
Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc. (In Re Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc.)
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-08-23 · cited 23×
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision involving creditor Ford Motor Credit Company (FMCC) and debtor Ken Gardner Ford Sales, Inc., which filed for bankruptcy in 1980. The issues concerned whether FMCC's perfected security interest in the debtor's inventory under a floor plan financing agreement was limited to $1,250,000 due to failure to pay the full Tennessee UCC filing tax, and whether the trustee could recover $211,067.09 in payments reducing the debt in the 90 days before bankruptcy as voidable preferences. The court held that under Tennessee law, as clarified in American City Bank v. Western Auto Supply, the security interest was effective only to the extent of the tax paid, so FMCC was secured only up to $1,250,000 even after later paying additional taxes and penalties. It further held that the pre-bankruptcy reductions were avoidable preferences because they did not qualify for any of the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 547(c), as the debt was incurred when the initial obligation arose and other exceptions like new value or purchase money were inapplicable due to the limited perfection. The bankruptcy court's decision was affirmed.
business & regulatorytaxespropertyprocedure
Fugunt v. Tennessee Valley Authority
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-08-17 · cited 7×
This case is a personal injury lawsuit brought by Ted Fugunt, an employee of subcontractor Johns-Manville, against the Tennessee Valley Authority for injuries sustained while working at TVA's Sequoyah Nuclear Plant. Fugunt had already received workers' compensation benefits from his direct employer and sought additional tort recovery from TVA. The court granted TVA's motion for summary judgment, holding that TVA qualified as a principal contractor under Tennessee workers' compensation statutes (TCA §§ 50-908 and 50-915). The reasoning centered on TVA's role in overseeing the overall project, contracting directly with subcontractors, and performing functions equivalent to those of a general contractor, which entitled it to statutory immunity from common-law tort claims. Tennessee precedent and the policy of the workers' compensation law supported treating TVA as immune once it assumed liability for compensation benefits.
labor & employmenttorts & liability
Hospital Affiliates International, Inc. v. Schweiker
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-07-30 · cited 12×
This case under the Medicare Act concerns a provider, Hospital Affiliates International (HAI), that sought reimbursement for a claimed capital loss on the 1975 sale of a hospital building and equipment to a newly formed nonprofit, Downtown Hospital Association (DHA), asserting the loss resulted from prior inadequate depreciation and was allowable under 42 CFR § 405.415. The fiscal intermediary and Secretary denied the claim, and the Provider Reimbursement Review Board upheld the denial after finding the transaction involved related parties through HAI's continuing management role. On cross-motions for summary judgment and affirmance, the district court denied HAI's motion and upheld the Secretary's decision. The court reasoned that the administrative findings were supported by substantial evidence, the PRRB adequately explained its conclusions, and the hearing procedures satisfied due process despite limits on cross-examination of an intermediary witness.
healthcarebusiness & regulatoryprocedure
Securities & Exchange Commission v. Youmans
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-07-23 · cited 3×
This case was an SEC enforcement action against former officers of a bank holding company seeking a permanent injunction against future violations of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. The SEC alleged that the defendants had failed to disclose material facts in SEC filings and proxy materials concerning risky mortgage loans, the company's financial condition, and related transactions that contributed to the insolvency of its main banking subsidiary. After a bench trial, the court found that defendants Holliday and Chepul had recklessly omitted required disclosures in proxy materials in violation of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act. The court declined to enjoin Holliday, concluding there was no likelihood of future violations given his new position, but issued an injunction against Chepul because his current role presented substantially similar opportunities for violations.
