The case involved W. J. Massee, who was arrested in South Carolina pursuant to a warrant issued by Governor Blease at the request of Tennessee Governor Hooper for extradition on charges of making threats and using duress. After a habeas corpus hearing, Circuit Judge Sease discharged Massee, ruling that the requisition was irregular on its face for lacking a required copy of the indictment and was unauthorized by the Tennessee governor. The South Carolina Supreme Court reversed, holding that the requisition papers complied with the federal extradition statute and were not subject to the collateral attacks made below. It further held that Massee was required to appear in person for the habeas corpus proceedings and could not waive his presence or proceed via bond after failing to appear, resulting in remand to custody for surrender to Tennessee authorities unless the requisition was officially revoked.
The case concerned a dispute over the office of supervisor of registration in Anderson County, with plaintiff Lindsey claiming that defendant Tollison was unlawfully holding the position and seeking a court order to remove him and install Lindsey. The court dismissed the petition without prejudice, holding that the proceeding could not proceed because it had not been properly initiated under the Code of Procedure. The statutes had abolished the writ of quo warranto and required such claims to be brought as civil actions commenced by service of a summons allowing the defendant twenty days to answer. The order to show cause issued here required an answer in less than twenty days, creating a fatal jurisdictional defect that prevented the court from exercising authority over the matter.
This case involves a dispute over whether life insurance policies, in which the insured retained the power to change the beneficiary, became part of the bankruptcy estate or remained exempt from creditors. The dissenting opinion concludes that the power to change the beneficiary qualified as property under general legal principles and the Bankruptcy Act, causing it to pass to the trustee. The dissent further reasons that any state-law exemption for policies payable to a spouse was constrained by constitutional limits on total exemptions and did not apply here. Because the policies had no cash surrender value at the time of adjudication, the bankrupt could not retain them by paying that value under the Act's provisions.
The case involved a South Carolina landowner who hired a farm worker, allowed him to plant seven acres as part of wages, and provided cash advances totaling about $97 without recording any lien. The worker sold two bales of cotton grown on the land to the defendant company, which held a prior recorded chattel mortgage on the crops and had advanced funds to the worker. The landowner sued in claim and delivery to recover the cotton or its value based on an alleged lien for advances. The magistrate ruled for the defendant, but the circuit court reversed; on appeal, the court held that the landowner had no rent lien because the land use was wages and that any unrecorded advance lien could not prevail over the defendant's indexed mortgage absent actual notice, as required by the 1912 Civil Code. The judgment of the circuit court was reversed.
The case concerned an action for specific performance of a contract to sell land, in which the defendant contended that the plaintiff held only a life estate under the deed from Belle M. Goethe and thus could not convey marketable title. The deed conveyed the property to F. W. Browning for his natural life, then to his heirs living at his death in fee, with language purporting to shield it from his debts. The court held that this language created a fee simple estate in F. W. Browning, relying on prior South Carolina decisions such as Davenport v. Eskew, Clinkscales v. Clinkscales, and Egan v. Touchberry that had interpreted comparable provisions the same way. The Circuit Court's ruling in favor of the plaintiff was therefore affirmed.
The case involved a dispute over voter eligibility in a special municipal election scheduled for June 3, 1913, in Columbia and Shandon, specifically whether electors registered under the general municipal registration process could vote or if they were required to register separately under the special election provisions. The court decided that qualified electors could vote using the general registration. The core reasoning was that section 220 of the 1912 Code grants the right to vote in all municipal elections to those registered as required, while the special registration in section 221 was intended only to supplement the general process for those not previously registered, without any clear statutory language excluding general registrants from special elections. The court also found that the certificate form in section 225 did not alter this broader statutory purpose.