District Court, N.D. Ohio — appointed by Lyndon B. Johnson
Bombrys v. City of Toledo
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1993-06-04 · cited 20×
In Bombrys v. City of Toledo, the plaintiff, an insulin-dependent diabetic, sued after being automatically disqualified from a police officer training program solely due to his condition, alleging violations of the Rehabilitation Act, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and Ohio civil rights law. The court found that the City's blanket exclusion policy was unlawful, as it failed to consider individual medical evidence showing the plaintiff's diabetes was well-controlled and did not pose an inherent safety risk, drawing comparisons to other manageable conditions like epilepsy or asthma that did not bar employment. It ruled that the policy violated federal disability statutes, the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause, and state law, granting a permanent injunction against the blanket disqualification while allowing the plaintiff to proceed with his claims. The decision emphasized the need for individualized assessments rather than categorical bans based on disability.
civil rightslabor & employmenthealthcare
Resolution Trust Corp. v. Fountain Circle Associates Ltd. Partnership
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1992-05-23 · cited 8×
This case involves the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC), acting as receiver for a failed savings association, seeking to foreclose on mortgages securing over $3 million in loans on an apartment complex in Ohio and requesting the appointment of a federal equity receiver to manage the property and collect rents during the foreclosure proceedings. The court granted the motion, appointing a receiver under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 66. The core reasoning was that federal law governs the appointment, which is warranted when the mortgaged property is inadequate security for the debt and the mortgagor is in doubtful financial standing, as evidenced here by the property's appraised value being significantly less than the debt owed and indications of the defendants' financial difficulties and delays in the litigation.
propertyprocedurefederal power
United States v. Hebeka
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1992-05-19 · cited 2×
The case involved defendant Michael K. Hebeka, who was convicted by a jury on three counts of food stamp fraud under 7 U.S.C. § 2024(c) and making false claims to the USDA under 18 U.S.C. § 287 for redeeming millions of dollars in food stamps through a retail store over a period from 1985 to 1991. At sentencing, the court considered Hebeka's objections to the presentence report's application of the federal sentencing guidelines, which recommended a range of 108-135 months based on enhancements for loss amount, planning, obstruction, and role in the offense. The court ruled that the guidelines are inapplicable and that sentencing must proceed under the pre-guidelines statutes, which carry a maximum of five years per count. The core reasoning was that the charged offenses are not continuing in nature under the explicit statutory language, distinguishing this from cases involving post-guideline crimes where pre-guideline conduct may be considered, and noting potential ex post facto concerns with applying higher guideline ranges.
criminal lawprocedure
Sanders v. McMackin
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1992-03-30 · cited 8×
In Sanders v. McMackin, a state prisoner filed a pro se habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 challenging his Ohio convictions for aggravated robbery, including a firearm specification that added three years to his sentence. The court granted the writ in part, vacating only the firearm specification conviction and the related sentence, while denying relief on the other grounds. The core reasoning was that Ohio law, as interpreted in State v. Gaines and modified by State v. Murphy, requires the prosecution to present some evidence of the firearm's operability at the time of the offense, either direct or circumstantial, and the record here contained only a description of the gun's appearance with no testimony about its functionality, shots fired, or threats implying operability.
criminal lawprocedureguns
Brown v. Winkle
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1989-06-21
In Brown v. Winkle, plaintiffs sought a permanent injunction barring the use of urinalysis drug screening as a condition for selecting firefighter trainees, arguing that the practice violated applicants' Fourth Amendment privacy rights and had not been validated under EEOC Uniform Employee Selection Guidelines. The defendants moved for summary judgment, citing the Supreme Court's ruling in National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab that governmental interests in public safety can outweigh privacy concerns for certain positions. The court granted the defendants' motion and denied the injunction, reasoning that firefighters' duties uniquely require unimpaired judgment and dexterity where any impairment endangers lives, that a U.S. Postal Service study established the job-relatedness of drug screening, and that Von Raab had superseded earlier contrary Sixth Circuit precedents. The court further held that the EEOC guidelines serve only as a means to ensure fairness and do not prevent the screening requirement in this context.
civil rightslabor & employment
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co.
District Court, N.D. Ohio · 1985-06-28 · cited 4×
This case arose when the EEOC sued A&P after the company closed five warehouses and, under collective bargaining agreements, denied severance pay to 89 employees over age 55 who were eligible for early retirement pensions, alleging a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. The court first resolved a statute-of-limitations dispute, holding that the three-year period applied because A&P's denial of severance benefits was deliberate and intentional, or at least in careless disregard of the ADEA. It noted that the ADEA prohibits age-based discrimination in compensation and benefits but provides an exception for observing the terms of a bona fide employee benefit plan such as a pension, which the parties stipulated was not a subterfuge. The opinion serves as findings of fact and conclusions of law after trial on stipulated facts and testimony.
labor & employmentcivil rightsprocedure