business & regulatory
Harris v. Fort Oglethorpe State Bank
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-07-23 · cited 5×
The case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in the Chapter 13 proceeding of debtors Darrell and Pamela Harris, who listed a cosigned loan from Fort Oglethorpe State Bank. The bankruptcy court denied the bank's request to lift the automatic stay against collection from the cosigner and imposed a $60 filing fee by treating the request as an adversary proceeding. The district court affirmed the denial of relief, holding that the exceptions in 11 U.S.C. § 1301(c) for plans that do not pay the claim or cause irreparable harm do not apply when the approved plan provides for full payment plus interest, as the legislative history shows the stay requires creditors to wait for payments under the plan while protecting their substantive rights. The court reversed the filing fee, concluding that a request for relief from the comaker stay may proceed by motion under Bankruptcy Rule 914 rather than requiring a formal adversary proceeding.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Matter of Parker
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-06-10 · cited 31×
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court's confirmation of the debtors' Chapter 13 repayment plan over objections by creditor Credithrift. The creditor argued that the debtors' attorney was required to file a proof of claim to receive payment, that attorney fees had priority only over other unsecured claims and must be paid over the life of the plan, that the plan's language regarding fees was misconstrued, and that the plan was too vague. The court held that an attorney need only file a request for payment of administrative expenses under 11 U.S.C. § 503 rather than a proof of claim, that such fees may be paid before or concurrently with other claims as long as payments begin no later than the first distribution to creditors, and that the plan provided sufficient detail without excessive specificity. The decision affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling on all points based on the relevant provisions of the Bankruptcy Code governing administrative expenses and plan administration.
business & regulatoryprocedure
Ocoee River Council v. Tennessee Valley Authority
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-06-03 · cited 2×
The case involved environmental and recreational groups suing the Tennessee Valley Authority to enjoin repairs to the Ocoee No. 2 hydroelectric project, which had been shut down due to safety issues and now supported whitewater activities on the river, alleging violations of the National Environmental Policy Act, the Clean Water Act, and related statutes. The court granted TVA's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the lawsuit. It held that the final environmental impact statement adequately considered alternatives, including project retirement, and that TVA's decision to repair the dam and flume while providing limited recreational water releases was supported by analysis of costs, benefits, power output, and environmental effects. The court reasoned that NEPA imposes procedural requirements that TVA had followed, without dictating substantive outcomes, and that judicial review does not permit substituting the court's judgment for the agency's reasonable decision-making.
environmentfederal powerbusiness & regulatory
Pine v. Credithrift of America, Inc.
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-03-22 · cited 9×
The case involved Tennessee debtors who sought to avoid Credithrift's $2,112 nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in their household goods through a bankruptcy proceeding. The Bankruptcy Court granted avoidance of the lien under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), and the District Court affirmed that ruling on appeal. The court held that although Tennessee opted out of federal exemptions and limited its own exemption under TCA § 26-2-102 to the debtor's equity interest, section 522(f) operates independently to permit avoidance of qualifying liens on household furnishings that would otherwise impair an exemption, regardless of state-law mechanics. This interpretation aligns with congressional intent to protect debtors from lenders using low-value collateral as leverage to compel reaffirmation of discharged debts. The District Court rejected arguments that section 522(f) applies only to post-petition liens or requires existing equity.
propertyfederal powerprocedure
Giles v. Credithrift of America, Inc. (In Re Giles)
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-03-22 · cited 6×
The case involved debtors in bankruptcy seeking to avoid Credithrift's nonpossessory, nonpurchase-money security interest in their household goods, furnishings, and appliances. The bankruptcy court ruled that the lien could be avoided under 11 U.S.C. § 522(f), and the district court affirmed on appeal. The court held that the provision applies to pre-existing liens to allow a fresh start and prevent lender leverage through repossession threats, that debtors retain a sufficient interest in the property for exemption purposes even when subject to a security interest, and that Georgia's opt-out exemption statute permits lien avoidance beyond mere equity interests.
propertyprocedure
Ray v. Security Mutual Finance Corp. (In Re Arnett)
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-01-22 · cited 18×
This case concerns a bankruptcy trustee's attempt to avoid a creditor's security interest in a debtor's automobile as a preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy Code. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's decision that the transfer was not avoidable. The core reasoning was that under 11 U.S.C. § 547(c)(1), the transaction qualified for the exception for a contemporaneous exchange for new value, as the parties intended it to be contemporaneous and it was in fact substantially contemporaneous despite a 33-day delay in perfection; the court treated the 10-day period in § 547(e)(2) as a safe harbor but held that longer delays could still qualify if factually explained by external factors like mail and third-party bank processing without risk of fraud.
