Veronica DiCarlo Wicker

The case was an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision granting creditors an extension of time to object to both the debtor's discharge under 11 U.S.C. § 727 and the dischargeability of specific debts under 11 U.S.C. § 523. The debtor, who had filed for Chapter 7 protection, argued that the creditors' motion only referenced discharge (not dischargeability), that they had enough information by the original August 5, 1991 deadline, and that the extension was unwarranted. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy judge's ruling, finding that the creditors established cause due to the debtor's incomplete production of records and that the debtor suffered no prejudice from the motion's wording, making the extension applicable to both discharge and dischargeability issues.

procedurebusiness & regulatory

This case concerns a dispute over pension death benefits under the New Orleans Electrical Pension Plan governed by ERISA and the Retirement Equity Act of 1984, pitting the deceased participant's estate against his surviving spouse. The spouse had pleaded guilty to manslaughter in the participant's death and had been declared an unworthy heir by a state probate court, with benefits directed to the estate. The court ruled in favor of the estate, holding that the spouse was not entitled to the qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity despite ERISA's spousal protections. The reasoning centered on the interplay between federal pension rules, state succession law disqualifying the spouse for her crime, the lack of evidence that the participant would have elected coverage, and ERISA provisions allowing waiver or non-application of spousal consent in cases of legal separation or abandonment.

criminal lawlabor & employmentfederal power

This case involves the FDIC, as successor to the FSLIC receiver for an insolvent savings bank, suing the bank's former auditors and their insurer on claims of breach of contract, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence arising from audits performed from 1981 to 1985. The defendants moved for summary judgment on the ground that all claims had prescribed. The court denied the motions, holding that the contract and fiduciary-duty allegations merely restated standard professional duties of care and therefore sounded in tort, subject to the shorter prescriptive period, but that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to when the bank knew or should have known of the alleged malpractice, precluding summary judgment on timeliness.

proceduretorts & liability

The case involved Mortgage Market, Inc. (MMI), which purchased a $250,000 certificate of deposit from Bankers Trust, a national bank that was later declared insolvent by the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, with the FDIC appointed as receiver and paying only the insured $100,000 portion. MMI sued former outside directors Hardesty, et al., along with the FDIC, alleging a constructive trust, breach of fiduciary duty, and violation of a Louisiana statute (La.Rev.Stat. § 6:419) that barred bank officers from accepting uninsured deposits after learning of insolvency. The court granted the directors' motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. It held that federal law preempts the state statute and related fiduciary claims because they intrude on the OCC's exclusive authority over national bank insolvency and operations. The court also found that the directors owed no duty to depositors under Louisiana law absent a specific agreement.

business & regulatoryfederal power

This case involved a dispute over whether the beneficiary of an accidental death and dismemberment insurance policy could recover $150,000 after the insured died from autoerotic asphyxiation at his home. The insurer denied the claim, citing policy language that limited coverage to accidental bodily injury independent of other causes and excluded losses from intentionally self-inflicted injury. The court granted summary judgment to the insurer and denied the beneficiary's motion. It reasoned that even assuming the death was accidental, the insured's intentional act of restricting oxygen to his brain via the elaborate pulley system qualified as an intentionally self-inflicted injury that directly led to the loss, making the exclusion applicable and barring recovery.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a civil lawsuit by vessel owners Lan Huong Thi Nguyen and Tricia Vu seeking damages after U.S. Coast Guard officers seized two commercial fishing boats in Louisiana upon discovering small amounts of marijuana aboard, leading to administrative fines and the vessels' return. The plaintiffs alleged improper seizures and damage to the vessels, despite having signed hold harmless agreements and condition forms. The court granted in part the motion to dismiss by federal defendants, dismissing claims against several high-level officials including Meese, Thornburgh, Von Raab, Elkins, and Fox for lack of personal jurisdiction due to insufficient minimum contacts with Louisiana, while denying dismissal as to other federal officers and rejecting the motion by local sheriff defendants. Core reasoning centered on due process requirements for personal jurisdiction over non-resident officials, the inapplicability of nationwide service statutes to individual-capacity suits, and the need to evaluate qualified immunity and FTCA exceptions for remaining claims.

criminal lawfederal powerproceduretorts & liability

In this case, a deckhand employed by Co-Mar Offshore Marine Corporation sued multiple parties, including Marathon Oil Company, after being injured by equipment operated by another subcontractor during operations involving a vessel chartered to Marathon. After the plaintiff dismissed Marathon, Marathon sought summary judgment against Co-Mar and its insurer Angelina Casualty for the costs of defending the suit, based on an indemnity provision in their Blanket Boat Time Charter. The court granted summary judgment for defense costs, holding that the charter was a maritime contract requiring Co-Mar to defend Marathon for claims connected to vessel operations and loading activities, and that Louisiana's Oilfield Indemnity Act did not apply. The court denied Marathon's request for penalties and attorney's fees under Louisiana insurance law, finding that a conflict of interest meant the insurers' refusal to defend was not arbitrary or capricious.

