This case involved a negligence claim by plaintiff Robert C. McLean, an Avondale Shipyards insulator, who was severely burned by hot steam and water while working in Fire Room No. 1 aboard the USS WILLIAM C. LAWE, a Navy destroyer under repair. The court found the United States liable after a bifurcated trial on liability, determining that Navy personnel negligently opened the wrong valve during a boiler light-off procedure, sending pressurized hot fluid into a line that blew out a wooden plug near the plaintiff. The court rejected the government's arguments that a valve leak or the wooden plug caused the injury, instead crediting testimony that the Navy had exclusive control and that Avondale's procedures were reasonable and standard. On damages, the court awarded $1,202,880.56, including amounts for past and future pain and suffering, disability, disfigurement, lost wages calculated at the plaintiff's pre-injury wage rate with a productivity factor, and medical expenses subject to reimbursement under the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.
The case concerned a constitutional challenge to the federal rape statute, 18 U.S.C. § 2031, which authorized death or imprisonment for rape committed within special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States. The defendant argued that the death penalty provision violated the Eighth Amendment either on its face or as applied without standards. The court ruled that the death penalty clause was unconstitutional because the statute provided no guidelines or requirements for considering mitigating or aggravating circumstances, contrary to Supreme Court precedents such as Gregg v. Georgia and Proffitt v. Florida. However, the invalid portion was severable under precedents like United States v. Jackson, leaving the remainder of the statute intact and authorizing imprisonment for any term of years or life.
In this case, a biology professor at the University of New Orleans sued the university and its Board of Supervisors under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985(3), alleging harassment, intimidation, and other reprisals after he exercised his First Amendment rights. The court granted the defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. It held that the claims were time-barred under Louisiana's one-year prescriptive period for tort actions (La. Civ. Code arts. 2315 and 3536), rather than the ten-year catch-all period, because the alleged wrongful acts all occurred before July 31, 1972, and any later effects did not restart the limitations clock. The court also found no basis for a continuing-tort theory or a viable § 1985(3) conspiracy claim tied to the Thirteenth Amendment. The ruling rested on the principle that § 1983 claims sound in tort and that prescription begins when the injurious acts occur.
The case involved plaintiff Leonard Ross, as assignee of a subsequent purchaser of a construction project, suing the interim lender Continental Mortgage Investors (CMI) for lost profits due to cost overruns and fund diversions by the original borrower. CMI had assigned its loan interest to another entity before the purchase occurred, and the purchaser was aware of some issues but proceeded without investigating or relying on CMI. The court granted CMI's motion for summary judgment, holding that under Louisiana law an interim lender owes no duty to a subsequent purchaser absent a fiduciary relationship or assumption of project supervision, neither of which existed here. The decision emphasized that the parties had no contractual or fiduciary ties, and the plaintiff was an experienced real estate investor who failed to take basic protective measures.
This case involved a manufacturing company suing the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act for damages caused by the National Labor Relations Board's delay in enforcing a 1956 order to reinstate striking employees and pay back wages, which stemmed from a 1954 labor dispute. The plaintiff claimed the Board's inaction from 1956 to 1961 violated the Administrative Procedure Act's requirement for reasonable dispatch and impaired its defense while increasing the back pay amounts. The court ruled in favor of the defendant, holding that the agency's allocation of enforcement resources constituted a discretionary function exempt from liability under the FTCA's exceptions, even though the delay was inordinate and caused harm.
This case arose from a dispute between plaintiff Rex Cauble, who sought to acquire control of the First National Bank of Jefferson Parish through a cash tender offer for 150,000 shares at $41 per share, and the bank's president and management, who opposed the takeover. Both parties filed motions for preliminary injunctions, alleging violations of federal securities laws governing tender offers, including failures to disclose control intentions, misleading communications to shareholders, and improper market activities. The court denied both motions for injunctive relief, finding that each side had committed critical violations of the Securities Exchange Act and related regulations. To restore the parties to their pre-violation positions, the court ordered the plaintiff to file an amended offer disclosing his intent to obtain control and replace management, required the defendant to correct misleading valuation statements sent to shareholders, and permitted tendering shareholders to withdraw their shares after the corrections. The decision balanced equities to protect offerors, the target corporation, and shareholders alike under the applicable disclosure rules.
