Dick Yin Wong

This case concerns an eminent domain proceeding by the County of Hawaii to acquire registered seashore land for a public beach park, focusing on the proper location of the seaward boundary after alleged erosion. The Hawaii Supreme Court held that the owners lost title to the portion of the lot seaward of the vegetation line due to erosion, applying the Ashford precedent to redefine the high-water mark and thereby reducing the compensation owed for the taking. The federal district court reviewed whether this ruling improperly altered the boundaries fixed by the original land court registration decree, which had used the seaweed line as the monument. The core reasoning centers on the conclusive effect of land court judgments, the distinction between registered and unregistered land, and the impact of changing the boundary marker on the owners' property rights.

property

The case involved a passenger who was denied boarding on a Northwest Airlines flight due to overbooking despite a confirmed reservation, leading to alternative arrangements and an arrival about 1 hour and 40 minutes later than scheduled; she sued for general and punitive damages alleging misrepresentation, emotional distress, and other harms. The court granted the airline's motion for summary judgment. It reasoned that there was no viable federal claim under 49 U.S.C. § 1374(b) due to lack of evidence of undue preference or discrimination, that denied boarding compensation rules did not support liability here, and that diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 was absent because the damages sought lacked a factual basis, were not claimed in good faith, and fell below the jurisdictional threshold.

business & regulatoryprocedure

This case involves a dispute over the installation of a union officer after an election in Local No. 745 of the United Brotherhood of Carpenters and Joiners of America. Plaintiffs claimed that defendants violated their rights under the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act by refusing to install the elected candidate, Kupau, based on a post-election eligibility determination by the union's General President. The court held that it had jurisdiction under Title I of the Act because the claims involved discriminatory post-election conduct rather than a challenge to the election itself. The court granted the plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction, ordering Kupau's installation, and denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, finding that plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits and would suffer irreparable harm without relief.

labor & employmentelectionscivil rights

In Wakinekona v. Olim, a Hawaii state prisoner serving life without parole sued after being transferred to Folsom State Prison in California following a program classification hearing, claiming the hearing committee was biased and that the process violated due process under the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments as well as state regulations and law. The district court initially ruled that state regulations created a protected liberty interest requiring impartial decisionmakers but reconsidered after First Circuit decisions in Lombardo v. Meachum and Four Unnamed Inmates. The court concluded that Hawaii statutes and regulations granted prison officials broad discretion over transfers without imposing standards that would create a liberty interest, so due process did not apply and the federal claims were dismissed under Rule 12(b)(6); the remaining state-law claims were also dismissed for lack of pendent jurisdiction.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Aluli v. Brown, plaintiffs sued to halt the U.S. Navy's live and inert ordnance bombing on Kahoolawe Island, Hawaii, claiming violations of the National Environmental Policy Act for failing to submit an updated environmental impact statement with funding requests and of Executive Order 11593 and related regulations for not adequately surveying, inventorying, or nominating historic and archaeological sites for the National Register of Historic Places. The district court granted partial summary judgment to plaintiffs on the historic preservation claim (Claim Nine) and ordered the Navy to comply with EO 11593 and 36 C.F.R. Part 800 by cooperating with state surveys, nominating qualifying sites without awaiting full-island completion, and referring the island for an eligibility determination; it also required submission of a revised EIS that quantifies all archaeological sites. The court rejected the Navy's arguments that the NHPA did not apply absent a prior Secretary of the Interior eligibility finding and that internal Navy instructions were unenforceable, reasoning that EO 11593 imposes affirmative duties on federal agencies to protect potential historic properties and that the Navy must request an eligibility opinion when sites appear to qualify. The court permitted continued bombing activities subject to these compliance obligations.

environmentfederal power

This case involves public school teachers in Hawaii who are not members of the teachers' union (HSTA) and who sued to challenge the constitutionality of mandatory service fees deducted from their wages under HRS § 89-4 and paid to the union, alleging that portions of the fees were used for political purposes unrelated to collective bargaining in violation of their First, Ninth, Tenth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights as well as state constitutional provisions. The plaintiffs sought damages, declaratory relief, and an accounting, framing the claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985(3), and 1986. The court held that it had subject matter jurisdiction over the federal claims and pendent jurisdiction over the state claims, but dismissed the § 1985(3) claim because the complaint failed to allege any conspiracy among the defendants. Relying on the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Abood v. Detroit Board of Education, the court recognized that service fees are permissible for bargaining-related activities but not for political expenditures without affirmative consent, yet it concluded that abstention under the Pullman doctrine was appropriate due to ambiguities in the state statute that could be clarified by Hawaii courts and that would potentially resolve or narrow the federal constitutional questions.