proceduretorts & liabilitybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a claim by vessel owners and a mortgagee for proceeds under a named-perils marine hull insurance policy after two crewboats disappeared from their moorings in Louisiana waters in 1986. The insurer, La Reunion, brought a third-party action against the surplus-lines broker Continental for indemnification. After trial, the court granted Continental's motion for involuntary dismissal, finding that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proving the loss resulted from any covered peril such as assailing thieves or perils of the seas, as there was no evidence the vessels sank or were stolen by force. The court also rejected coverage under any breach-of-warranty endorsement because no additional premium had been paid and the endorsement was never effectively issued.

business & regulatoryproperty

This case involved a lawsuit by Natural Gas Pipeline Co. and others to recover for damage to an offshore pipeline caused by the anchor of the vessel M/V MR. OFFSHORE. The plaintiffs settled with the vessel owners and operators for $2,570,000 and then pursued claims against Odom Offshore Surveys, Inc., which had been hired to survey the pipeline and guide anchor placements, alleging that Odom negligently positioned an anchor too close to the pipeline on November 21, 1981. After a bench trial, the court found Odom liable for the damage on the grounds that the misplaced anchor proximately caused the harm and constituted negligence. However, the court also held that Odom's insurance policy excluded coverage because the incident arose from Odom's rendering of professional services, leaving Odom responsible for the full amount plus prejudgment interest.

torts & liabilitypropertybusiness & regulatory

This case involved a taxpayer who received $600,000 in commissions from illegal marijuana importation activities in 1978 and 1979 that he did not report as income on his original returns. After an IRS audit led to assessments of additional taxes and fraud penalties totaling over $300,000 (which the taxpayer paid), he filed a refund suit arguing that the income should not be taxable because the proceeds were forfeited to the government under a plea agreement and counter letter. The court granted summary judgment to the United States and denied the taxpayer's motion. It held that gains from illegal activities constitute taxable income under the Internal Revenue Code, and although the forfeiture could qualify as a loss under section 165, any deduction is disallowed under section 280E and public policy because it would frustrate the sharply defined national policy against drug trafficking.

taxescriminal law

This case involved a trademark infringement lawsuit filed by Barq’s Inc. (Biloxi), a Mississippi soft drink manufacturer, against Barq’s Beverages entities operating only in Louisiana. The defendants asserted antitrust defenses and a counterclaim alleging that the plaintiff sought to monopolize or attempt to monopolize the soft drink industry by sending threatening letters and filing sham lawsuits, despite a 1934 agreement granting concurrent ownership of trademarks in Louisiana. The court granted the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment dismissing the antitrust defenses and counterclaim. It reasoned that the Noerr-Pennington doctrine immunizes bona fide litigation and petitioning from antitrust liability, and that the plaintiff held zero percent of the relevant market in Louisiana and less than one percent nationally, making monopolization or attempted monopolization impossible as a matter of law under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.

business & regulatory

In Hope v. United States, plaintiffs who participated in a Tidewater stock option plan sought refunds of 1981 federal income taxes after the IRS denied incentive stock option (ISO) treatment under the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981. The plan had been amended in 1980 to allow exercise with previously acquired stock, and Tidewater later elected to convert it to an ISO plan; Treasury regulations treated the amendment as a modification under IRC §425(h) that reset the grant date and required repricing to qualify for favorable capital gains treatment. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs, holding that Temporary Treasury Regulation §14a.422A-1 and the related proposed regulations did not properly interpret ERTA §251 and §425(h). The core reasoning was that the regulations erroneously classified the pre-August 1981 amendment as a disqualifying modification that prevented ISO eligibility without statutory support for that result.

