Thomas J. Whelan

In Aguayo v. U.S. Bank, plaintiff Jose Aguayo sued the national bank after it repossessed his vehicle and sent a notice of sale that allegedly failed to meet the post-repossession disclosure requirements of California's Rees-Levering Automobile Sales Finance Act; he pursued the claim under the state's Unfair Competition Law. U.S. Bank moved to dismiss, arguing federal preemption. The court granted the motion to dismiss, holding that the National Bank Act and OCC regulation 12 C.F.R. § 7.4008(d) preempt state laws imposing disclosure requirements on national banks' lending activities, including repossession notices, because they impermissibly interfere with federally authorized powers. The court further ruled that preemption applies equally to loans originated by dealers and later assigned to the bank. The motion to strike was denied as moot.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case is a federal habeas corpus petition filed by Richard Gonzalez Samayoa challenging his 1988 California state convictions for two counts of first-degree murder with special circumstances and burglary, for which he received a death sentence. The petitioner sought an evidentiary hearing on multiple claims and summary judgment on some of them, asserting issues including ineffective assistance of counsel, prosecutorial misconduct, trial errors, and constitutional violations. The district court denied the motions for evidentiary hearing and summary judgment on the specified claims and denied the entire habeas petition, finding that the claims lacked merit under applicable legal standards and did not require further factual development. The ruling rested on review of the state court record, procedural history, and determination that the state court's prior denials were consistent with federal requirements.

criminal lawprocedure

This case concerns an appeal from a bankruptcy court's order in a Chapter 11 proceeding involving North Plaza, LLC, where the trustee sought documents and testimony from a real estate broker (Lei) and his company regarding communications with the appellants' (Dynamic Finance and Sabella) legal counsel during loan negotiations secured by the debtor's property. Appellants claimed the documents were protected by attorney-client privilege because Lei acted as a client representative, but after an evidentiary hearing the bankruptcy court rejected the privilege and compelled production. Appellants appealed the order and moved the district court for a stay pending appeal. The district court denied the stay, concluding that appellants had not shown a likelihood of success on the merits under federal common law governing the privilege, that the balance of harms and public interest favored proceeding with the broad discovery allowed under Bankruptcy Rule 2004, and that the bankruptcy court's ruling was not clearly erroneous.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved a petition by Unite Here, a labor union, to confirm an arbitration award against the Pala Band of Mission Indians regarding alleged unfair labor practices by the tribe's casino under the Model Tribal Labor Relations Ordinance (TLRO), which was adopted to satisfy conditions in the tribe's Gaming Compact with California pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act. The tribe moved to dismiss the petition. The court granted the motion and dismissed the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. It reasoned that the underlying dispute arose under the TLRO rather than federal law, so there was no federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and the parties' consent or limited waivers could not independently confer jurisdiction on the federal court.

labor & employmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves healthcare providers challenging the Secretary of Health and Human Services' implementation of a Medicare Part B competitive bidding demonstration project for clinical laboratory tests, specifically rules regarding bid submissions and exceptions for face-to-face providers. The court determined that it has jurisdiction over the claims and that the plaintiffs have standing, despite not exhausting administrative remedies. The reasoning is that requiring administrative exhaustion would result in no review at all because losing bidders cannot submit claims or appeal under the statute, and the plaintiffs suffered concrete injuries from the bidding requirements. Judicial review is not barred for challenges to the face-to-face exception rule.

healthcareprocedurefederal powerbusiness & regulatory

The case concerns allegations by the People of the State of California and the City of San Diego that Kinder Morgan's petroleum storage and distribution facility has leaked contaminants onto adjacent city-owned land and groundwater beneath Qualcomm Stadium, violating the City's Pueblo water rights and creating ongoing pollution since before 1992 despite state cleanup orders. Plaintiffs brought claims for nuisance, trespass, negligence, unfair business practices, health and safety violations, and declaratory relief. The district court granted in part and denied in part the defendants' motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) and motion to strike the prayer for attorneys' fees and punitive damages, applying the Twombly plausibility standard, construing allegations in plaintiffs' favor, and evaluating the sufficiency of each claim along with the availability of requested remedies.

environmentpropertytorts & liabilityprocedure

EchoStar sued Viewtech for designing, developing, and distributing FTA receivers and pirate software that enable consumers to unlawfully intercept and decrypt EchoStar's encrypted DISH Network satellite television signals without authorization or subscription. Viewtech moved to dismiss the complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), arguing lack of standing under the DMCA, inapplicability of the Communications Act to the alleged conduct, failure to state a private cause of action under the ECPA, and federal preemption of the state-law claims. The court granted the motion only as to Count II under 47 U.S.C. § 605(a), holding that the statute does not cover the satellite signals at issue, but denied dismissal of the remaining claims, finding they were sufficiently pled, that EchoStar had standing, and that the state claims were not preempted by copyright law because they concerned security-system breaches rather than protected works of authorship.