procedurepropertybusiness & regulatory
Chadwick v. Pillard
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-01-18 · cited 3×
This case involves a former union member suing his local and international unions after being expelled for protesting certain union dues and circulating a handbill about his protest, claiming the expulsion violated his rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act (specifically Section 101(a)(4)) to freely express views on union matters. The defendants moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing the plaintiff had not exhausted internal union remedies. The court denied the motion, finding that the plaintiff had pursued internal procedures for over four months and that further exhaustion would be futile, as permitted by the statute and Sixth Circuit precedent allowing judicial discretion when remedies are inadequate.
labor & employmentprocedurefree speech
United States v. Hill
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1982-01-12 · cited 9×
This case involved the United States seeking to recover civil penalties from defendants Charles Hill and Ceamon Hill, doing business as Hill Construction Company, for violations of the Surface Mining Control and Reclamation Act of 1977, including nine violations noted in a 1979 Notice of Violation and one in a Cessation Order for mining outside the permitted area, as well as two more in a 1980 notice. The court granted the government's motion for summary judgment, awarding $21,660 in penalties, after finding that the defendants had not pursued available administrative reviews, making the penalty assessments final. The defendants' arguments that the penalties and orders violated due process or constituted a taking under the Fifth Amendment were rejected, as the Act provides for hearings and the cessation was temporary, with no administrative relief sought by the defendants.
environmentbusiness & regulatoryfederal power
Chattanooga Corp. v. Klingler
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-12-03 · cited 6×
The case involved a Tennessee corporation that purchased assets, including patents, from a dissolved California corporation and its shareholders, with part of the purchase price paid as royalties; the buyer sought a declaratory judgment that it owed no further royalties because its products did not fall within the patent claims. The defendants, most of whom were California residents, moved to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction or to transfer venue, while the plaintiff sought to enjoin related arbitration proceedings in California. The court determined that it lacked personal jurisdiction over five of the six defendants under the Tennessee long-arm statute and due process requirements, that the underlying dispute arose from a contract governed by California law with an arbitration clause, and that venue would be improper if treated as a patent case. Considering these factors along with the superiority of California as a forum and the parties' arbitration agreement, the court dismissed the action as a matter of discretion.
procedurebusiness & regulatory
Griffin v. Rose
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-10-02 · cited 3×
This case is a federal habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 filed by Charles Frank Griffin, who was convicted in Tennessee state court of armed robbery and sentenced to life imprisonment. The petitioner raised four claims: an illegal search and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment, denial of the right to counsel before a lineup in violation of the Sixth Amendment, admission of an unduly suggestive lineup identification, and admission of a coerced confession. The court granted the respondents' motion for summary judgment and dismissed the petition, holding that the Fourth Amendment claim was barred under Stone v. Powell because the state courts had provided a full and fair opportunity to litigate it, and finding that newly offered evidence did not establish a due process violation or meet the requirements for relief on the other grounds. The decision rested on the state court record showing probable cause for an investigatory stop under Terry v. Ohio, proper lineup procedures, and exhaustion of state remedies.
criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure
Lorain Division, Koehring Co. v. Walldorff
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-09-17
This case involved a company seeking a preliminary injunction to compel the Acting Director of an NLRB region to hold a decertification election among its employees represented by the United Steel Workers union, after the NLRB canceled a stipulated election and dismissed the company's subsequent petitions. The court considered the defendant's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction or failure to state a claim, taking the plaintiff's allegations as true. The court set aside a prior temporary injunction, reasoning that the NLRB has discretion under its established 'blocking charge' policy to dismiss employer petitions for decertification elections while unfair labor practice charges are pending, a policy upheld in prior cases, making it unlikely the plaintiff could establish jurisdiction under precedents like Leedom v. Kyne. The plaintiff was given time to respond before potential dismissal.