taxesbusiness & regulatory

The case involved a horse owner suing a veterinarian, his employer, and insurer for damages after his thoroughbred racehorse died following intravenous administration of the drug Myosel-E mixed with lactated ringers to treat anhidrosis. After a bench trial, the court made findings of fact that the horse suffered a fatal anaphylactoid reaction likely due to sensitivity to Vitamin E in the solution, that the trainer had not requested treatment for myositis or myositis syndrome, and that the package insert recommended the drug only for myositis syndrome prevention though experts indicated it could also be used for simple myositis. The court evaluated the two negligence claims—administering the drug when not indicated for the horse's condition and failing to warn of the potential fatal reaction—based on expert testimony, witness accounts of the horse's symptoms, and medical evidence regarding proper use and risks.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved a worker injured on a Chevron fixed platform on the Outer Continental Shelf who sued Chevron for damages; Chevron then sought contractual indemnification and defense costs from the worker's employer Dickson Welding and its insurer under a master service agreement and a later service contract. Dickson and the insurer moved for summary judgment, arguing that the Louisiana Oilfield Indemnity Act rendered the indemnity provisions unenforceable to the extent they required indemnification for Chevron's own negligence or fault. The court granted the motion in part, holding that the Act voids any agreement requiring defense or indemnity for the indemnitee's sole or concurrent negligence, that paragraph (a) of the contracts applied to the employee's injury claim but did not clearly extend to Chevron's own fault, and that Chevron therefore could not recover indemnity or defense costs attributable to its own negligence or fault.

business & regulatorytorts & liability

The case involved Cox Cable New Orleans seeking a declaratory judgment that federal law preempted local regulation, allowing it to retier its basic cable service package and adjust rates without City Council approval under its franchise agreement with New Orleans. The court determined it had federal question jurisdiction but ruled that federal preemption did not apply to retiering of basic service, requiring Cox to obtain city approval for such changes. Consequently, the court denied Cox's summary judgment motion, remanded related state claims to state court, and dismissed remaining federal claims without prejudice.

business & regulatoryfederal power

The case involved ACORN, a nonprofit organization, challenging the City of New Orleans' ordinance (§ 38-182) that prohibited standing in roadways or on neutral grounds to solicit funds, which ACORN used in its "tagging" method of approaching drivers at traffic lights for contributions and information. The court decided that the ordinance was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and permanently enjoined its enforcement by the city and police. The core reasoning was that streets and public areas are traditional public forums where protected expressive activity, including solicitation of funds, cannot be broadly restricted without narrow tailoring to significant government interests like traffic safety, and the blanket ban failed that standard as it was not the least restrictive means and had been selectively enforced.

free speechcivil rights

This case concerned motions by defendants Jeffrey Thomas Strmel and Gregory Kirk Bell to suppress evidence of marijuana found in a trailer after their 1983 arrest for possession with intent to distribute. The defendants argued that Customs agents violated their Fourth Amendment rights by searching the trailer arriving from Venezuela, installing electronic beepers without a warrant, and conducting later searches of the trailer and tractor. The court denied the motions, concluding that the initial searches and beeper installations were lawful under border or extended border search doctrines and that any evidence from the post-arrest search would have been admissible regardless due to the lawful arrest. The ruling rested on findings that the defendants lacked standing in some respects and that the government actions did not require warrants given the international shipment context and surveillance leading to the stop.

criminal lawprocedure

The case involved multiple railroad companies and Amtrak challenging a St. Charles Parish ordinance that capped train speeds at 25 mph, arguing it provided no safety benefit while unconstitutionally burdening interstate commerce under the Commerce Clause. After the parish repealed the ordinance during trial, the court rejected the defendant's mootness claim, finding the issue capable of repetition. The court ruled for the plaintiffs, declaring the ordinance void and permanently enjoining its enforcement, based on findings that it regulated evenhandedly but imposed excessive burdens on interstate rail traffic relative to minimal local safety gains, per the balancing test in Pike v. Bruce Church.

business & regulatoryfederal power

In Martin v. Louisiana Power & Light Co., the plaintiff, after becoming heavily intoxicated at a lounge, climbed a utility pole on a bet and suffered severe electrical burns that resulted in the loss of his right arm and leg below the joints. He sued the power company under Louisiana Civil Code articles 2317 (strict liability) and 2315 (negligence) for failing to make the pole inaccessible. The district court granted the defendant’s motion for summary judgment. It held that utilities are subject only to a negligence standard, that contributory negligence is measured by an objective reasonable-person test even for an intoxicated alcoholic, and that the pole’s step height did not constitute a cause-in-fact of the accident or fall within any duty to protect the plaintiff from his own voluntary conduct.

torts & liabilityprocedure

The case involved Clifford Favrot seeking a tax refund for legal expenses incurred in attempting to enforce a prenuptial agreement to recover past alimony payments and terminate future obligations after his divorce. The court denied Favrot's motion for summary judgment and granted the United States' motion, ruling that the expenses were not deductible. The reasoning centered on the "origin of the claim" test, determining that the claims arose from the marital relationship and thus constituted nondeductible personal expenses under Section 262, rather than expenses for the production of income under Section 212(1).

taxesfamily law