This case concerned a minor child's lawsuit against American Airlines for loss of consortium damages stemming from her father's injuries in the 1999 crash of Flight 1420 in Little Rock, Arkansas. The suit was originally filed in Texas state court, removed to federal court there on diversity grounds, and transferred to the Eastern District of Arkansas as part of multidistrict litigation involving the crash. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand and granted the airline's motion for summary judgment. It held that the claim was derivative and could only proceed in the Arkansas forum where the father's injury suit was pending, and that neither Colorado (the family's home state) nor Arkansas law recognizes a child's right to recover for loss of parental consortium.
This case arose from a daughter's claim for loss of consortium against American Airlines after her father was injured in the 1999 plane crash at Little Rock, Arkansas; the suit was filed in Texas state court, removed to federal court there on diversity grounds, and transferred to the Eastern District of Arkansas as part of multidistrict litigation. The court denied the plaintiff's motion to remand, holding that loss of consortium is a derivative claim that must be brought where the parent's underlying injury action is pending. Because neither Colorado (the family's residence) nor Arkansas recognizes a child's cause of action for loss of consortium, the court granted the airline's motion for summary judgment and dismissed the case.
The case concerned a dispute over a $500,000 life insurance policy on John Rauch, president of Lineo Construction, which Pioneer Nursing had arranged and to which the policy was assigned after issuance; Pioneer sought to recover after Rauch's death while Lineo owed it funds for completing a HUD-financed nursing home project. The court granted Pioneer's motion for summary judgment and denied the insurer's cross-motion, holding that the policy was valid. Under Arkansas statutes and precedent, Pioneer possessed a lawful and substantial economic interest in Rauch's continued life because he was essential to Lineo's performance on the construction contract and to satisfying any judgment in Pioneer's pending suit against Lineo, so the arrangement was not an illegal wagering contract.
The case involved a passenger, Anna Lloyd, suing American Airlines for damages after sustaining physical and psychological injuries, including PTSD and major depression, in the June 1, 1999 crash of Flight 1420. Following a jury verdict awarding the plaintiff $6,500,000, the court denied the defendant's motion for judgment as a matter of law on the PTSD damages claim. The court held that the plaintiff's physical injuries, such as a puncture wound, knee damage, and smoke inhalation, satisfied the bodily injury requirement under the Warsaw Convention and allowed recovery for accompanying mental harms. It further concluded that PTSD qualifies as a physical injury because it causes biological changes in brain function, and the crash events proximately caused the plaintiff's conditions.
In this case, plaintiff Kristin Maddox sued defendant American Airlines under the Warsaw Convention for personal injury damages and obtained a jury verdict resulting in a judgment of $11,015,000 plus post-judgment interest. Both parties filed motions to amend the judgment: Maddox sought prejudgment interest under Oklahoma law and a higher post-judgment interest rate, while American sought a credit for a prior special drawing rights (SDR) payment made pursuant to the treaty. The court granted American's request for the SDR credit of $134,453 plus interest, reducing the judgment to $10,876,495.07, but denied Maddox's requests. It reasoned that federal law under 28 U.S.C. § 1961 governs post-judgment interest even in diversity cases, and that the Oklahoma prejudgment interest statute is procedural rather than substantive, so Arkansas choice-of-law rules did not require its application in this Warsaw Convention case governed by Oklahoma substantive law.
This case arose from a fatal car accident in which plaintiff Pamela Lung's vehicle collided with a tractor-trailer driven by Peter Estes, who failed to stop at a stop sign; the truck was owned by third parties but leased to defendant Manning Services, Inc., a motor carrier, and bore Manning's logo and DOT number at the time. The plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment on whether Estes's negligence could be imputed to Manning on an agency theory. The court granted the motion, holding that Estes was Manning's agent as a matter of law. The decision rested on federal DOT leasing regulations requiring the carrier lessee to assume complete responsibility for leased equipment and on Eighth Circuit precedent imposing liability on the motor carrier whose logo appears on a vehicle involved in an accident, regardless of whether Estes qualified as an employee for every other purpose.