labor & employmentcivil rightsfree speechfederal power

The case involved four consolidated forfeiture actions in which the government seized 15 pinball machines owned by National Amusement, Inc., after the $250-per-machine special tax required by 26 U.S.C. § 4461(a)(2) went unpaid, rendering continued operation of the machines illegal under 26 U.S.C. § 4901(a). The court held that the machines were forfeitable under 26 U.S.C. § 7302 as property used in violation of the Internal Revenue Code. It reasoned that the machines constituted an essential element of the illegal activity because no violation could occur without them, and it rejected the owner's arguments that the machines were not instrumentalities of the crime, that the owner was innocent, or that forfeiture violated due process.

criminal lawtaxesfederal powerprocedure

This case involved a challenge by Hawaii welfare recipients and the state Department of Social Services and Housing to a USDA letter requiring that one-time rental security deposits paid by the state be counted as income when determining food stamp eligibility and benefit amounts under the federal Food Stamp Act. The plaintiffs argued the letter violated the Administrative Procedure Act and Freedom of Information Act by not being published in the Federal Register and conflicted with regulations treating such payments as nonrecurring lump-sum exclusions from income. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiff class of recipients, dismissed the state agency for lack of standing, held the letter invalid as an unpublished interpretation of general applicability, and ruled that the deposits do not qualify as income because they are excluded under the governing rules and do not increase food purchasing power in the relevant sense. It ordered the letter's non-enforcement, restoration of lost benefits, and notice to affected households.

federal powerprocedurebusiness & regulatory

The case involved five U.S. citizens employed on Kwajalein in the Trust Territory of the Pacific Islands who alleged that searches of their residence and persons, arrests, detention without counsel or phone access, and coerced job termination following discovery of marijuana violated their constitutional rights under the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, along with claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The court held that § 1983 did not apply because the Trust Territory is not a state or territory, but federal question jurisdiction existed under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and constitutional protections extended to U.S. citizens there under the Trusteeship Agreement and related authorities. It granted dismissal of claims for injunctive relief under § 1983 but denied dismissal of damages claims, reasoning that federal agents' alleged conduct could support a Bivens action for constitutional violations without official immunity protection.

civil rightscriminal lawfederal power

This case involved a Hawaii state prisoner who challenged his transfer to a mainland facility following a program classification hearing conducted by the same individuals who had presided over an earlier related hearing. The court examined whether the process complied with state corrections regulations requiring an impartial Program Committee for decisions involving grievous loss to inmates. Drawing on Wolff v. McDonnell, the court found that the state's rules created a liberty interest in a fair hearing that is protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. It held that the hearing violated due process and ordered a new hearing before an impartial board, while denying damages and granting the plaintiff's motion to amend.

criminal lawcivil rightsprocedure

In Pascual v. O'Shea, petitioners who were U.S. citizens adopted children in Hawaii under state law while the children resided in the Philippines and sought to classify them as immediate relatives for immigration purposes under 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b) and 1101(b)(1)(E). The INS District Director and Board of Immigration Appeals denied the petitions, ruling that the Hawaii family court lacked jurisdiction over the children and that the two-year residency requirement was not satisfied. The district court held that Hawaii Revised Statutes § 578-1 conferred jurisdiction based on the adoptive parents' residence in the state, making the adoptions valid, and that the federal statute's requirements were met because the children were under 14 at adoption and had the requisite two years of legal custody and residence (with pre-adoption residence permitted under the BIA's interpretation). The court therefore reversed the administrative decisions and ordered approval of the petitions. The case primarily involves immigration and family law issues with questions of federal statutory interpretation.

immigrationfamily lawfederal power

In Batey v. Digirolamo, plaintiffs filed a complaint alleging fraud and securities law violations in the sale of real estate limited partnership interests and recorded a lis pendens on the defendants' Honolulu property under Hawaii Rev. Stat. § 634-51. Defendants moved to set aside the lis pendens, arguing that the statute violated due process under the U.S. and Hawaii Constitutions by allowing the filing without prior notice or a hearing, thereby clouding title and impairing the property's marketability. The court denied the motion, holding that the lis pendens did not constitute a seizure or significant deprivation of property rights comparable to the prejudgment remedies invalidated in cases like Sniadach and Fuentes. It reasoned that any harm was speculative, defendants retained full use of the property, and the statute advanced legitimate state interests in maintaining an orderly system for recording real property transactions and preventing multiplicity of litigation involving bona fide purchasers.

propertyprocedurecivil rights

The case involved plaintiffs who purchased an automobile on credit from Aloha Motors, Inc. under a standard-form Retail Installment Contract, which was assigned to First Hawaiian Bank; they alleged that the required Truth in Lending Act disclosures were inadequate and sought to represent a class of 786 similarly situated Hawaii consumers who received the same form. The court granted the motion for class certification under Fed. R. Civ. P. 23. It held that the 1974 amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 1640(a) expressly authorized class actions and capped damages, satisfying the numerosity, commonality, typicality, and adequacy prerequisites as well as the predominance and superiority requirements of Rule 23(b)(3). The decision emphasized that the statutory changes eliminated prior concerns about excessive liability while advancing the Act’s goal of uniform enforcement through collective litigation.

