In Smith v. Astrue, the plaintiff challenged the Social Security Commissioner's denial of disability insurance and supplemental security income benefits under the Act, asserting that her syncope (unexplained fainting spells), back pain, and other conditions rendered her unable to work. The court reviewed the administrative decision under the substantial evidence standard and found that the Commissioner had not fully developed the record concerning the true extent of the plaintiff's syncope. In particular, the residual functional capacity assessment and initial hypothetical questions to the vocational expert failed to incorporate the full severity of her episodes, which involved sudden unconsciousness and risks such as head injuries, despite medical evidence and testimony indicating greater limitations than those considered. The court therefore reversed the final decision and remanded the case for additional proceedings to properly evaluate the impairment and pose revised hypothetical questions.
The case involved three consolidated lawsuits concerning the validity of restrictive clauses in uninsured motorist insurance policies issued in Arkansas after the state's 1965 Uninsured Motorist Act took effect. The policies either excluded government-owned vehicles from the definition of uninsured automobiles or allowed insurers to deduct workers' compensation benefits from policy limits. The court held these clauses invalid, ruling that they conflicted with the statute's requirement for minimum coverage limits of $10,000 per person and $20,000 per accident for persons legally entitled to recover from uninsured motorists. The reasoning centered on the principle that statutory mandates control over conflicting policy terms, as the legislature intended to provide effective, undiminished protection equivalent to that available from an insured tortfeasor.
The case involved a habeas corpus petition by Robert Winters, who had been convicted in municipal court of a misdemeanor under a city ordinance for immorality, sentenced to 30 days in jail plus a $254 fine (with additional jail time substituted for nonpayment under state law), and not informed of or provided counsel despite being indigent. Winters argued that his conviction violated the right to counsel, equal protection due to his inability to pay the fine, and due process because the ordinance was vague. The court held that the conviction and sentence were constitutionally invalid, primarily because the combined penalties constituted a serious offense requiring that Winters be advised of his right to counsel, and it granted the city time to retry him before issuing the writ. The court reasoned that while substituting jail time for an unpaid fine is not unconstitutional per se, the lack of counsel notification in this context rendered the judgment void, and it addressed but rejected the petitioner's broader custody and equal protection claims.
This case involves a Chapter XIII bankruptcy proceeding where debtor Gerald W. Rutledge sought to extend time to pay debts, including payments on a car loan secured by Worthen Bank. The bankruptcy referee approved the debtor's amended plan over the bank's objection, which proposed paying the full contract amount but bringing delinquent payments current within a reasonable time. The district court reviewed the decision and held that the plan "dealt with" the secured creditor by extending the time for payments, requiring the creditor's acceptance for confirmation under the Bankruptcy Act. The court remanded the case for the plan to be amended to exclude the bank or to meet specific conditions for maintaining an injunction against repossession, such as setting a definite time for curing delinquencies.
The case involved an employee who was injured at his workplace and sued the employer's workers' compensation insurance carrier, alleging negligence for failing to inspect the plant and recommend safety measures around hazardous equipment, based on premium rate data the carrier had filed with the state insurance commissioner. The court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. The core reasoning was that the Arkansas Workmen's Compensation Act equates the insurance carrier with the employer for purposes of liability and immunity, so the carrier could not be sued as a third-party tortfeasor, and the carrier had neither contractually agreed to nor actually performed any safety inspection services.
The case involves an Arkansas plaintiff injured in 1964 by a defective swivel manufactured by a Washington corporation and shipped to Arkansas for use by the plaintiff's employer on a construction project. The defendant had no other contacts with Arkansas, and service was attempted under the state's long-arm statute based on transacting business or contracting to supply goods in the state. The court quashed service, holding that the statute's specific provision governing out-of-state acts causing in-state injury controls over more general provisions and requires regular business, persistent conduct, or substantial revenue from Arkansas, none of which occurred in this single isolated transaction. The court did not reach the constitutional due process question.