criminal lawbusiness & regulatoryprocedure

Veoh Networks filed a declaratory judgment action against UMG Recordings seeking a ruling that its video hosting service qualified for the DMCA Section 512(c) safe harbor and did not infringe UMG's copyrights. UMG moved to dismiss the complaint for lack of an Article III case or controversy, lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and abuse of the Declaratory Judgment Act, or alternatively to transfer venue. The court granted the motion to dismiss without prejudice, holding that the complaint failed to allege facts establishing an actual controversy because it was too vague and abstract, with no specific copyrights identified, rendering the requested relief an impermissible advisory opinion rather than resolution of a fixed dispute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

Plaintiffs, as assignees of their grandmother's rights under several Allstate insurance policies, sued the insurer for breach of contract, bad faith, negligent misrepresentation, and declaratory relief after Allstate refused to defend or indemnify her in an underlying tort action. That action alleged the grandmother's negligence and related claims arising from her husband's repeated sexual molestation of the plaintiffs during their childhood. Allstate moved to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court granted the motion, concluding that the policies covered only accidental occurrences and that child molestation is intentional conduct as a matter of California law, creating no potential for coverage and thus no duty to defend. The contract and bad-faith claims were dismissed with prejudice, while the negligent-misrepresentation claim was dismissed with leave to amend for failure to meet the particularity requirements of Rule 9(b).

business & regulatorytorts & liabilityprocedure

In Chong v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, the plaintiff alleged that her auto insurer improperly sought full reimbursement of $5,000 in medical payments from her settlement with a third-party tortfeasor, claiming that after deducting attorney fees and costs her net recovery left her uncompensated in violation of California’s common-law make-whole rule; she brought unfair business practices and common-law claims on behalf of a putative class of policyholders. The insurer moved to dismiss for failure to state a claim and alternatively to strike the class allegations, arguing that California does not follow a blanket make-whole rule, that no precedent treats attorney fees as preventing the insured from being made whole, and that the policy language overrides any default rule. The court denied both motions, holding that the complaint adequately pleaded a cognizable legal theory under an interpretation of the make-whole doctrine that may consider attorney fees, that the reimbursement provision does not clearly displace the rule, and that individualized inquiries and class-certification issues could not be resolved on the pleadings.

business & regulatoryproceduretorts & liability

In Silvas v. ETrade Mortgage Corp., plaintiffs filed a putative class action alleging that E*TRADE's policy of not refunding a $400 mortgage lock-in fee after borrowers canceled the transaction within the three-day rescission period under the Truth in Lending Act (TILA), along with related website disclosures, violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL) by constituting false advertising and an unlawful practice. Defendant moved to dismiss on grounds of federal preemption. The court granted the motion and dismissed the action with prejudice, concluding that the Home Owners' Loan Act (HOLA) and Office of Thrift Supervision regulations occupy the field of federal thrift regulation and preempt the UCL claims, which sought to regulate a federal thrift's lending activities. The court further held that TILA's savings clause does not override HOLA preemption.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involves an employment dispute in which plaintiff Yvonne Reid, a pharmaceutical sales representative, sued her employer GSK after being terminated shortly following her return from maternity leave. Reid had declined to attend a required two-week training session in another city due to her infant's care needs and was fired for job abandonment despite GSK's offers of accommodations. The court denied Reid's motion for summary judgment and granted in part and denied in part GSK's motion, ruling that her request did not qualify as protected leave under the FMLA or CFRA because those statutes do not permit reduced-schedule leave for the birth of a child and that the termination was not an unlawful interference with her prior protected leave. The court allowed certain remaining claims, including aspects of her discrimination and punitive damages allegations, to proceed to trial.

