In Markham v. Jaudon, a customer sued his stockbrokers for selling shares purchased on margin without prior notice of the time and place of sale, alleging the sale constituted a tortious conversion of his property. The court determined that the transaction created a pledgor-pledgee relationship, with the brokers holding the stock as security for their advances, and that the sale without notice entitled the plaintiff to recover damages measured by the stock's highest value after the sale. Core reasoning focused on the contract terms as described by the plaintiff, under which the brokers were to carry the stock until the customer chose to sell, treating any deviation via unnotified sale as a breach without reference to industry custom or the customer's duty to maintain margins. The majority reversed an order for a new trial and entered judgment for the plaintiff on the verdict.
The case concerned whether the holder of promissory notes that were made for accommodation without consideration and transferred after maturity could enforce them against the indorser. The court reversed the lower court's judgment in favor of the plaintiff holder. It held that an overdue note is taken subject to all defenses inherent in the instrument itself, including want of consideration, because the transfer after dishonor places the holder on notice and strips away the protections of negotiability under the law merchant. The core reasoning was that the general rule governing dishonored commercial paper applies without exception for accommodation notes, as confirmed by U.S. Supreme Court precedents, and that any implied authority to negotiate does not extend to transfers after due date.
The case involved a claim by the plaintiff against the defendant for a balance of unpaid wages allegedly owed to the plaintiff's deceased relative for performing work as a surveyor and draughtsman in England under an oral contract. The lower court (referee) excluded the defendant's evidence of payments made on the account and later struck out the defendant's testimony about dealings with the deceased. The appellate court reversed the judgment, reasoning that suing for a balance invited inquiry into the full amount of indebtedness and reductions by payments, and that testimony received without objection at the time could not be stricken later after the adverse party had an opportunity to assess its impact.
The case involved a loan of money made in New York by the defendant's intestate to Mrs. Baker (later Mrs. McCraney), secured by her bond and a mortgage on land in Wisconsin, with interest charged above New York's legal rate of seven percent. The court held that the transaction was a New York contract governed by New York usury laws, rendering the bond and mortgage void, despite the mortgage's location in Wisconsin where higher interest rates were permitted. The core reasoning was that the loan originated and was to be repaid in New York without any requirement to use the funds in Wisconsin, so the parties could not evade local usury rules merely by referencing another state's laws or using out-of-state collateral; a subsequent mortgage did not alter this invalidity. The judgment was affirmed.
This case involved an appeal from a rape conviction where the defendant challenged the admission of the victim's out-of-court statements to her mother, made more than three weeks after the alleged incident, as well as the sufficiency of corroboration for the victim's testimony. The court held that while the fact of a recent complaint by the victim can be admitted as corroborative evidence in rape prosecutions under a narrow hearsay exception, the mother's testimony was improperly received because it included detailed particulars of the complaint, references to threats, and statements not made promptly after the events. The opinion reviewed treatises and precedents limiting such evidence to a simple confirmation of complaint on direct examination, without details or use as substantive proof, and concluded that the error required reversal of the judgment and a new trial. The court noted that the complaint's timing and circumstances further undermined its admissibility as corroboration.
This case involved a dispute over the sale of cheese in which the buyer alleged defects and claimed breach of an express warranty by the seller. The court affirmed the judgment for the plaintiff, ruling that acceptance of the goods did not bar recovery or require their return when an express warranty was present, unlike in cases of executory contracts for merchantable quality without such a warranty. The jury had found a warranty based on the parties' intent and understanding, supported by evidence distinguishing it from mere sales puffery. Evidentiary objections, including to expert opinions on storage conditions and to the admission of depositions with minor formal irregularities, were rejected as not warranting reversal.