business & regulatoryprocedure

In this antitrust case, plaintiff Wisdom Rubber Industries sued defendant Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, alleging that the cancellation of Wisdom's non-exclusive distributorship for certain irrigation pipes in Hawaii and the grant of an exclusive distributorship to another company violated federal and state antitrust laws by restraining trade and attempting to monopolize the market. The court granted summary judgment to the defendant, finding no evidence of any conspiracy or agreement to restrain trade. The court reasoned that the mere termination of a distributorship does not violate antitrust laws, that alternative sources of the pipes were available from other manufacturers, and that the pipes at issue were not relevant to the specific market in which monopolization was claimed. The court also dismissed the state law claims for the same reasons and noted that section 3 of the Sherman Act did not apply.

business & regulatory

The case involved the Secretary of Labor suing Hawaiian Telephone Co. on behalf of eight employees whose jobs ended at age 60 under the company's retirement plan, alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act's prohibition on age-based discharge. The court granted summary judgment to the company, holding that the plan qualified for the statutory exception in § 4(f)(2) of the ADEA. The plan, adopted in 1931 and never amended in its retirement provisions, was found to be a bona fide employee benefit plan that paid substantial retirement benefits to the affected workers. The court reasoned that the term "subterfuge" in the exception should be read to protect plans only when they do not serve as a means to terminate employees without providing adequate benefits, and because sufficient payments had been made here, the involuntary retirements were exempt from the Act's coverage.

labor & employmentcivil rights

In Davis v. United States, trustees of the James Campbell estate sought a tax refund after the IRS denied nonrecognition of gain under IRC § 1033 on proceeds from state condemnations of agricultural land and a fishery, which the plaintiffs had reinvested in permanent improvements (such as drainage, water systems, and roads) to their existing industrial park property. The court held that the expenditures qualified as a "purchase" and that the improvements constituted real property of "like kind" to the converted property under § 1033(g), entitling the plaintiffs to deferral of the gain, while rejecting qualification under the stricter "similar or related in service or use" standard of § 1033(a)(3)(A) because the agricultural and industrial uses were not of the same general class. The decision rested on the statute's purpose of allowing continuation of the taxpayer's prior capital commitment through like-kind real property replacements, drawing on legislative history, regulations defining "like kind," and precedents such as Filippini v. United States.

taxespropertybusiness & regulatory

In Mizuguchi v. Molokai Electric Co., the plaintiff alleged that his employer coerced him into signing a retirement agreement in violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq., after filing a state complaint that was referred to federal authorities. The defendant moved to dismiss, arguing that the federal suit was filed too soon after the notice of intent to sue and that the notice itself was untimely under ADEA timing rules tied to state proceedings. The court held that the complaint was premature because it was filed only 21 days after notice, violating the statutory 60-day waiting period, and therefore dismissed it without prejudice to refiling after the period elapsed. It further analyzed the notice timing under 29 U.S.C. § 626(d)(2), noting that because state proceedings had not terminated, the 300-day period from the alleged violation applied rather than the 30-day alternative.

labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure

The case involved plaintiffs Steven and Donna Sneed suing Beneficial Finance Company of Hawaii for alleged violations of the Truth in Lending Act in the disclosure statement for a refinanced loan secured by furniture and possibly other items. The court granted summary judgment to the plaintiffs after finding multiple deficiencies in the statement, including inadequate description of the security interest, unclear identification of the property and borrowers, and related disclosure issues. The core reasoning emphasized that the Act mandates clear, understandable disclosures to allow informed credit decisions by ordinary consumers, and that any single violation triggers liability under the statute.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned a borrower's claim under the Truth-in-Lending Act that the lender failed to disclose in its statement the contractual right to accelerate the full loan balance upon default, even though the right appeared in the promissory note. The court had previously granted summary judgment for the lender and reconsidered only this disclosure issue. It concluded that the acceleration right is a significant credit term whose disclosure is required by the policy of the Act and implicitly by Regulation Z section 226.8(b)(4) on default charges, consistent with the majority of other courts' interpretations. Nevertheless, the court declined to impose civil liability because the requirement was not explicitly stated in the regulation, the lender's narrower reading of the term "charges" was reasonable in light of state law requiring rebate of unearned interest, and the lender had substantially complied.

business & regulatoryprocedure

The case concerned insurance agents who sued an electrical contractors' association, a union, and insurance companies, alleging that amendments to their collective bargaining agreement requiring all signatories to participate in a specific workers' compensation insurance plan amounted to a conspiracy violating Sherman Act §1 and that the agreement itself was prohibited by NLRA §8(e). After extensive discovery, the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. The court determined there were no disputed material facts and that the case was ready for decision on the motions. It examined whether the agreement involved unlawful secondary activity under federal labor law and related antitrust claims, applying precedents distinguishing primary from secondary conduct.

labor & employmentbusiness & regulatory