labor & employmentcivil rights

The case involved a lawsuit by Dawn Marie Anderson against Credit Collection Services under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), alleging that a debt collection letter was deceptive because it quoted a federal statute mentioning legal remedies and included a Western Union logo that implied urgency. The court considered the defendant's motion to dismiss and the plaintiff's cross-motion for summary judgment. The court granted the motion to dismiss, finding that the letter's language did not falsely represent the debt's status or threaten legal action in a way that would mislead the least sophisticated debtor, and that the logo did not simulate a telegram or create a false sense of urgency. Consequently, the plaintiff's cross-motion was denied as moot.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case concerned a state prisoner's federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his first-degree murder conviction and life sentence without parole. Petitioner raised two claims: one regarding the exclusion of expert testimony (Claim One) and another alleging that incriminating statements were admitted in violation of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments (Claim Two). The court adopted the magistrate judge's report and recommendation, denying the motion to dismiss Claim One for lack of exhaustion but granting dismissal of Claim Two as procedurally barred. The core reasoning was that the California Supreme Court's denial citing In re Dixon (1953) rested on an independent and adequate state procedural ground (failure to raise the claim on direct appeal), triggering the procedural default doctrine, and the petitioner failed to demonstrate cause and prejudice or actual innocence to overcome the bar.

criminal lawprocedurefederal power

This case involved a dispute over whether an errors and omissions insurance policy covered defense costs for an arbitration proceeding initiated before the policy's effective date. The plaintiff sought partial summary judgment declaring that the defendant insurer was obligated to provide coverage, arguing that the policy's "pending litigation" exclusion did not apply to arbitration. The court granted the motion, holding that under California law, the term "litigation" does not include arbitration, as distinguished by Supreme Court precedent, and thus the exclusion was inapplicable; however, coverage was limited to amounts exceeding the $25,000 self-insured retention.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case is a malicious prosecution action brought by Hydranautics against FilmTec after the Federal Circuit reversed a prior patent infringement judgment in FilmTec's favor regarding U.S. Patent No. '344 for a reverse osmosis membrane. The court considered Hydranautics' motion for partial summary judgment on whether FilmTec (and its parent Dow) knew or should have known that inventor John Cadotte's assignment of rights to FilmTec was invalid and that title to the patent actually belonged to the United States due to Cadotte's work under a government contract at MRI. The court granted the motion, finding no genuine dispute that Dow had examined relevant lab notebooks and other evidence by mid-1989 establishing the government's ownership and the invalid assignment, well before authorizing the 1990 infringement suit. The decision rests on the Federal Circuit's prior legal conclusions about the invention's conception date and ownership, along with undisputed facts about corporate knowledge imputed from officers and employees.

business & regulatorypropertyproceduretorts & liability

In this admiralty case, plaintiff Lenn Gagne sued Zodiac Maritime Agencies alleging that the wake from its vessel, the Santa Cruz, damaged his sailing vessel Ingomar and injured him during a 2000 voyage. The plaintiff had previously settled a separate lawsuit against the operator of another nearby ship, the APL Korea, for $50,000 arising from the same incident. The court granted the defendant's motion for summary judgment on the basis of judicial estoppel, finding that the plaintiff's own deposition testimony established that the APL Korea was the vessel that passed close by and caused the damage, creating an irreconcilable inconsistency with his current claim.

proceduretorts & liability

This case involves the United States seeking civil forfeiture of a residential property in Paradise Valley, Arizona, under 18 U.S.C. § 981, alleging it was purchased with proceeds from mail and wire fraud or traceable to money laundering. Claimant Tommy Thompson, who purchased the property at a nonjudicial foreclosure sale after the government recorded a lis pendens, moved for summary judgment on the ground that the foreclosure extinguished any federal interest. The court denied the motion, explaining that CAFRA requires a claimant to prove innocent-owner status by showing a bona fide purchase for value without notice of forfeiture, a burden Thompson did not meet given the recorded notice and factual questions about his knowledge.

criminal lawproperty

This case involved a plaintiff who sued a bank in state court asserting claims including defamation and violations of federal consumer protection statutes. After the defendant filed an answer and cross-complaint in state court, it attempted to remove the action to federal court. The district court remanded the case to state superior court, concluding that the defendant had waived its right to remove. The court reasoned that filing a cross-complaint manifesting an intent to litigate in state court, rather than solely to preserve the status quo, constitutes a clear and unequivocal waiver of removal rights under 28 U.S.C. § 1447.

procedure

In this case, two Clinical Laboratory Scientists employed by UCSD Medical Center, one Asian female and one African-American female, alleged that the defendant failed to promote them due to discrimination and brought claims under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 1981, contract theories, and state torts including intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, along with a constructive termination claim. The court ruled on the defendant's motion to dismiss several of these claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). It dismissed the § 1981 claim as barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity, dismissed the contract claims as a matter of law or by non-opposition, and dismissed the negligent infliction claim because employment decisions are inherently intentional rather than negligent, but allowed the intentional infliction claim to proceed as adequately pled under federal standards.

civil rightslabor & employmentproceduretorts & liability