather than salaried status.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory

The case involved the United States seeking to collect over $1 million in tax deficiencies from defendant Sidney Davidson by filing federal tax liens and levies on his potential interests as beneficiary and fiduciary in an estate and trust. Davidson had validly renounced those interests under Colorado law after the decedent's death. The court addressed cross-motions for summary judgment on whether a federal tax lien under 26 U.S.C. § 6321 could attach to the taxpayer's state-law right to accept or disclaim an inheritance, examining choice-of-law questions and Supreme Court precedents such as United States v. Bess and Aquilino v. United States that distinguish federal consequences from state-created property rights, while noting a split among other circuits.

taxespropertyfederal power

This case involves a remand from the Tenth Circuit directing the district court to address whether Michael Sean Edmond's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance by failing to file a timely notice of appeal after his guilty plea, as raised in his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 habeas petition. The court had previously dismissed the claim, relying on the unpublished Tenth Circuit decision in United States v. Fowler, which held that a defendant who substantially benefited from a guilty plea could not show prejudice from counsel's failure to appeal. Here, Edmond had pleaded guilty to one count in exchange for dismissal of two others, received a downward departure to 40 months based on a §5K1.1 motion, and would have risked trial on all counts if the plea were vacated. Following Fowler, the court concluded that the substantial benefits Edmond received from the plea agreement precluded a finding of prejudice under the Strickland test, even though prejudice is often presumed when counsel fails to perfect an appeal. Accordingly, the court denied the §2255 motion.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved a criminal charge under the International Parental Kidnapping Crime Act (IPKCA), 18 U.S.C. § 1204, against defendant Mike Mohammad Alahmad for allegedly removing a child from the United States with intent to obstruct the maternal grandmother's visitation rights. The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing that a grandmother cannot hold "parental rights" under the statute. The court denied the motion, holding that the IPKCA defines parental rights to include visiting rights as determined by state law, and Colorado law recognizes grandparents' visitation rights in custody proceedings. The court reasoned that the statute draws no distinction among joint custody, sole custody, or visiting rights and does not limit who may hold them, so a state court order granting such rights to a grandmother triggers the federal statute's protections.

criminal lawfamily law

This case involves a dispute over a 1986 loan from Silverado Banking to Funplex Partnership, later held by the FDIC as receiver, including allegations that the FDIC breached agreements allowing plaintiffs to pay off the loan for $4.2 million and not sell it to a third party, with claims against defendant First Commercial for tortious interference and related relief. Plaintiffs moved to disqualify the law firm Senn Lewis from representing First Commercial, arguing the firm had previously represented plaintiff Chado in a related matter involving redemption rights on foreclosed property tied to the loan. After an evidentiary hearing, the magistrate judge denied the disqualification motion, finding the prior representation involved only a limited and incidentally related issue that was not substantially factually related to the current claims, with no confidential information that could be used adversely. The district judge affirmed this order, overruling plaintiffs' objections as neither clearly erroneous nor contrary to law.

procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory

The United States filed suit against the Colorado Supreme Court seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to bar enforcement of Colorado Rules of Professional Conduct 3.3(d) and 3.8(f) against federal prosecutors, arguing these state ethics rules violated the Supremacy Clause when applied to federal criminal investigations and prosecutions. After amendments rendered some provisions moot, the sole remaining issue was Rule 3.8(f)(1), which bars prosecutors from subpoenaing a lawyer about a client in grand jury or other criminal proceedings unless the prosecutor reasonably believes the information is unprivileged, essential, and unavailable by other means. The court held that the rule cannot apply to federal prosecutors before the grand jury because grand juries operate independently of judicial supervision under precedents such as United States v. Williams, but the rule is valid and enforceable in other criminal proceedings since states retain inherent authority to discipline attorneys and the requirements do not conflict with federal rules on subpoenas or privilege.

criminal lawfederal powerprocedure