labor & employmentfederal power
Ray v. Dawson
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-09-04 · cited 17×
This case is an appeal from a bankruptcy court decision in an adversary proceeding where the trustee sought to sell two parcels of real property owned by the debtor and his non-filing wife as tenants by the entirety under Section 363(h) of the Bankruptcy Code. The bankruptcy court ruled that the trustee could sell only the debtor's right of survivorship in the properties, not the parcels in fee simple, after the debtor claimed exemptions under Section 522(b)(2)(B). The district court affirmed this ruling. The core reasoning is that under Tennessee law, property held as tenants by the entirety is exempt from process by an individual spouse's creditors, so Section 522(b)(2)(B) removes the full interest from the bankruptcy estate, leaving only the survivorship right subject to sale.
propertyprocedure
Dove v. Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-07-21 · cited 4×
This case involved employees of the Chattanooga Area Regional Transportation Authority (CARTA), a publicly owned and operated metropolitan transit system, suing under the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) for overtime wages, with CARTA defending on grounds that the FLSA's overtime requirements were unconstitutional as applied to it. The court granted CARTA's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the suit. It held that operating the transit system constituted an integral governmental function under National League of Cities v. Usery, rendering it immune from the FLSA via the Tenth Amendment, because the system was a not-for-profit public service heavily reliant on government subsidies, performed a traditional local government role akin to parks and recreation, and federal regulation would directly displace local control over employment relationships without a demonstrably greater federal interest. The court distinguished contrary precedent and noted the shift of mass transit from private to predominantly public operation.
labor & employmentfederal power
Carborundum Co. v. Tennessee Valley Authority
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-04-30 · cited 4×
This case involved a dispute over an electric power supply contract between Carborundum Company and the Tennessee Valley Authority for a silicon carbide plant in Tennessee. Carborundum sought a declaratory judgment that the contract's minimum monthly service charge provision was unenforceable after the company ceased plant operations in 1979 due to rate increases, while TVA counterclaimed for payment of accrued minimum charges through the contract's 1980 expiration. The court granted TVA's motion for summary judgment, dismissed Carborundum's claims, and awarded TVA $1,095,037.05 plus any additional accrued amounts. The core reasoning was that the minimum bill provision formed an integral part of TVA's rate structure, which Congress authorized the agency to set and which courts cannot review for reasonableness, rather than constituting a penalty or liquidated damages clause; this followed the precedent in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Tennessee Valley Authority.
business & regulatoryfederal power
Hawkins Ex Rel. Hawkins v. D & J Press Co.
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-03-30 · cited 16×
This product liability case arose when plaintiff Dillard Hawkins suffered severe injuries, including leg amputations and brain damage, while operating an industrial briquette press manufactured by defendant D & J Press Co. at his Tennessee workplace in July 1979; the press had been first sold for use in 1966. The suit, filed in July 1980 in Tennessee state court and removed to federal court on diversity grounds, alleged the press was defective. Defendant moved for summary judgment, arguing the action was time-barred by the ten-year statute of limitations in the Tennessee Products Liability Act (TCA § 29-28-103), measured from the product's first purchase regardless of when the injury occurred. The court granted the motion, holding that the statutory limit applied to bar the claim, that it controlled over other potentially applicable periods such as workers' compensation rules, and that its application did not violate due process or Tennessee constitutional provisions on legislative procedure.
torts & liabilityprocedure
Byrd v. Harris
District Court, E.D. Tennessee · 1981-03-23 · cited 8×
This case involves an attorney seeking judicial review of the Social Security Administration's award of attorneys' fees for representing a claimant in a disability benefits case, where the fee was less than the contracted 25% contingency. The court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The reasoning is that under 42 U.S.C. § 406, when the Secretary awards benefits, only the Secretary can approve fees, and such awards are not subject to court review; additionally, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) does not provide jurisdiction because no hearing was held and the attorney is not a party, and no colorable constitutional claim was raised.
procedurefederal powerhealthcare